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Directed by: Dr. Gail Hennis. Pp. 244. 
The central question of this inquiry is: What happens 
when people join in a game? The methodology used throughout 
the study is based upon hermeneutical inquiry. Textual in­
terpretation of the two primary foci of the study, namely, 
the game and the human condition, is used to reveal sig­
nificant standpoints for consideration. The two major 
points of interest are interpreted, at first separately; 
then an effort is made to join various ideas into a paradigm 
for the human condition of the game. 
Understanding the game is approached through history, 
descriptions, and metaphors. The human condition is exam­
ined through the written works of Hannah Arendt, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Michael Polanyi and Elizabeth Sewell. Dis­
closures about game and the human condition are made in 
light of some problematic concerns from the history of ideas 
in Western civilization, such as the relations between mind 
and body, action and contemplation, and work and play. 
The claim of uniqueness is given to the game because 
1) the quality of agon or contest is inherent in its struc­
ture, 2) the game produces nothing material, and 3) skilled 
performance in the presence of others, both players and 
spectators, allows players a way to distinguish themselves 
through action. The structure, made by and taken up by 
persons, connects players to past performances, provides for 
outstanding deeds to be performed during play, and preserves 
the structure for others and their actions of the future. 
The game as a cultural activity has a durability because of 
its immaterial result and because of its passage onwards 
from one generation of players to another. The conditions 
of the game, which provide a space wherein people can ap­
pear in distinctly human fashion, are those of action, per­
formance, skills, boundaries, personal knowing, unpredict­
ability, contest, intentionality, perception, embodiment, 
and communication with objects and other people. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study issues from the discipline of physical edu­
cation. The area of the "game" is located within the dis­
cipline as an integral part of its activity base. When 
human beings enter the structure of "game" through perfor­
mance, multiple interpretations and meanings arise. The 
concern of this study will be to explore what kinds of 
understandings of the game emerge when it is seen through 
the perspective of persons in action. 
In order to reveal some of these meanings in a coherent 
fashion, game must disclose itself as the phenomenon that it 
is, and persons must be spoken of as the beings that they 
are. Should these things happen during the course of this 
inquiry, then the game, which beckons actors and spectators 
to inform its structure, can be seen as a space appropriate 
for human appearance. The concept of "human appearance" 
then becomes an important one in this inquiry. It is a con­
cern with space which is appropriate for public display that 
commands a central position within this discussion. 
Therefore, the title of the inquiry, "The Human Con­
dition of the Game," suggests the two main foci of the 
study. The two important words are game and human. The 
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structure of the boundaried space of game and the realm of 
human affairs will be looked at separately, and then a join­
ing of the two primary areas will be undertaken in order to 
see if a claim can be made for the game providing a space 
of appearance where people can appear in their human con­
dition. From the various standpoints which will be estab­
lished, one question becomes critical. Simply put, what 
happens when people join in a game? When the form of game 
and the intentional activities of human beings are combined 
to become one whole endeavor, what is revealed? And how 
does what is revealed increase our understanding of both 
game and human action? 
In order to discuss these matters, standpoints will 
have to be established throughout the study to help guide it 
toward order and coherence. Networks of relationships among 
words, events, people, and ideas will have to be woven. 
Since this study is not primarily a definitional effort, its 
claims invite careful discerning and judging and rest on a 
kind of phenomenological methodology which suggests that 
both descriptions and important distinctions be made through­
out the course of the inquiry. 
The game will be explored through concepts offered by 
Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois primarily; the human con­
dition will be examined by drawing on the thoughts of 
Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, Elizabeth Sewell, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in that order. Other texts have been 
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utilized to support the ideas and relationships of these 
primary authors. "The road that walks," as Heidegger once 
referred to the process of discovery, is a brief and some­
what enigmatic phrase that appropriately describes the 
method that was used during the collecting of the data and 
the writing of the work. A discussion of such a method as 
it applies to this kind of a study is an important one. At 
the outset, some key words, texts, and concepts were iden­
tified, yet the precise movement of the inquiry remained 
largely unknown. It has been a process of following barely 
discernible clues which played the crucial role in a subse­
quent establishment of arrival, connecting, and departure 
points. This process is an important one to attempt to 
understand, and, as such, an effort will be made to describe 
the methodological approach which this study took, even as 
the method itself is in the process of disclosing other 
meanings. 
But, in order to lay a bit more ground for the inquiry, 
it is important to suggest why the game is the crucial 
structure on which this study hinges. The game is a cul­
tural form made up by persons and entered into by persons. 
Games have been transmitted from age to age and region to 
region throughout both Eastern and Western civilizations. 
Games and their legacies have provided fecund ground for the 
work of artists, poets, historians, novelists, scientists, 
and philosophers. Generated from the earliest of Olympic 
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encounters and continuing to the most contemporary of games, 
the structures and instruments which people choose to take 
up through games also inform their lives with meaning. 
These activities, at once playful and serious, provide a 
direct linkage to the traditions and people of the past. 
They provide a space for common public appearance in the 
present; and, so long as we continue to engage in them, they 
insure that similar events will exist in the future in which 
as yet unknown performances can occur. 
While many are involved in the conduct of games, the 
physical education teacher often provides a significant 
share of the understandings which emerge during the course 
of their play. And it is to those who teach physical educa­
tion and also to those who are involved in the game setting 
that this study is addressed. What makes the area of game 
problematic for such people is that games are buffeted by 
and brush incessantly against many different kinds of forces. 
For example, two such powerful forces are reflected in the 
words 'play' and 'sport." When these forces clash or exist 
in unresolved tension, a blurring of the rightful shape of 
game occurs and it becomes very difficult to tease out the 
distinctions that are appropriate to understanding games. 
Difficult as it may be though, when these distinctions are 
established, something unique can be discerned about game 
which makes the space of game an ennobling one for human 
beings to enter. For it is this structural and rule-guided 
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space of contest which can provide a setting for grasping 
the larger significance of the human condition. It is this 
agonal space, one which is orderly yet paradoxical, often­
times unpredictable and unproductive, which can nonetheless 
allow for heroic deeds to be performed among a common 
people. An uncovering or recovering of game, a lifting of 
the weight of other pressures from its distinct shape, will 
have to be undertaken during this study in order to move us 
toward understanding both the mystery and manner of its form 
and of the people who take it up. 
This researched paradigm or image of game viewed 
through the prism of human activity, contains the implica­
tions of this work. The model will bear inevitably the 
marks of philosophical inquiry. The model may in the end 
raise more questions than it provides answers, but this 
would not be inconsistent with the declared methodology of 
this treatise. It is intended to be one perspective among 
many which inform this study and against which this study 
will be judged. To both the credit and sometimes discredit 
of the game, many interpretations have been and will con­
tinue to be generated. And while the certainty of its on­
going rich yield seems assured, what makes for a further 
problem is often just this richness. One cannot finally 
retreat to a position of utter relativity when theorizing 
or conceptualizing about the game. Rather, at some point a 
commitment must be made to uncover what is there, to see 
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what is given, and to scrape away layers of possible mis­
representation . 
The data, then, will emerge from meanings of words, 
written texts, myths, and from people and events from the 
past. The discourse will be one which circles, spirals, 
somersaults, and lines out. Not all the ideas will be fully 
connected; some go so far and no further. But all have 
relation to understanding the human condition of the game. 
All are moving toward answering the basic questions of this 
study: What happens when the game comes alive, when people 
are called to appear as performers among others? What 
happens in a game when human beings are pulled upward on 
their own slope of discovery to tell more than they know 
through their movement, to become more than they are by 
their deeds? 
7 
CHAPTER II 
ON METHOD 
In General 
Now, of all acts the most complete is that of con­
structing. A work demands love, meditation, 
obedience to your finest thought, the invention of 
laws by your soul, and many other things that it 
draws miraculously from your own self, which did not 
suspect that it possessed them. This work proceeds 
from the most intimate center of your existence, and 
yet it is distinct from yourself.1 
The scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi echoes the 
sentiments of the poet Paul Valery when he says, in a 
similar vein, "Heuristic passion seeks no personal posses­
sion. It sets out not to conquer, but to enrich the 
2 world. 11 Somewhere within these thoughts lies a concept of 
method which guided this study. It was and continues to be 
a way of discovery which emphasizes a world of "est and 
non," an active tension between to be and not to be. The 
recurrent image of "est and non" seems appropriate for this 
study as it was portrayed by Muriel Rukeyser in her bio­
graphical look at the voyager - explorer of the seventeenth 
century, Thomas Hariot. Hariot's life was constituted by 
making connections between his deeds and his thoughts. His 
world was not one of either-or, and in the words of his 
biographer Rukeyser, it was described this way: 
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Traces of a lifetime . . . the opening of the world 
to word and deed, the ways in which the poetry, the 
science, all exploration, a personal relation to the 
unknown, are claimed and lived. The place where the 
country of Est and the country of Non Est are seen to 
meet and be alive, as a door to a continually opening 
new world.3 
The concept of method about which we will speak is akin 
to Hariot's work of putting together a set of relationships 
based upon an active exploration of the world of his con­
cerns. It is a process of discovery which goes forward and 
backward, up and down, over and around again, at all times 
seeking ways of making connections. It is a world where the 
vita activa and the vita contemplativa are seen to be part­
ners in discovery and not separated because of the nature 
of the work. Being on full alert and yet quiet enough to 
hear the signals, watching and waiting, feverishly reading 
and then sewing together relationships are all important 
parts of this method. The poet Elizabeth Sewell describes 
it as "a continual, profound and lonely struggle . . . mov­
ing from native disorder toward a creative order, out of 
4 which grow the human self and our own lives and thoughts." 
She suggests that discovery relies on an incessant hunt for 
clues through a groping forward, image by image, toward 
prophecy, vision^and questions. All this, she claims, is 
partly method, partly philosophy, and partly education. The 
movement is one of constant unmaking and remaking. Sewell 
says: 
9 
Great men do not create systems they regard as final. 
They have enough of the poet in them to be ready al­
ways to call everything back into play again, never 
to sit down before the system they have made and say 
'Here is an end of the matter.'5 
By way of agreement, the scientist Michael Polanyi also 
speaks about the process of exploration: "We feel the slope 
toward deeper insight as we feel the direction in which a 
heavy weight is pulled along a steep incline. It is this 
dynamic intuition which guides the pursuit of discovery. 
This way of pursuing something aptly describes an approach 
toward method in that it seeks to make sets of relationships 
out of clues which lead an investigator toward a reality 
upon which they bear. By contrast, in modern modes of 
inquiry there is an almost exclusive reliance on deducing, 
analyzing, pre-ordering, defining, or categorizing. Bernard 
Boelen states that "The actual beginning of any method is 
non-methodical, and is like any beginning, an unforeseeable, 
original and creative moment in the spontaneity of our im-
7 mediately lived experience." 
This vision of a hidden reality guides a researcher but 
has an essentially indeterminate character at the outset. 
For the writer Flannery O'Connor, the process of discovery 
involves descending far enough into oneself to reach the 
underground springs that will give life to the work. She 
describes the descent as one "through the darkness of the 
familiar into a world where, like the blind man cured in the 
gospels, he sees men as if they were trees but walking. 
8 This is the beginning of vision." 
Hannah Arendt speaks of her teacher Martin Heidegger 
as one who laid down pathways and trail marks which were al-
9 ways conducive to opening up new dimensions of thought. 
She characterizes Heidegger as a passionate thinker, who 
never thought 'about' something, rather, he thought some­
thing. Heidegger himself calls this a 'releasement toward 
things,1 an openness to the mystery of them. He contrasts 
this kind of passionate, wonder-filled contemplation with 
calculative thinking. "Calculative thinking races from one 
prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, 
never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not think­
ing which contemplates the meaning which reigns in every­
thing that is.""'"^ 
Meaning is crucial to the discovery process. The 
recognition of meaning does not indicate naive intuitionism. 
Rather, the arduous task of interpretation is one which at­
tempts to uncover what lies concealed beneath the familiar. 
No longer merely to take for granted the experiences of 
everyday life is to begin to marvel at their capacity for 
yielding the unusual and the extraordinary. But, as Boelen 
says, these interpretations cannot be based on sheer inspi­
ration. He suggests that the process "involves all our 
potentialities, such as: sensitivity, technical skills, 
hard work, discipline, laborious research, profound concen­
tration, intersubjective dialogues, love, humility, respect, 
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11 asceticism and wonder." As the brilliant poet Rainer 
Rilke says in describing his own exhausting and difficult 
times with writing: 
For the sake of a single verse, one must see many 
cities, men and things, one must know the animals, 
one must feel how the birds fly and know the gesture 
with which the little flowers open in the morning. 
. . . And yet it is not the memories themselves. 
Not till they have turned to blood within us, to 
glance and gesture, nameless and no longer to be 
distinguished from our selves - not till then can it 
happen that in a most rare hour the first word of a 
verse arises in their midst and goes forth from 
them.12 
This act of incorporating or embodying phenomena is 
called "indwelling" by both Polanyi and Heidegger. Sewell 
describes it as 'two becoming one.' She says: 
This union of the self and the object it is contem­
plating may seem strange at first sight. ... By 
an ever increasing number of transformations during 
which, however, identifying is never wholly lost, the 
self will be made one with whatever it is in contact 
with, provided only that it allows the imagination 
to operate. ... Do not misunderstand this; it is 
not an invitation to an infantile and dilettante 
game of whimsical make-believe. It is an invitation 
to the universe.13 
And yet, unfortunately, it is precisely this concept of em­
bodying or joining with the objects of our concerns that we 
have grown to mistrust. As if to foretell the loss of the 
belief in the act of indwelling, T. H. White, in his magical 
story of the young King Arthur, says, "For in those days 
even the grown-ups were so childish that they saw nothing 
uninteresting in being turned into snakes or owls, or in 
going invisibly to visit giants. 
12 
Sewell invites us to return to the world of children 
and 'savages' to recover the use of the imagination as it 
works to affirm what often seem to be contrary states of 
being. This power of the imagination to sally forth and 
close gaps, as Polanyi says, provides us with the ability to 
think about things that are not yet present. Polanyi says: 
When recognizing a problem and engaging in its pur­
suit, our imagination is guided by our dynamic and 
strategic intuition; it ransacks our available 
faculties. . . . But . . . the first step is to 
remember that scientific discoveries are made in 
search of reality - of a reality that is there, 
whether we know it or not. The search is of our 
own making, but reality is not. We send out our 
imagination deliberately to ransack promising 
avenues, but the promise of these paths is already 
there to guide us.15 
Polanyi, like Sewell, insists that the powers of both in­
dwelling and of the imagination are integral to discovery. 
Furthermore, all knowing, for Polanyi, is personal, 
not made but discovered. What saves personal knowing from 
being subjective is the fact that something really and ob­
jectively exists. In commitment to seeking the reality of 
that which is there, a universal intent is expressed 
through such commitment. This commitment, says Polanyi, can­
not be totally formalized, for, "you cannot express your 
X 6 commitment noncommittally." This means that taking up 
the responsibility for discovery precludes divesting our­
selves from its shape or results by merely setting up ob-
17 jective criteria of veriflability. 
13 
Richard Gelwick describes these ideas further: 
We are not free to do as we please but called to 
respond to the clues and problems that can be ascer­
tained by us and other competent persons. Our 
satisfaction is not in pleasing ourselves but in our 
contact with aspects of reality that can be found 
by others and offer prospect of further discovery. 
So when we talk of things like knowledge being personal, 
embodiment, indwelling, and the exercise of the imagination 
• 
in discovery, we are not speaking of mere whimsy, naive 
intuitionism, or radical subjectivity. In speaking of the 
kinds of decisions which, for example, scientists make dur­
ing the discovery process, Polanyi claims: 
The choices are made by the scientist; they are his 
acts, but what he pursues is not of his making: 
his acts stand under the judgment of the hidden 
reality he seeks to uncover. His vision of the 
problem, his obsession with it, and his final leap 
to discovery are all filled from beginning to end 
with an obligation to an external objective. . . . 
His acts are personal judgments exercised respon­
sibly with a view to a reality with which he is 
seeking to establish contact. This holds for all 
seeking and finding of external truth.19 
This is an important point. For, all knowledge within 
the range of both the arts and sciences, in fact in all 
epistemic activity, proceeds on the basis of both personal 
commitment and universal intent to make contact with an as­
pect of reality that truly exists. Despite our modern habit 
of appealing to empirical data as wholly objective and in­
trinsically true, Polanyi points out that "the content of 
any empirical statement is three times indeterminate. It 
relies on clues which are largely unspecifiable, integrates 
14 
them by principles which are undefinable, and speaks of a 
20 reality which is inexhaustible." These three mdetermi-
nacies inevitably defeat any attempt at a strict theory of 
objectivity or a wholly empirical basis for scientific 
validity. 
Part of the modern problem of assigning the label of 
objectivity to, for example, numbers and measurement tech­
niques, and the label of subjectivity to, for example, any­
thing that emerges from personal observations, experiences, 
stories, myths, or the senses, stems from what we have come 
to assume about the nature of facts. "What is imagined must 
be a transformation or a reorganization of what is directly 
given. This is as true for religion as it is for science. 
21 Facts are the ordinary data of universal human experience." 
So says the philosopher John Macmurray. He goes on to 
indicate that the scientist, artist, and religious person 
alike start from a range of common experience and it is from 
this that facts are drawn and formulated. "The data of 
science are not themselves scientific, nor are the data of 
22 religion religious." Starting from a world of common 
fact, people within, for example, science, art, and religion 
move in different directions because each deals with the 
facts differently. 
Thomas Kuhn speaks at length about the importance of a 
paradigm to the process of scientific discovery. His use 
of this term is similar to Macmurray1s idea of a particular 
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configuration of facts which frames an area of understand­
ing. For Kuhn, the acceptance of a new paradigm is based 
less on past achievement than on future promise, and the 
decision to accept its authority is made on faith that the 
new paradigm will succeed in its ability to come close to 
23 the reality upon which it claims to bear. This parallels 
closely some remarks by Polanyi: 
The vision which guided the scientist to success 
lives on in his discovery and is shared by those 
who recognize it. It is reflected in the confidence 
they place in the reality of that which has been dis­
covered and in the way in which they sense the depth 
and fruitfulness of a discovery.24 
Suzanne Langer puts it this way: 
The construction of a coherent theory - a set of 
connected ideas about some whole subject - begins 
with the solution of a central problem; that is 
with the establishing of a key concept. There is 
no way of knowing, by any general rule, what con­
stitutes a central problem. . . . But the best sign 
that you have broached a central philosophical issue 
is that in solving it you raise new interesting 
questions. The concept you construct has implica­
tions and by implications builds up further ideas, 
that illuminate other concepts of the whole subject, 
to answer other questions, sometimes before you even 
ask them.25 
Before we can establish the central problem of this 
inquiry, we must ask a set of questions about the nature of 
our intellectual and embodied commitment. How do we value 
a method of discovery which supports Rilke's words: "Live 
the question now. Perhaps you will gradually, without 
noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer," 
or, "that which now still seems to us the most alien will 
16 
2 6 become what we most trust and find most faithful?" Do we 
trust the work of the imagination and do we have the faith 
to accept what it finds? Do we have the time to wait for 
disclosure? Are we prepared to go in search of the self-
unravelling clue, to set off for regions as yet unseen, to 
discourse with a road that walks? Will we visit a giant, 
turn into a toad, or make the mysterious passage past the 
dragon in order to tell our story? 
The method proposed suggests a movement between both 
disclosure and appropriation, or, in the words of Flannery 
O'Connor, a discourse between mystery and manner. She sug­
gests that you find the manner from the texture of the 
existence that surrounds you, and the mystery is revealed 
when you are called to go through the surface of what you're 
27 looking at. This method has the capacity to change our 
relation to the world; it is a search for radical founda-
/ 
tions and roots. Thevenaz suggests that this type of 
method, which he calls phenomenological, is animated by a 
power of going beyond and digging deeper in an exhausting 
2 8 struggle to find a beginning. To recognize that human 
beings are bound up in the flux of everyday life and to ask 
some central questions about the relationship of person to 
world is the direction which this method takes. The some­
times inchoate responses suggested as answers should not be 
considered ground for failure. For the matter which will 
be addressed is a complex one upon which many things bear. 
17 
And the tissue of images created from this study may appear 
frail at times. But it is toward a vision that the work 
moves, toward a network of relationships which heretofore 
has not been proposed about the subject matter under con­
sideration . 
As Elizabeth Sewell says, "the work is to master and 
be mastered by one's idea, a passionate process. . . . This 
Work has to do with language and metaphor, with the cosmos 
and the figuring self in relation. It is a living, think­
ing, growing, remembering work, between [the self] and the 
real world. 
In Particular 
. . . the act of beginning necessarily involves an 
act of delimitation by which something is cut out 
of a great mass of material, and made to stand for, 
as well as be, a starting point.30 
To find a point of departure and to choose events, 
texts, and people which support an inquiry such as this one 
become matters of extreme consequence. For it is within 
that kind of frame or paradigm that a perspective will be 
formed. The task of the imagination in this kind of en­
deavor is "to build in words a structure such that it shall 
conform in ways sensed as well as reasoned, dreamed as well 
as cogitated, to the total shape of some event or being as 
31 the human spirit perceives it." Or, as Coleridge put it, 
"the task of the imagination is to apprehend the 'unity in 
32 multeity' of the objective world." Buchler calls this 
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"a power to manipulate complexes in a perspectival order," 
and suggests: 
Plans may either precede methodic activity entirely 
or emerge articulately in the course of it; a 
structure may either be envisioned beforehand or 
fall into place gradually as though its parts were 
independently animate and mutually harmonious. . . . 
Method cannot be either purely mechanical or purely 
fortuitous. 
The plan of this study now needs to be elucidated more 
pointedly, and more specific configurations must be cut out 
from the mass of material. We are making preparations, in the 
words of Elizabeth Sewell, "to lend our lives to the figure[s]" 
we will be contemplating, and to learn a little bit more 
34 about ourselves in the process of our explorations. 
The company I will keep during this journey includes, 
at the fore, Miss Sewell, Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi and 
Johan Huizinga. Also, Roger Caillois, Paul Ricoeur, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and a host of other characters will 
lend their visions of reality to the endeavor. Written 
texts have been chosen for their relation to the primary 
subject areas of the game and the human condition. 
Having cut out this particular set of materials from a 
mass, a tentative plan emerges for the generation of what 
might be called a conceptual model. In outline fashion at 
this point, Chapter Three will involve laying the groundwork 
for what constitutes the essence of the game. Chapter Four, 
"The Human Condition," will deal with the theories of, 
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primarily, Arendt, Polanyi, Sewell, and Merleau-Ponty. It 
will also draw on a number of other authors who speak to the 
concept of the human condition. These two chapters bear the 
brunt of defining and describing terms which might be 
necessary for the remainder of the study. Of particular 
concern in this chapter will be the concepts of intentional-
ity and embodiment. They are important to this study as 
characteristics of human beings who make choices and move 
their bodies based on such volitions. 
Chapters Three and Four will then be woven together as 
Chapter Five, "The Human Condition of the Game." It will 
be at this time in the discussion where points of connection 
and sets of relationships will be established in the placing 
of the structure of game into the realm of human affairs. 
The question of what happens when people join in a game will 
be addressed as a result of the web of relations woven be­
tween the previous two chapters. The construction of this 
chapter will be interpretive in design, and will also lay 
stress on teasing out the meanings which seem appropriate to 
the particular configuration established. Chapter Six will 
conclude this study and will lend itself to a discussion of 
significance and implications of such a work as this. 
Fleshing out this skeletal structure will be the appointed 
work for the imagination, my imagination, and the images of 
others joining in the soundless dialogues which might pro­
duce such a study. 
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Before all this can take place one more piece must be 
fitted into position. A question must be both posed and 
answered. The question is this: What is the premise upon 
which any of this plan rests? The answer simply is that 
the undergirding for all of this work lies in the tacit ac­
ceptance of the importance of textual exegesis. Textual 
interpretations, meanings, and understandings fall within 
an area of discovery often termed hermeneutics. Janet 
Harris suggests the following about hermeneutics: 
The major focus of hermeneutics is upon human 
processes of interpretation. This focus is defined 
broadly by some scholars to include the study of in­
terpretation of cultures in general, and it is more 
narrowly confined by others primarily to the study 
of interpretation of literary texts.35 
And Paul Ricoeur says that: 
Interpretation is the work of thought which con­
sists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the 
apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of mean­
ing implied in the literal meaning. . . . there is 
interpretation wherever there is multiple meaning, 
and it is in interpretation that the plurality of 
meanings is made manifest.36 
When the essential characteristics of phenomena appear 
to lie in concealment, an uncovering of meanings not im­
mediately apparent must be effected by a process which in­
volves more than just intuition. This is why the process 
of looking at texts and people and events is important. And 
it must be understood that this way of looking "always takes 
place within a tradition, a community, or a living current 
of thought, all of which display presuppositions and 
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37 exigencies." The stream of everyday life in which we move 
and participate contains the subjects and objects for con­
sideration. Interpretations are made standing in a present 
which is composed of a past filled by images, ideas, and 
stories which we somehow embody. Consequently, theories 
generated do not stand over and against or independent of 
the subjects and objects under consideration. "This implies 
essentially 'to say what is', to recognize phenomena in 
their facticity in a phenomenal sense rather than to con-
3 8 strue it from an epistemic stance." 
At the very heart of the matter is a crossing of 
"facts," in Macmurray's sense, with "interpretations," in 
Ricoeur's sense. The effort to draw out hidden meanings and 
also to wait for disclosure constitutes the interpretive 
process. Richard Palmer describes it this way: 
The method appropriate to the hermeneutical situation 
involving the interpreter and the text is one that 
places him in an attitude of openness to be addressed. 
. . . The attitude is one of expectancy. ... He 
recognizes that he is not a knower seeking his object 
and taking possession of it. . . . The event that 
comes to language in the hermeneutical experience is 
something new that emerges. ... In this event, made 
possible by the dialectical encounter with the mean­
ing of the transmitted text, the hermeneutical 
experience finds its fulfillment.39 
The critical word for consideration throughout this 
brief discussion of hermeneutics has been 'text.1 A 
critical question to be asked, then, is what constitutes a 
text? For an answer to that crucial question, the support 
of Clifford Geertz, Paul Ricoeur, and Elizabeth Sewell will 
be enlisted. 
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Ricoeur offers a paradigm for text which includes 
speech and performances. These two events, namely, words 
and deeds, constitute meaningful action. 
My claim is that action itself, action as meaning­
ful, may become an object of science, without 
losing its character of meaningfulness, through a 
kind of objectification similar to the fixation 
which occurs in writing. [Action] constitutes a 
delineated pattern which has to be interpreted ac­
cording to its inner connections.40 
We begin to see here a claim made about meaningful action/ 
performances which are considered as worthy of interpreta­
tion as would be a literary text. Regarding performance, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer feels that "text is understood not be­
cause a relation between persons is involved but because of 
the participation in the subject matter that the text com-
4 1  . . .  municates." It is precisely these claims of participation 
and performance in meaningful action that will form the 
basis of a hermeneutic inquiry which looks at game as text. 
Geertz's now well-known study on the Balinese cockfight 
also takes up this concept of game, as meaningful action, 
as text. He says, "to put the matter this way is to engage 
in a bit of metaphorical refocusing of one's own for it 
shifts the analysis of cultural forms from an endeavor in 
general parallel to dissecting an organism ... to one in 
42 general parallel with penetrating a literary text." 
Harris offers a note on this kind of method: "The major 
goal of hermeneutic social research is to understand inter-
subjective meanings which are formed by, and which form, 
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culture. Unlike the natural science research model, 
herraeneutic research is not directed toward prediction of 
43 cultural phenomena." 
Now another key term comes into focus here: in ad­
dition to text we are now concerned with the word 'culture.1 
For the present, culture will be taken in Arendt1s sense: 
"Culture [is] the mode of intercourse of man with the things 
44 of the world." The concern with culture revolves around 
that which "every civilization leaves behind as the quin­
tessence and the lasting testimony of the spirit which 
45 animated it." Ricoeur relates to this notion of culture 
through a hermeneutic approach. "Existence arrives at ex­
pression, at meaning, and at reflection only through the 
continual exegesis of all the significations that come to 
46 light m the world of culture." 
By treating the cockfight (as Geertz does) as game, as 
text, as cultural form, in which 'the saying something of 
something' takes place, there is the possibility of gaining 
access to meanings of human events and how they uphold cul­
ture. This concept of game as text as cultural form will 
become a pivotal concern later on in this paper. But for 
now, let us accept this as an important point in beginning 
our inquiry. That is, as a text appropriate for interpre­
tation, game is a structure informed by people in action, 
and also gains significance due to its status as a cultural 
event. 
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The concept of language might be another way to see 
the interpretation of game as parallel to interpretation of 
modes of communication. The idea of text, constituted by 
language taken to be significant is an important one for 
Sewell. The word significant means, literally, that which 
makes signs. This includes for Sewell a world of people, 
things, and all the languages.' These signs "have a bearing 
on the future, but they require interpretation before any-
47 thing can be done with them." And, for Sewell, all forms 
of communication and language make signs of some sort. 
Sewell interprets language to be constituted by five formal 
ways of making figures or signs: 1.) dance and ritual, 
where the body as a whole is employed formally; 2.) music 
and rhythm; 3.) plastic arts; 4.) mathematics; and, 5.) 
48 word-language. For Sewell, relationships, ranging from 
the totally abstract to the fully corporeal, are made through 
49 these kinds of figuring or language systems. But it is 
specifically the system of formal movement, inclusive of 
dance and ritual, with which I am concerned. For it is here 
that the game can be added as a mode of communication in 
need of interpretation. Sewell says, "the body can have 
and invent for itself a complete language of its own 
[through movement]. . . . It is not just any movement, but 
the understanding that from particular movements signifi­
cances can arise.And it is with this point, that 
Sewell parallels Ricoeur on the importance of a paradigm for 
25 
text and language which includes the interpretation of 
events tied to both words and deeds. 
Since "the most important factor in the construction 
51 of a hermeneutic is the starting point," I would propose 
that a beginning has been established. A framework has 
been constructed through which this study will be articu­
lated, and a number of pivots have been positioned on which 
this study will turn. The starting point of game as text, 
as cultural form, was made in good company. And many of the 
matters discussed so far invite further thought. Dwelling 
within this frame of reference means that a commitment has 
been made toward searching for some understanding of what 
is significant about our human lives. 
Our commitment is an expression of responsibility 
to our passion for knowledge and our self-set 
standards for accuracy, consistency, and relevance. 
. . . Without this personal commitment, our con­
vivial sharing in the creative and unpredictable 
adventure of seeking the key to the mysteries of 
the [world] could not be carried on.52 
What is proposed is to speak about action. We will 
find out what we,know about movement, through myth, metaphor, 
and model. The game is the significant event and the human 
being is perceived as a figurer of performances. The phe­
nomenon of agonal living, as a dimension of human exper­
ience, will be watched for its disclosure of what it means 
to interplay people, rules, and things. 
By exercising our capacity to remember and judge, we 
will discern what constitutes a good fit for the emerging 
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paradigm. Discovery will be made "in two moves: one 
deliberate, the other spontaneous, the spontaneous move 
being evoked in ourselves by the action of our deliberate 
5 3 effort." Radical roots will be exposed to a new rain of 
images as the model develops. 
This may mean being united with magicians and madmen, 
children and 'savages.1 But it is this very risk of join­
ing dreams with scholarship that we must embrace if we want 
the chance to be a part of the game. For "it is this world 
which is the real world; not the world of fact but the world 
of significance; the world of fact become possibility, be­
come existence with a meaning, a future, and a destiny. 
For a fact known is no longer merely a fact. It is a pos-
54 sibility of transformation." 
Captains ready? 
Players ready? 
Play 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GAME 
"Here begins the Great Game.""1' 
Before the text of the game can be identified, it is 
necessary to re-search what has emerged regarding some 
events and ideas important to an understanding of the game. 
The material gathered appears to suggest a three-step un­
folding. The first section deals with the myths and his­
tories of game; the second direction attempts to describe, 
define, and delineate what game is; and the third part sug­
gests the use of game as a metaphor or model for explaining 
points of view not necessarily directly related to an in­
vestigation of game. But this is not to suggest that clear 
lines of demarcation exist for each of the three segments. 
One part does not end precisely at a point where the next 
part begins. Myths, descriptions, and models cannot be 
partitioned out in simple separation from one another, be­
cause they, all together, bear on the nature of the game. 
If Kipling was correct when he said, "The Game is so 
2 large that one sees but a little at a time," then a way has 
to be found through this labyrinthine structure in order to 
uncover bits of evidence which will lead toward establishing 
the text of game needed for this reading. The tripartite 
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rendering of the game, as one method for recovering its pos­
ture, will yield information from which a text of game will 
emerge. An overview of this sort is not intended to be 
exhaustive of the existing literature. Rather, it is in­
tended to present a picture of what appears to have emerged 
over time concerning the enigmatic and complex phenomenon 
called game. 
Concerning the method of this chapter, judgments were 
made regarding the best way to make sense of the material. 
Since the literature is extensive and cuts across many dis­
ciplines, some approach that suggested reasonable order 
needed to be found. No evidence indicates that previous 
work on game has been approached in the manner which will 
follow. To judge that the material falls out in three ways 
is the way I see it. This is not necessarily the way 
others have seen it or even would see it should they have 
the opportunity to undertake a similar study. 
Numerous configurations of the data were looked at be­
fore the present one was settled upon. With such a huge 
number of events and writings to choose from, the selection 
of materials representing the game became a major problem. 
For it is upon this selection and its subsequent organiza­
tion that this dissertation takes its stand. The judgmental 
risk implies that the essence of game as it bears upon 
reality issues from its myths, its definitions, and its 
metaphors. Also implicit within the judgments of the 
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subsequent pages is a personal commitment to laying out a 
model-text which best represents the phenomenon of game. 
Myths and Stories 
For the time being, a suspension of the lines of demar­
cation among play, game, and sport will have to be accepted. 
Additionally, the activity of dance will form part of the 
discussion. The reason for this suspension of delineation 
is due to the fact that our starting point for looking at 
games incorporates these kinds of activities in order to 
represent some more comprehensive ideas. The stories and 
myths which have clustered around the game also involve 
play, sport, and dance. All forms at the moment have some 
bearing on the constitution of game. Where one form leaves 
off and another begins is as much a problem for the method 
of this chapter as it is for understanding the nature of 
the phenomenon. How much success is evidenced in cutting 
out a true game, separate from the other forms, will be 
determined at a later point in discussion. 
The starting point, then, will revolve around some rec­
ollection of earlier events which seem to be appropriate. 
These events come to us in the form of myth and story which 
are taken from both Eastern and Western civilizations. It 
is important to remember that myth is not synonymous with 
make-believe; rather, a myth seeks to give a real account 
of phenomena and also provides a way for ordering any 
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civilization's way of seeing, including our present one. 
David Miller suggests, "Without myth there is no meaning, 
nor life at all. It is simply that our myth-framework has 
shifted. ... We are technological, and so, whether we 
3 realize it or not, is our functioning mythology." In 
Benjamin Ladner's words, "Myths must be taken seriously as 
4 ways of ordering man's experience in the universe." Myths 
from older worlds and those from the present-day must be 
considered important to research, to telling what we know, 
and to explaining what we do. 
At the heart of every civilization is a foundation myth. 
Jurgen Moltmann says, "The primeval becoming has the char­
acteristics of a game. Gods and men appear in the totality, 
as if they were part of the game."5 An important Hindu 
theneis lila which is associated with divine play and sport. 
David Kinsley suggests that the gods create the world in 
play, and that, "The gods as players are revealed to act 
g 
spontaneously, unpredictably, and sometimes tumultuously." 
Hugo Rahner feels that "We cannot grasp the secret of homo 
ludens, unless we first in all reverence, consider the 
matter of Deus ludens, God the creator, who, one might say, 
as a part of a gigantic game called the world of atoms and 
7 spirits into being." Myths about play thus start as myths 
about beginning. Or, as Miller puts it, "Both Eastern and 
Western religious thought contain creation stories which 
rely on the word 'play' as a basic metaphor for understand-
g 
ing our world." 
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Folk games and ritualized games form a mode for acting 
out stories of the gods. Gerardus Van der Leeuw calls this 
concept one of sacer ludus in which: 
Man stylizes the events of his life through pre­
determined movement, and connects this with something 
which took place in primeval times. A work of art 
arises which we call dance, game, drama, but also 
liturgy, and for which I suggest the same sacer ludus. 
. . . The sacer ludus occurs in innumerable vari­
ations. . . but always finally returns to a unity g 
from the multiplicity and confusion of human affairs. 
This sacred or divine connection to game prompts Kinsley to 
say, "In both play and religion man exercises and is cap­
tured by his world creating, imaginative faculty. And I am 
indeed reluctant to call this faculty a vestigial aspect of 
man's racial childhood.""'"^ 
The significance of play, game, and dance being tied 
to sacred and cosmic origins has been well explored by 
Huizinga, Kinsley, Moltmann, Miller, Rahner and Van der 
Leeuw. Biblical references such as ". . . and the people 
sat down to eat and to drink, and rose up to play," to 
"David leaping and dancing before the Lord,11"'""'" suggest the 
linkage between religion and game. The connection between 
game and the divine myth of creation is an important one 
with the observance of revelry, ritual, and myth central to 
religion. 
Certain Greco-Roman myths include stories of game. A 
saying of Heraclitus is: "Time is a child playing, moving 
counters on a game board. The kingdom belongs to the 
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12 child." Zeus is often portrayed playing with a ball, and 
Dionysus is the playful, boisterous child who, in many ways, 
is likened to the god Krsna, the embodiment of lila, in the 
13 Hindu religion. The poet Ovxd relates the legend of 
Hyacinth throwing the discus with Phoebus in a friendly 
contest: 
Then, when the youth and Phoebus were well stripped, 
And gleaming with rich olive oil, they tried 
A Friendly contest with the discus. First 
Phoebus, well-poised, sent it awhirl through air, 
And cleft the clouds beyond with its broad weight; 
From which at length it fell down to earth, 
A certain evidence of strength and skill. 
Heedless of danger Hyacinthus rushed 
For eager glory of the game resolved 
To get the discus. . . . 14 
Miller claims that "The origin of ideas about play is 
15 ' . m religion." For Van der Leeuw sacer ludus is linked to 
the parade, the dance, and the game. "When one wishes to 
describe the course of the world," he says, "one cannot 
avoid reaching back to the image of ordered movement. It is 
for this reason that the Muses and Graces dance, Apollo and 
16 Dionysus, Shiva and Krishna." Van der Leeuw states 
further, "Among primitive men, every game . . . is a 
17 religious activity, a contact with invisible powers." 
Within the area of philosophy, the writings of Plato 
contain many references to play, game, athletics, and dance. 
One such from Laws is: "Life must be lived as play, playing 
18 certain games, making sacrifices, singing and dancing." 
Athletics was another important concern. Daniel Dombrowski 
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suggests that "For Plato, athletics is meant not only for 
19 personal fitness, but also as a public endeavor." Plato 
believed that studies for children should include dance and 
wrestling. In a particularly famous quotation from Laws he 
says that "Man is a plaything in the hand of God, and truly 
2 0  this is the best thing about him." Miller contends that 
Plato's ideas represented a transition from living under a 
Homeric mythology to living based upon the ideals of 
21 philosophy. In this shift, play, games, dance, and ath­
letics continued to maintain a strong and central position 
in life. However, historically this transition resulted in 
the start of some dualistic concepts which have influenced 
the course of thinking in Western civilization. The conse­
quences of this dualistic approach toward being—namely, the 
separation of mind from body, myth from reality, primitive 
from civilized, and the serious from the frivolous--will be 
examined later in this inquiry. 
Johan Huizinga feels that "The two ever-recurrent forms 
in which civilization grows in and as play are the sacred 
22 performance and the festal contest." Therefore, dancing, 
singing, and the playing of games as part of these festivi­
ties and celebrations must be considered important. The 
ultimate representation of this notion lies in the impor­
tance accorded the four great national athletic meetings of 
ancient Greece, held at regular intervals at Olympia, at 
Delphi, on the Isthmus of Corinth, and at Nemea. "These 
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games were in each case part of one of the four Panhellenic 
festivals, the most important of all the religious festivals 
2 3 of ancient Greece." Linking games to the sacred and to 
celebration was a consistent characterization of the ancient 
games, and would continue to be a dominant theme for the 
playing of games for many centuries. In fact, the secular­
ization of play did not begin to take hold until the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries when the rise of dualistic 
thinking began to have its effects. 
Judith Swaddling reports on the Olympic games: 
Every fourth year for a thousand years, from 776 B.C. 
to A.D. 395, the pageantry of the Olympic festival 
attracted citizens from all over the Greek world. . . . 
The Games were held in honour of the god Zeus, the 
supreme god of Greek mythology, and a visit to 
Olympia was also a pilgrimage to his most sacred 
place, the grove known as the Altis.2 4 
Epictetus recorded in his Dissertations: 
There are enough troublesome things in life; aren't 
things just as bad at the Olympic festival? Aren't 
you scorched there by the fierce heat? Aren't you 
crushed in the crowd? . . . Doesn't the rain soak 
you to the skin? Aren't you bothered by the noise? 
. . . But it seems to me that you are well able to 
bear and indeed gladly endure all this, when you 25 
think of the gripping spectacles that you will see. 
The poet Pindar composed a number of Odes in honor of the 
victors of various events in the games. The Ode was written 
to be accompanied by music and a dance. Geoffrey Conway 
tells that "The athletic contest celebrated by the poem is 
not directly described, but it often colours the metaphors 
and similes used. . . . The poem proceeds to praise the 
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victor and his success. ... A due tribute to the tutelary 
god of the Games in which the victory was won - to Zeus, 
Apollo or Poseidon as the case may be - was always included 
2 6 by Pindar." An example of one of Pindar's Ode's follows: 
For the Gods give all the means of mortal greatness. 
They grant men skill, 
Might of hand and eloquence. 
My praise is ripe for One: 
I do not mean 
To make a No-Throw with the javelin's bronze cheek 
That quivers in my hand, 27 
But with a great cast to outdistance all the field. 
For Pindar, according to the translator C. M. Bowra, victory 
in the games "illustrated the fact of glory as something 
which came from the Gods and the reality of success which is 
2 8 won by a proper use of natural gifts and laborious effort." 
About the games, M. I. Finley and H. W. Pleket make an 
important point: "The ancient world never knew anything 
like the modern idea of a separation between church and 
state. One of the community's main functions was the regular 
and proper performance of a variety of religious duties. . . . 
Religious games were official public activities, the 
responsibility of the controlling community who were normal-
29 ly laymen, not priests." Swaddling puts it this way, 
"There is no modern parallel for Olympia; it would have to be 
a site combining a sports complex and a centre for reli­
gious devotion, something like a combination of Wembley 
Stadium and Westminster Abbey.Peter Brown says that 
"The modern reader . . . hoping to find an equivalent in 
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ancient Olympia to the modern events . . . under the same 
name is bound for a great surprise: it would be as if a 
sports correspondent, setting out to cover the Montreal 
Olympics, should find that he had been sent, instead, to 
31 cover the Holy Week ceremonies at Seville." 
Many of the events of the ancient game continue to 
exist, for example, running events, discus throwing, javelin 
throwing, the long jump, wrestling, boxing, and horse 
racing are all part of the current sporting world. Prize-
giving, training sessions, stadia, gymnasia, and swimming 
baths also remain in the contemporary world from the ancient 
games. But the games of antiquity also included ritual 
sacrifices, feasting, processions, parades, prayers, musical 
32 contests, singing, ceremony, and revelry. Thus, the link 
of game to a world of the sacred and the festal remained. 
It is also important to understand the nature of games as 
contests as viewed by the Greeks. Huizinga says, "That the 
majority of Greek contests were fought out in deadly 
earnest is no reason for separating the agon from play, or 
for denying the play-character of the former. The contest 
has all the formal and most of the functional features of 
the game." 
Finley and Pleket report that the origins of the Greek 
passion for competitive games may be found in Homer's 
Iliad, which tells of the games Achilles organized to 
accompany the burial rites of Patroclus. "The games in the 
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Iliad reveal that as far back as our evidence goes the 
Greeks did not draw the line between the sacred and the 
secular. . . . There was no inconsistency between worship 
and competitive games as parts of a single religious cele-
34 bration." Finley and Pleket note that, "Greek (and Roman) 
society was shot through with the competitive spirit. The 
normal Greek word for an athletic contest . . . was agon, 
which could be used for any contest or struggle. . . . 
Choruses and playwrights competed, as did runners or 
wrestlers."^ 
But the gods finally did desert Olympia and the games 
of passionate contest declined. Lucian, during the second 
century A.D., wrote in his book Anacharsis: 
If the Olympic Games were being held now . . . you 
would be able to see for yourself why we attach 
such great importance to athletics. No-one can 
describe in mere words the extraordinary . . . 
pleasure derived from them and which you yourself 
would enjoy if you were seated among the spectators 
feasting your eyes on the prowess and the stamina 
of the athletes, the beauty and power of their 
bodies, their skill, strength, courage, and 
tenacity. You would never stop . . . applauding 
them.36 
We now move in this inquiry from the days of the ancient 
games to the Middle Ages. Roger Caillois cites various 
implements and playthings which marked the games of the 
Middle Ages, such as masks, kites, dice, tops, checkerboards, 
and swings. And he speaks of games such as tag, hopscotch, 
climbing greasy poles, string games, pantomimes and 
3 7 roundelays as being prominent. All these games and their 
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implements were still linked to festival and celebration. 
Important among medieval festivals was the Feast of Fools 
which survived until the sixteenth century. This cele­
bration, in its revelries and rituals, was still related to 
38 "cosmic history and the stories of man's spiritual quest." 
"On that colorful occasion . . . priests and townsfolk 
donned masks, sang . . . and generally kept the whole world 
39 awake with revelry and satire." Harvey Cox says, "Only 
man celebrates. Festivity is a human form of play through 
which man appropriates an extended area of life, including 
the past, into his own experience. . . . Fantasy is a form 
40 of play that extends the frontiers of the future." 
Rahner has researched the medieval rituals of the 
Seville cathedral boys "dancing in groups of six; they per­
form the dance before God according to strict and sacred 
rules that have come down from time immemorial.11^"'" 
Medieval mysticism takes up the theme of the dance: 
Tomorrow shall be my dancing day; 
I would my true love did so chance 
To see the legend of my play, ^ 
To call my true love to the dance. 
This verse designates Christ the Redeemer as "the Great 
43 Dancer who came to earth to teach man how to celebrate." 
Rahner recounts the sacral dance and ball games carried out 
by bishop, clergy, and townspeople after Mass on Easter day 
44 in various French towns during the Middle Ages. 
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Huizinga says, "Mediaeval life was brimful of play: 
45 the joyous and unbuttoned play of the people." The themes 
of play, dance, festivity and celebration abound. Henry 
Suso, a fourteenth-century German mystic, describing heaven 
as a playground, wrote: "Here are harps and fiddles; here 
A C  
they sing, and leap and dance, and play all joyful games." 
/ 
Writing of Siva, Allama, a medieval Hindu poet and saint 
said; "I saw him juggle his body as a ball in the depth 
of the sky, play with a ten-hooded snake in a basket."47 
The extraordinary was real and the connection to other 
worlds was made possible through play, dance, and festival 
during the Middle Ages. 
In Elizabethan England, people of all classes enjoyed 
a variety of simple sports and amusements particularly at 
local fairs and festivals. "If Elizabethans had to work 
long hours at hard tasks, they nevertheless found time for 
48 play and gaiety." Early forms of cricket, handball, 
hurling, and soccer were in evidence. Fencing, archery, 
and fishing took on the elements of contest, and golf, 
tennis, and running were part of the official curricula at 
49 some schools in Scotland during the sixteenth century. 
But simple amusements and recreations were often associated 
with festivals celebrating special occasions such as the 
end of harvest, sheepshearing time, or the start of spring. 
The games were played in public and open to all people in 
the community. Many of the children's games from these times 
45 
still survive in some form today. For example, blindman's 
buff, hopscotch, tag, and r.ing-around-the-rosey continue 
to be played, and, playthings such as marbles, pegs, and 
50 tops continue to be used in games. 
John Betts cites the Irish playing a form of hockey, 
the Spanish playing ball games, the Greeks playing a form 
of rugby and the Persians playing polo from very early 
51 times. Bowling, billiards, cock-fighting, hunting, 
racquet games, ball games, horse racing, and sailing con­
tests all "had their roots well established by the Middle 
Ages. Literally hundreds of games, sports, dances, amuse­
ments, and contests can be cited throughout the annals of 
all cultures to these earlier points in history. Poets, 
painters, potters and journalists have been telling the 
tales of game endeavors for centuries, and artifacts of 
their work remain from which a picture of game emerges. 
What appears to be clear, at least into the seventeenth 
century, is the existence of a link between play, game, 
sport, dance on the one hand, and festivity, celebration, 
ritual, the sacred, community, special occasions and season­
al events on the other. The calendar was full of festival 
days, and it is not hard to imagine that as difficult as 
life must have been in its labor, its activity in public was 
surely enjoyable. 
In more contemporary times, namely, the eighteenth 
through our own century, it is important to note a change in 
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character in the events surrounding game. Prior to the 
eighteenth century, what held a community together was its 
festivity, its religion, its celebration, and its special 
occasions. Part of that revelry was linked directly to 
playing and dancing together and in public. The movement 
into the industrial and technological age caused a secular­
ization of play, a splitting off of play from the signifi­
cant events in the life of a community, and a tendency to 
characterize play as frivolous and unnecessary to life. As 
the shift toward progress and production was made, play be­
came an adjunct to the so-called "real" and serious matters 
of life within many cultures of Western civilization. 
This study cannot catalogue the history of Western 
civilization, even in dealing with matters which bear so 
directly on the development of culture (namely, play-game-
sport-dance) . Yet, before moving into times which are a bit 
more familiar, a few events have to be noted. It was sug­
gested earlier that the seeds had been planted for the 
secularizing of play. The either-or dualisms initially 
evidenced in Greek philosophical works in fact were estab­
lished when the ancient games of Greece were in full flower. 
Another event of importance occurred during Greco-Roman 
times. From 350-300 B.C., during the time of the over­
whelming conquests of Alexander the Great, the Greeks im­
posed their language and customs on the people of their 
conquered lands. The conquest of the Middle East resulted 
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in some Hebrew scriptures being lost and the remainder 
being translated into Greek. Jews were forced to speak 
Greek, and Greek ways of life were forced upon all people 
52 who fell under Greek domination. The Biblical writer, 
John, chose the Greek word logos to represent "The Word." 
In Greek logos meant to reckon, to think or to reason; in 
Hebrew The Word or dbr meant action, deeds, dynamic move­
ment, or speech in the form of negotiation between God and 
people. This use of logos was a forerunner of the word 
"logic." The Romans translated logos by the Latin word 
5 3 ratio, from which we get the word "rational." The 
effects of these subtle linguistic alterations were not, of 
course, felt immediately. But, they set the stage for the 
splitting of mind from body, rationality from action, and 
work from play. 
Now, says E. A. Burtt, "The cosmology underlying our 
mental processes is but three centuries old - a mere infant 
in the history of thought - and yet we cling to it with the 
same unembarrassed zeal with which a young father fondles 
54 his new born baby." What Burtt is referring to is the 
taking up of the Cartesian cogito, the method of doubting 
in order to establish knowledge, Galileo's mathematical ac­
count of the universe, and the invention of the first 
scientific instruments including the telescope. Heretofore, 
as Burtt points out: 
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The Middle Ages man was in every sense the centre 
of the universe. The whole world of nature was 
believed to be teleologically subordinate to him 
and his eternal destiny. Toward this conviction 
the two great movements which had become united in 
the medieval synthesis, Greek philosophy and Judeo-
Christian theology, had irresistibly led. The 
prevailing world-view of the period was marked by 
a deep and persistent assurance that man, with 
his hopes and ideals, was the all-important, even 
controlling fact in the universe.55 
This prevailing medieval world-view changed radically in 
light of the work of Copernicus, Kepler, Descartes, Galileo, 
and Newton. They all challenged the legitimacy of using 
unaided sense experience for making nature seem fully in­
telligible and immediately understandable. 
While history bears the marks of the accuracy of their 
challenge, Western civilization<also bears the scars for 
having had its whole cosmology turned upside down. Human 
beings were no longer to trust their senses, were no longer 
of central importance in the universe, came to rely on ab­
stract mathematics and technical instruments for knowledge, 
and began their epistemological enterprises methodological­
ly with doubt. Logos was reduced to logic, cause-effect 
thinking came into vogue, and the body became a problem for 
the mind. 
To return to the story of game at this point in history 
places us at a problematic juncture. Once again, it is dif­
ficult to draw exact lines of demarcation concerning a 
cosmology which embraced play as integral to its well-being, 
as opposed to one which split play away from its central 
49 
focus. The events which took place during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries had their effect on the game. 
What effect that was must be left to a later point in the 
discussion. 
The competitive team and communal games of England were, 
like much of its culture, imported to the American colonies. 
The seventeenth century also witnessed the rise of Puritan­
ism in the colonies. While it is often reported that that 
attitude toward games was repressive, it would be unfair to 
suggest that the Puritans suppressed sports and games entire­
ly in early America. The problem of the Puritans lay in 
their beliefs about "temporals." Temporals were regarded as 
God's gifts of cheering pleasures and restoratives, and were 
to be enjoyed richly but in their proper time and place. 
Games and sports fell under this concept of temporals; so 
it wasn't the suppression of these activities as much as an 
5 6 attitude of properly placing them that prevailed. Betts 
reports that sports were both enjoyed and legislated against 
in the major colonial towns for a century prior to the 
57 American revolution. Accounts of bowling, shooting, foot 
races, golf, cockfighting, sleigh-riding, singing, dancing, 
horse racing and billiards can be found in the records of 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century America. But as Betts 
points out, the combination of certain religious convictions 
coupled with the clearing of new lands and the building of 
towns left little time for merry-making during the founding 
5 8 days of America. 
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Edwin Cady contends that the ball games and team sports 
of England made their important resurgence in America dur-
5 9 mg the early part of the nineteenth century. Betts con­
curs with this in saying, "Only after two centuries of 
settlement in this New World was sport to emerge as an im-
/r 
portant institution in American life." It is interesting 
to note that Huizinga states: 
What we are concerned with here is the transition 
from occasional amusement to the system of 
organized clubs and matches. . . . The great 
ball-games in particular require the existence of 
permanent teams, and herein lies the starting 
point of modern sport. . . . That the process 
started in nineteenth-century England is under­
standable. . . . England became the cradle and 
focus of modern sporting life.61 
Somewhere between the shifting cosmology of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century Europe and the subsequent coloniza­
tion of America, replete with its religious convictions and 
ethical concerns about hard work and industry, lies a 
change in the position and shape of game in culture. 
Emerging from the early nineteenth century and onwards is a 
marking off of game and sport into a posture which most 
closely resembles that which we see today. Part of this 
posture suggests a separating of the adult play world from 
that of the child in both structure of events and attitude 
toward them. Whereas during the Middle Ages, for example, 
people were involved in celebration and the play that ac­
companied communal festivity, the increasing contemporary 
secularization of play and its separation from the rest of 
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life meant that the nature of play seemed to be affected 
based upon whether one was young or old. The particular­
izing of play, game, sport, and dance had begun, and efforts 
to shape each according to content, intent, age levels, and 
reasons for participation continue to this day. 
The splitting of the adult play world from that of the 
child becomes important for consideration. The literature 
suggests this direction by referring often to the imagina­
tive play-game world of children and the more organized 
game-sport world of the adult. It is game, though, which 
still retains a central place at least in this trio of 
words, play-game-sport, and now has to link all these modes 
of activity together in some way and for some reason. 
But, before embarking on this next bit of the investi­
gation, note must be taken of the historical and geographi­
cal movement of the discussion so far. Game and its asso­
ciated activities were the sources for myths and stories in 
both Eastern and Western civilizations from very early 
times. The focus of this essay began to narrow to Western 
civilization inclusive of Greco-Roman days. For the Middle 
Ages, Western Europe was primary to the discussion. The 
final movement toward England and the United States is 
deliberate. For it is primarily the British and American 
tradition of games that now realizes a central place in the 
contemporary paradigm of game in Western civilization. The 
three events which have been identified as being important 
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to both a changing and emerging nature of game are the 
living of life under the ideals of Greek philosophy, the 
imposition of Greek language and customs upon the Judaic 
world, and the mathematical and scientific revolutions of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All these events 
in their own ways influenced the resultant British/American 
paradigm of game. 
It is this conception of game toward which a turn is 
made in order to find the final pieces for this historical 
overview. Children's games, particularly those associated 
with rhymes and chants, have been handed on from generation 
to generation. William Newell feels that most of the games 
fi 0 
and songs of American children are of English origin. 
While there is a certain invisibility of children's culture, 
still embedded in their playing is an allusion to myths of 
the past. Newell's research indicates that many games have 
always belonged to children themselves, but no clear line 
can be drawn for every game, because for centuries many of 
the same games, rhymes, dances, and songs were favored by 
CL O 
men and women as well as children. However, an acting out 
of stories through ballads, songs, dances, rituals, and 
games has passed in many quarters from the adult world to 
the world of children, where children in turn have the 
responsibility of passing on to other children these tra­
ditional activities. It is within this child-to-child com­
plex that many songs, games, and dances of past generations 
have flourished. 
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Iona and Peter Opie are concerned in their research 
with street play and games where nothing is needed but the 
players themselves. They characterize the spirit of street 
play with words such as zest, variety, contradiction, and 
64 disorderliness. They count on oral tradition being in 
operation within the world of children, and say: 
Although some games have disappeared, and many have 
altered over the years, it can still be said that 
the way to understand the "wanton sports' of 
Elizabethan days, and the horseplay of even earlier 
times, is to watch the contemporary child engrossed 
in his traditional pursuits on the metalled floor 
of a twentieth-century city.65 
Newell holds that the games of children reflect an 
affectionate taking up of the past, and the inheritance of 
games left to children by children is one which involves 
the elements of the sacred, the mysterious, and the serious.^ 
Huizinga says, "The unity and indivisibility of belief and 
unbelief, the indissoluble connection between sacred earnest 
and 'make-believe' or 'fun' are best understood in the con-
6 V cept of play." He sees within the child's play-world a 
sense of mystic unity between the child and the plaything. 
The Opies suggest, "When children play in the street they 
not only avail themselves of one of the oldest play-places 
in the world, they engage in some of the oldest and most 
interesting of games, for they are games tested and con­
firmed by centuries of children, who have played them and 
passed them on, as children continue to do, without refer-
6 8 ence to print, parliament, or adult propriety." Newell 
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concurs by saying, "The old games, which have prevailed and 
become familiar . . . are recommended by the quaintness of 
formulas which come from the remote past, and strike the 
69 young imagination as a sort of sacred law." 
What seems to be significant about the child's play 
world is that it continues to embody the spirit of the play 
world from the Middle Ages and prior times when play, game, 
song, dance, ritual, and joyous celebration were linked to 
tradition and myth, which were linked to the cosmos and the 
sacred. Newell, Huizinga, Caillois, and the Opies all 
claim for the child's world an importance to carrying on the 
significant activity of play. The Opies feel that: 
We overlook the fact that as we have grown older 
our interests have changed, we have given up 
haunting the places where children play, we no 
longer have eyes for the games. . . . Unlike the 
sports of grown men, for which ground has to be 
permanently set aside, children's games are ones 
which the players adapt to their surroundings and 
time available.70 
It may be that Rilke has captured it best: 
. . . with the child's disposition, with what 
he has received. Received on long days of confiding, 
in those countless 
hours of confessing play, when he lifted and proved 
himself 
against the unenvying, distantly fashioning You— 
came by dividing his strength with another, to 
experience himself 
and his own freshly growing reserves. 
Expanses of playing! Then the ripening self passed 
further on 
in more blissful discovery . . . 
Is Cosmic space for a child too small: space for 
the feelings 
you stretch in amazement between you, intensified 
space.71 
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The separating of a child's world of games from the 
adult world of games seems to have taken place effectively 
from the eighteenth century onwards, at least in both 
Britain and the United States. William Blake, the 
eighteenth-century poet, suggests the separation in a frag­
ment of one of his poems from Songs of Innocence and 
Experience: 
They laugh at our play, 
And soon they all say, 
Such were the joys, 
When we all girls and boys, 
In our youth time were seen, 
On the Ecchoing Green.72 
For adults, in the United States particularly, the im­
pact of the Industrial Revolution and the urban movement of 
the middle years of the nineteenth century led to an exten­
sive establishing of organized competitive games and 
activities of all sorts. The pastimes of agrarian and 
village communities started to give way to the more orga­
nized games of cities and large masses of people. Huizinga 
says, "Ever since the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
games, in the guise of sport, have been taken more and more 
seriously. The rules have become increasingly strict and 
elaborate. Records are established at a higher, or faster, 
73 or longer level than was ever conceivable before." Cady 
believes that basic to the American experience are the 
themes of agonism and fraternity. He suggests that all 
kinds of experiences and activities, including those of 
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religion, agriculture, the arts, child-rearing, family, 
business, law, politics, pleasure, and social groupings are 
lived out under some formula containing agon and fraternity. 
He says of pre-industrial America in particular, "All 
[experiences] were both [agonal and fraternal], all ambiva-
74 lent and therefore laden with tension and conflict." 
Betts says that the English preceded us by several 
decades during the nineteenth century in the organization of 
sport, and it was their influence which was a major factor 
75 in the rise of organized sport m the United States. Cady 
states: 
Competitive sports of all sorts 'took off" in Great 
Britain during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Not cricket, soccer, and rugger alone, 
but almost everything now in the Olympic Games to­
gether with sports that are not, like tennis, be­
come more than past-times. . . . The rest of the 
English-speaking world, including the United 
States, followed eagerly, inventing games of their 
own.7 6 
Merlyn, the magician in T. H. White's book, The Sword and 
the Stone, was rumored to say: 
The trouble with the English Aristocracy is that 
they are games-mad/ that's what it is, games-
mad . 7 7 
And while the boys, Wart and Kay, practiced tilting and 
horsemanship, Merlyn grumbled about their athletics saying, 
"Nowadays people seemed to think that you were an educated 
man if you could knock another man off a horse. . . . The 
7 8 
craze for games was the ruination of true scholarship." 
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But in celebration of the athlete, Walt Whitman wrote 
in 1867: 
On a flat road runs the well-train'd runner; 
He is lean and sinewy, with muscular legs; 
He is thinly clothed - he leans forward as he runs, 7q 
With lightly closed fists, and arms partially rais'd. 
In 1896, A. E. Housman published his famous poem, "To An 
Athlete Dying Young." A verse from that poem reads: 
The time you won your town the race 
We chaired you through the marketplace; 
Man and boy stood cheering by, 
And home we brought you shoulder-high. 
On a more cynical note, Sarah Cleghorn wrote in 1917: 
The golf links lie so near the mill 
That almost every day 
The laboring children can look out 
And see the men at play81 
Rudyard Kipling in his nirieteenth-century novel Kim 
praises Kim for the love of the game for its own sake. The 
love of the purposeless Great Game runs as a theme through­
out the novel, and prompted Hannah Arendt to call the novel 
Kim the only one of the imperialist era in which a sense of 
82 genuine brotherhood existed. Lewis Carroll, the nine­
teenth-century author, used the games of croquet and chess 
in his famous Alice stories. A fragment from Adventures in 
Wonderland reads, "Alice thought she had never seen such a 
curious croquet-ground in her life: it was all ridges and 
furrows; the croquet balls were live hedgehogs, and the 
8 3 mallets live flamingoes." 
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In the twentieth century Hermann Hesse wrote his 
masterpiece Magister Ludi or The Glass Bead Game. This 
novel about Joseph Knecht, The Master of the Game, won Hesse 
the Nobel prize in 1946. Play, game, and sport continued 
to demand the attention of writers attempting to sort out 
its mysteries, its themes, its magic. And with the rise of 
magazines and newspapers during the nineteenth century, and 
radio and television during the twentieth, many people held 
witness to the events of games and sport. Moreover, the 
rise of both the industrial and technological complexes dur­
ing the twentieth century have resulted in a larger and more 
affluent middle class with increased money and time to spend 
on games and sports. "The leisure classes," as Cady says, 
"were of many intermediate grades from the farm boy playing 
84 ball after chores to the banker with a boat." 
Games and sports became part of the fabric of school 
life. Instructional physical education, intramural, inter-
scholastic and intercollegiate activities provided young as 
well as older people with extensive sport and game programs. 
Betts says, "The penetration of sport into every level of 
our educational system, into programs of social agencies and 
private clubs, and into leisure-time pursuits has been so 
progressively successful as to mark it as one of the im-
8 5 portant social trends [of the twentieth century]," Ellen 
Gerber characterizes the rise of sport, women's in particu­
lar, in one century's time by saying, "It has encompassed 
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activities ranging from simple recreational pastimes to high 
8 6 level international competition." 
Concerning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, W. H. 
Auden's words seem apt: "And, Homo Ludens, surely, is your 
8 7 child." But just what is the nature of Homo Ludens, con­
sidering the developments of the last two hundred years? 
Certainly, at the adult level, words like competition, 
organization, leisure-time, recreation, teams, pleasure, 
equipment, money, skill, training, social, and strict rules 
seem, on the surface, to have replaced the words sacred, 
mystical, communal, festival, dance, song, celebration, 
cosmic, and revelry. Additionally, massive levels of both 
participation and spectating are recorded in relation to all 
kinds of game events. Game language has pervaded virtually 
every walk of life. Sociologists, psychologists, anthro­
pologists, economists, politicians, theologians, and 
philosophers have taken to deriving theories from game and 
about game. A range of explanations have come to account 
for why people play and what play is. Some of these will 
form the basis for the next section of this inquiry. 
Descriptions and Definitions 
While the previous section followed a more or less 
chronological route, the one which seems to serve this 
section best is a thematic approach. The literature comes 
predominantly from twentieth-century writers. Once again, 
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the words play, game, sport and dance will be mixed to­
gether, often without any attempt to suggest what each might 
mean in isolation. That this complex of words has aroused 
the critical, analytical, and theoretical world should not 
be surprising, especially in light of the events discussed 
in the last section. 
The literature can be grouped in three ways. The first 
group of writers is concerned with meanings of words and the 
definitions of events. For purposes of this discussion, the 
work of Johan Huizinga is considered seminal. Prior to 
Huizinga's work on play during the 1930's, theories about 
why people played were suggested by authors such as Groos, 
Schiller, Mead, James, Watson, Freud, Dewey, and a number of 
other physiologists, and behavioral and social scientists. 
This material was written during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and, as R. B. Alderman concludes, 
it "centered around play as a biological phenomenon, instinc­
tive in nature, and physiological in function," with a sub­
sequent movement toward explanations relating to "psycho-
8 8 analysis, behaviorism, and cognition." 
These positions, while interesting, are not the focus 
of this study and no more than mention can be made of their 
importance in establishing the area of play as a viable 
field of study. For it is the work of Johan Huizinga, who 
took up the position that play is a basis of culture, which 
is important to this inquiry. 
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The work of Huizinga became, for many, the centerpiece 
for subsequent definitions and descriptions of play, its 
meaning and importance. It is this group of writers who 
will give shape to the first part of this section. 
The second group of writers appears to extend the work 
of Huizinga, first by accepting it unquestioningly, and 
then by grafting their own conceptions of play, game, or 
sport onto it. One feels almost a sigh of relief from these 
authors that Huizinga took an enormous and difficult burden 
from their shoulders by proposing his theory. It was left 
then to take up his work and move with it intact toward the 
development of more reasons for the play of people. 
The third grouping of material offers a more critical 
stance toward some parts of Huizinga's work and also con­
tains more proposals to explain why people play. It is 
within this group of authors that some important questions 
are re-asked about the nature of play. The method which 
characterizes this work is that of joining the play world 
with the human world of action thus giving to play a status 
of primary importance. 
These three small units are not necessarily chrono­
logical in nature. Rather, Huizinga1s work is the start, 
and is the centerpiece for the consideration of the authors 
in other sections. The work which continues today on the 
nature of play still has Huizinga's thought very much in 
focus, and has since Homo Ludens was first published in 1938. 
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Miller calls Huizinga's work "a most startling revo-
89 lution in human meaning." The book Homo Ludens: A Study 
of the Play Element in Culture was conceived while Huizinga, 
the rector of Leyden University, was working on a cultural 
history of the Middle Ages. It has become the focal point 
for an emerging mythology, a lingua ludica, from which 
models of game give rise to explanations of human meaning. 
For Huizinga, play was found to be a basis of culture. At 
three different points in his book, Huizinga describes play 
as follows: 
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we 
might call it a free activity standing quite con­
sciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not 
serious', but at the same time absorbing the 
player intensely and utterly. It is an activity 
connected with no material interest, and no profit 
can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own 
proper boundaries of time and space according to 
fixed rules and in an orderly manner.90 
Such a concept [play] seemed to be tolerably well 
defined in the following terms: play is a volun­
tary activity or occupation executed within certain 
fixed limits of time and place, according to rules 
freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its 
aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of 
tension, joy and the consciousness that it is 
'different' from 'ordinary life'.91 
Let us enumerate once more the characteristics we 
deemed proper to play. It is an activity which 
proceeds within certain limits of time and space, 
in a visible order, according to rules freely 
accepted, and outside the sphere of necessity or 
material utility. The play-mood is one of rapture 
and enthusiasm, and is sacred or festive in ac­
cordance with the occasion. A feeling of exaltation 
and tension accompanies the action, mirth and 
relaxation follow.92 
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Huizinga did not identify play with sport nor did he 
say that play was an essential element in sport. But he did 
link play to games, which he further identified as matches 
or contests. These he called agonistic activities. 
The agon in Greek, or the contest anywhere else 
in the world, bears all the formal characteristics 
of play, and as to its function belongs almost 
wholly to the sphere of the festival, which is the 
play-sphere. It is quite impossible to separate 
the contest as a cultural function from the complex 
'play-festival-rite1. ... In short the question 
as to whether we are entitled to include the contest 
in the play-category can be answered unhesitatingly 
in the affirmative.93 
This concept of the Greek agon Huizinga couples with the 
Latin word ludus. "Latin has really only one word to cover 
the whole field of play. , . . Ludus covers children's 
games, recreation, contests, liturgical and theatrical 
94 representations, and games of chance." The word play he 
traces to the Anglo-Saxon word plega meaning "to vouch or 
stand guarantee for, to take a risk, to expose oneself to 
95 danger for someone or something." Huizinga concludes, 
"Play, and danger, risk, chance, feat - it is all a single 
96 field of action where something is at stake." 
He moves to the relationship between play and contest 
by saying that, "In English you play a game. ... In order 
to express the nature of the activity the idea contained in 
the noun must be repeated in the verb. . . . Playing is no 
'doing' in the ordinary sense; you do not 'do' a game . . . 
97 you play it." And while Huizinga does not trace 
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thoroughly the words agon or game, a quick glance at the 
Oxford English Dictionary offers this information: 
1.) Agon: any contest or struggle, a public celebration of 
games, of or pertaining to athletic contests, a gathering 
for the public games; and, 2.) Game: play, delight, sport, 
merriment, a diversion of the nature of a contest, played 
according to rules, and displaying in the result the superi­
ority either in skill, strength or good fortune of the 
9 8 winner or winners. According to Miller, the word "win" 
comes from various European words meaning to struggle, gain 
99 by effort, wish, or desire. 
For Huizinga play makes sense and has meaning. It lies 
outside the categories of serious and non-serious. Huizinga 
removes play from the domain of antitheses by saying, "Play 
lies outside the antithesis of wisdom and folly, and equally 
outside those of truth and falsehood, good and evil.1'"1"00 
He suggests that its domain includes "contests and races, 
performances and exhibitions, dancing and music, pageants, 
masquerades and tournaments."" 0̂"'' But when games become 
systematized, regimented, and very serious, the world of 
sport takes over and pushes itself further and further away 
from the play-sphere. 
In modern social life sport occupies a place along­
side and apart from the cultural process, . . . 
The ability of modern social techniques to stage 
mass demonstrations with the maximum of outward 
show in the field of athletics does not alter the 
fact that neither the Olympiads nor the organized 
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sports of American Universities nor the loudly-
trumpeted international contests have, in the 
smallest degree, raised sport to the level of a 
culture-creating activity.102 
Huizinga speaks of play-element, play-sense, and play-
form as being rooted in ritual, rhythm, contrast, honor, 
magic, mystery, heroic longings, dignity and harmony. He 
uses such words as mirth, zest, merry, sacred, joyful, 
spontaneous, ecstasy, enchantment, rapture, order, movement, 
tension, grace, fun and primordial when talking about the 
play world. He says, "Here the ideas of contest, struggle, 
exercise, exertion, endurance and suffering are united. , . . 
To dare, to take risks, to bear uncertainty, to endure ten-
103 sion - these are the essence of the play spirit," 
Huizinga takes what he considers the best characteristics 
of the ancient Greek contests and couples these with the 
best traits of the Middle Ages. What emerges are events 
called games and a spirit called play. 
Huizinga calls into question the rise of modern sport 
which he locates from the nineteenth century onwards, and 
claims that modern sport cannot be called a basis of cul­
ture. His language changes drastically when he starts to 
refer to the contemporary period. Words like over-serious, 
regimented, social, massive, systematize, strict, elaborate, 
organized, unholy, calculation, commercialization, tech­
nology, self-conscious, and propaganda creep into the 
dialogue. He never denies the importance of contests in 
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which skill, strength, or perseverance are present, but he 
feels that they have become profaned due to the dominant 
themes of contemporary civilization, namely, social con­
sciousness, educational aspirations, and scientific judg-
104 ment. He says, "More and more the sad conclusion forces 
itself upon us that the play-element in culture has been on 
105 the wane. . . . Civilization to-day is no longer played." 
Many themes are wrapped into Huizinga's work, several 
of which have provided the basis for subsequent approaches 
to defining and describing the complex play-game-sport. 
Roger Cailiois, a French sociologist, extends Huizinga's 
work into his own system of classifications. His book, Man, 
Play, and Games, first published.,in the late 1950's, attempts 
to uncover principles by which games can be classified. 
Cailiois says of Huizinga's work, "His work is not a study 
of games, but an inquiry into the creative quality of the 
play principle in the domain of culture, and more precisely, 
of the spirit that rules certain kinds of games - those 
106 which are competitive." Cailiois is eager to set forth 
a theoretical system of games—namely, agon or competition, 
alea or chance, mimicry or simulation, and ilinx or vertigo. 
He also suggests a second type of classification system 
which moves on a continuum for what he calls paidia, charac­
terized by improvisation, freedom, exuberance, joy, 
spontaneity, and impulsiveness, to that which he calls ludus, 
which is characterized by rules, order, effort, patience, 
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discipline, and skill. Caillois comments on this continuum 
by saying, "As for ludus and paidia, which are not catego­
ries of play but ways of playing, they pass into ordinary 
107 life as invariable opposites." All these concepts, 
namely, agon, alea, mimicry, ilinx, paidia and ludus were 
borrowed "from one language or another" in order to suggest 
for Caillois the most meaningful and comprehensive term 
possible for each category. "*"0̂  
Caillois also mixes the terms play and game together 
within his discussion: 
A characteristic of play is that it creates no 
wealth or goods. ... At the end of the game, 
all must and can start over again at the same 
point. Nothing has been harvested or manufac­
tured. ... An outcome known in advance, with no 
possibility of error or surprise is incompatible 
with the nature of play. Constant and unpredictable 
definitions of the situation are necessary. . . . 
The game consists of the need to find or continue 
at once a response which is free within the limits 
set by the rules.109 
He goes on to state that play is defined as an activity which 
is free, voluntary, separate within defined limits of space 
and time, uncertain and undetermined as to results, un­
productive of elements of any kind, governed by rules, and 
make-believe as against real life."'"^ Caillois finds, ac­
cording to Miller, that "Playing and being playful about 
human activity tend to remove the secrecy and mystery that 
111 might be involved in that activity." Miller also feels 
that Caillois has moved from Huizinga's position of a cul­
tural approach toward games to that of deriving a sociology 
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112 based on games. But Miller feels that Caillois is at­
tempting the impossible in his research by trying to affirm 
Huizinga's judgment that play is the basis of culture and 
also to affirm the contrary judgment that play is the 
result of culture. 
Caillois says, "Play is a total activity. . . . The 
central problem posed by the indivisibility of the world of 
play ... is the primary basis for the interest in 
113 games." He believes that there is a deep-seated relation­
ship between his class of games called agon and his way of 
playing called ludus. The socialized form of this relation­
ship he calls sport. Within the category called agon, 
Caillois identifies a class of games which are competitive, 
which involve a sense of rivalry, and which presuppose 
. . . . . . . 115 training, experience, discipline, perseverance, and skill. 
It is the category of agon within Caillois' system that this 
study seeks to align with the similar word used by Huizinga. 
Caillois speaks of the games of agon taking place with­
in defined limits and rules which apply equally to all con­
testants. He also says, "Since the chances of the competi­
tors are as equal as possible, the result of agon is 
116 necessarily uncertain." Agonal activity is the vindica­
tion of personal responsibility according to Caillois, since 
it takes place under a set of conditions which strives for 
equality to be accorded to its players. Paul Weiss sug­
gests that Caillois is implying the following: 
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It is only when play is rule-governed and well 
controlled that one can be said to play in a game. 
Such play is engaged in by those who, for the 
moment at least, have detached themselves from an 
attempt to achieve something in daily life or from 
the pursuit of some career, to attend instead to 
the rule-controlled demands of an activity re­
quiring bodily excellence and a union with equip­
ment in situations which challenge and test.H7 
As for Caillois1 gradation of play and game from paidia to 
ludus, Peter Mcintosh feels that this is an attempt "to show 
a progressive formalization of play from the spontaneous 
118 activities of children to the organized play of adults." 
Moving beyond the work of Caillois, John Loy proposes 
that sport is a special type of game, one which is insti­
tutionalized and occurs as a social situation. In order to 
arrive at his definition of sport, Loy relied extensively 
on the material provided by both Huizinga and Caillois. 
Loy concludes: 
In a game the contestants act as if all are equal 
and numerous aspects of 'external reality' such 
as race, education, occupation and financial status 
are excluded as relevant attributes for the duration 
of a given contest. ... In games obstacles are 
artificially created to be overcome. ... In a 
play or game situation all of the structures and 
processes necessary to deal with any deliberately 
created obstacle and to realize any possible al­
ternative in the course of action are potentially 
available. . . . Games are playful in nature in 
that they typically have one or more elements of 
play: freedom, separateness, uncertainty, unpro­
ductiveness, order, and make-believe. In addition 
to having elements of play, games have components 
of competition.119 
Sport for Loy is an institutionalized game affected by 
organization, technology, representative teams, sponsorship, 
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external governance structure, high level of physical skill, 
equipment and uniforms, the presence of coaches, trainers, 
assistants, spectators, and elaborate training procedures. 
Furthermore, sport involves the presence of both producers 
and consumers. Loy describes the producers as the players, 
coaches, trainers, managers, officials, media technicians, 
service personnel and club owners. The consumers are the 
spectators who view the sport through actual attendance, 
through the media, or read of sport events in newspapers or 
120 magazines. 
The work of Paul Weiss offers additional insight into 
the nature of play, game, and sport. He sums up Huizinga's 
and Caillois' work by saying: 
Play is a distinctive activity carried on with no 
intent to do anything other than follow out the 
created rationale of a controlled area arbitrarily 
bounded off from the rest of the world.121 
Weiss contends that only if one submits to a game as having 
its own rules, and actually lives through its prescribed 
beginning to its prescribed ending, does one then play a 
122 . game. Sport as we know it, he suggests, is little more 
than a hundred years old in its history. Weiss feels that 
games become sports only when they exhibit a stabilized and 
historic set of rules which cannot be violated. 
Weiss calls sport a structure for a series of games 
which are unitary and episodic; "a sport needs more than one 
123 occasion when its rules are exemplified." He links game 
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to contest and notes that such contests are well-bounded, 
rule-abiding, unitary events having a number of distinct 
yet interrelated parts. Weiss also believes "We tend to 
forget that the justification of contests is their provision 
of opportunities to find out who one is in relation to 
other men in a bounded situation. 
Another sort of classification system has been proposed 
by Peter Mcintosh. He begins his work by saying, "The 
effort to conquer an opponent, the self or an environment 
in play and only in play gives to sport its peculiar satis-
125 faction and its especial virtue m human life." Mcintosh 
suggests four categories in which sports and types of 
physical activity can be placed.* The first involves those 
activities which provide an opportunity to prove onself 
better than an opponent or an opposing team, for example 
tennis, football, or cricket. In the second group he in­
cludes combat sports such as wrestling and fencing. The 
third class he describes as conquest sports such as hiking, 
cycling, and climbing. The fourth category is one of 
physical activity but not of a sporting nature. He identi­
fies the object of this class as one of expressing or com­
municating ideas and feelings through movement such as in 
drama, dance, or gymnastics. 
Mcintosh feels that the play element is a feature of 
sport and that systematization and organization do not 
undermine sport. Moreover, he says, "There is a risk that 
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concentration on techniques and technical knowledge may ob­
scure the element of play in sport, but the majority of 
those who play are not noticeably corrupted by being informed 
127 why and how they do what they do." 
Eleanor Metheny has created a whole mythology around 
dance, sport, and exercise. These non-verbal modes she 
feels are significant for millions of people who are inter­
ested in such artificially made human forms for the meaning 
they give to their lives. While she does not speak of game 
per se (neither does Mcintosh) her discussion of sport 
offers the following: 
A sport form is an organization of effective 
actions. The conception of these actions is de­
noted in a code of rules. . In this code, 
every element of mass, space, and time that enters 
into the performer's conception of the task is 
clearly identified . . . and counted in the 
determination of the score. ... A sport form 
is a .self-chosen and rule-governed task which in­
volves an attempt to overcome the inertia of 
certain substantial forms in certain specified ways. 
Metheny feels that the rules of sport "eliminate the demands 
of necessity . . . and all need for consideration of 
material values by defining a futile task that produces 
129 nothing of material value." She goes on to say that 
The rules of sport provide each performer with a 
rare opportunity to concentrate all the energies 
of his being in one meaningful effort to perform 
a task of his own choosing, no longer pushed and 
pulled in a dozen directions by the many impera­
tives he may recognize in his life. . . . Secure 
in the knowledge that the world will not be 
changed by his performance, ... he may value the 
experience of pursuing a trivial task in the 
symbolic world of sport for what it is in its own 
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right, he may value it because it creates a mean­
ingful image of himself at his utmost.130 
Both Metheny and Mcintosh have produced views about 
sport which seem to parallel the work of Caillois and 
Huizinga on game while using the word sport for their 
description. Loy and Weiss are attempting to look at sport 
as distinct from game. Loy is much clearer on delineating 
a pattern called sport based upon the degree of organization 
and production which results because of the event. Weiss 
attempts to investigate sport as a pattern which emerges 
through historical means and through increasingly more rule-
bound repetitions of the same game format. 
The final piece of work for inclusion in this section 
on basic description and definition moves toward a concept 
of leisure. Josef Pieper's book Leisure: The Basis of 
Culture parallels in some ways Johan Huizinga's book Homo 
Ludens; A Study of the Play Element in Culture. Pieper 
makes his case philosophically while Huizinga makes his 
historically and anthropologically, but their premises are 
related. The difference is that Pieper applies his argument 
about leisure and culture to the discipline of philosophy 
by suggesting that philosophical inquiry is a basis for cul­
ture. He suggests that philosophy involves contemplation, 
wonder, not being busy about things, and is also non-
utilitarian. Pieper links the word leisure to its Greek 
counterpart skole and its Latin counterpart scola from which 
74 
131 we get the English word 'school.' Culture, Pieper sug­
gests, is 
. . .  t h e  q u i n t e s s e n c e  o f  a l l  n a t u r a l  g o o d s  o f  t h e  
world and of those gifts and qualities which, 
while belonging to man, lie beyond the immediate 
sphere of his needs and wants. All that is good 
in this sense, all man's gifts and faculties are 
not necessarily useful in a practical way.132 
"Leisure," Piep^er says, "is not a Sunday afternoon idyll, 
133 but the preserve of freedom, education, and culture." 
The soul of leisure, in Pieper's opinion, is celebration 
and it is within this celebration that truly human values 
are saved and preserved. "The sphere of leisure is no less 
than the sphere of culture in so far as that word means 
134 everything that lies beyond the utilitarian world." 
Leisure in Pieper's sense is not simply the result of spare 
time, a holiday, a week-end, or a vacation. In fact, it is 
bound up in taking the time to celebrate and experience the 
serenity which results. "The serenity springs precisely 
from our inability to understand from our recognition of the 
mysterious nature of the universe; it springs from the 
courage of deep confidence, so that we are content to let 
135 things take their course." For Pieper, when human beings 
step beyond the chain of ends and means relationships, they 
136 approach what he calls "the frontier of experience." For 
Pieper as for Huizinga the concept of freedom in taking up 
the world lies within what we constitute to be basic to 
culture. 
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This section on description began with the work of 
Johan Huizinga who claimed that play is a basis of culture. 
It concluded with the work of Josef Pieper who claimed 
leisure to be a basis of culture. The confluence of the 
vita activa and the vita contemplativa may suggest that the 
base upon which human freedom and human values rest is 
bound up with play and leisure. This is another idea which 
needs to be explored at a later point in the discussion. 
There is an additional group of writers who also are 
interested in offering descriptions of play, game, and 
sport. They lean heavily on the work of Huizinga and 
Caillois. When investigating the topic of game, the works 
of Huizinga and Caillois stand out as seminal to inquiry, 
and the profundity of Huizinga's work especially has yet to 
be fully realized. 
137 "Games are a means of coping with the world." Says 
John Lahr, "Sports have a fictional appeal in a society 
whose organization fractures work and puts a premium on 
efficiency rather than imagination. Sports recast man in a 
138 heroic mold." For the Opies, games that attract addition­
al rules and formalities become sport, which to their way of 
thinking is fatal to the game. For the game becomes pro­
gressively more elaborate, the playing of it demands further 
finesse, and the length of time needed for its completion 
139 increases. 
Arnold Beisser feels that we deepen our understanding 
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of play by contrasting it with its opposite work, that sort 
of labor which is directed toward some end.''"^ "Within the 
sports stadium we can see order and excitement in contrast 
to the often meaningless tasks of contemporary work. We 
sense continuity, for what we play as children, we watch as 
141 adults." In speaking about game, George Leonard says, 
"Rules, limits, and constraints of all kinds are, at the 
heart of it, strategies for the creation of order and 
beauty. ... At the interaction between content and con­
text, there the game is.""*"^ 
It seems that once the burden of description has been 
lifted, writers begin to shift their focus toward what is 
valuable about play, game, and sport, with little attention 
paid to how each word differs. For example, Peter Berger 
calls play a signal of transcendence. He says: 
Play always constructs an enclave within the 
'serious' world of everyday life. . . . Joy is 
play's intention. When this intention is 
actually realized, in joyful play, the time 
structure of the playful universe takes on a 
very specific quality - namely, it becomes 
eternity. ... It is his ludic constitution 
that allows man to regain and ecstatically 
realize the deathless joy of his childhood.143 
Thomas Green, in speaking of the importance of play, has 
some misgivings about game: "We all recognize that when 
playing a game becomes strongly enough related to the 
object of winning, it is precisely then that we are inclined 
to say that participating in the game has ceased to be play 
144 and has instead become work." 
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In summarizing a number of descriptions of play, 
Celeste Ulrich settles on four generalizations which charac­
terize the literature: 
1. Play is always engaged in as a voluntary act, 
2. Play is always fixed within limits of time and 
space. 
3. Play is never a real-life situation; play has no 
cause to serve. 
4. Play creates its own world; it is a secret world 
which has its own tensions.145 
Cady contends that the Big Game is characterized by the 
player who can be called: "homo agonistes, the aggressor 
and competitor, but, simultaneously, homo fraternalis, the 
team worker and altruist, and homo ludens, the player, 
146 worshipful and agonic." 
All these ideas about play,„ game, and sport reflect 
concepts of both Huizinga and Caillois. Some are contra­
dictory and confusing, but some will be useful to the model 
of game toward which this discussion is moving. However, a 
lack of clarity among authors is evident concerning the 
grammatical usage of the words play, game, sport. All three 
words, according to dictionary citations, are both verbs 
and nouns, and each word can become an adjective, namely, 
playful, game, and sporting. Now when words can move about 
in so many ways with little attempt to establish in what 
sense each is being used, the reader is left in a quandary 
of how best to grasp the intent of the literature. If this 
problem can be sorted out, the reader is confronted then by 
a conceptual problem. That is, play-game-sport as a complex 
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describing an activity often appears to be antithetical to 
work, real-life, seriousness, usefulness and purposeful-
What may be helpful at this juncture of the discussion 
is to recapitulate the kinds of problems which have beset 
investigators attempting to arrive at some appropriate 
understanding of this phenomenon, namely the play-game-
sport complex: 
1. The effects of Platonic philosophy separating 
reality into two realms, the spiritual and the 
material, and dividing the self into mind and 
body. Coupled with this is the effect of im­
posing Greek culture and language on a large 
portion of civilization during the conquests 
of Alexander the Great. 
2. The effects of the scientific revolutions of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in 
fostering an acceptance of dualistic thinking 
and in changing the dominant theory concerning 
epistemology from one of trusting sense 
experience to one of doubt and mistrust of 
sense experience, 
3. With the rise of-organized sport from the 
early nineteenth century onwards, the effects 
of splitting the child and adult world of play. 
4. The effects of the industrial and technological 
revolutions from the late nineteenth century 
onwards resulting in a greater secularization 
of play and more elaborate organization of the 
play world. 
5. Definitional efforts clouded by the use of the 
words play-game-sport as nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives. 
6. Conceptual descriptions which split play from 
real-life into a framework of make-believe, 
and non-serious frivolity set in opposition to 
the world of work. 
It will be the work of this study to tackle some of 
these problems, but several authors have proposed interpre­
tations of the nature of play-game-sport with these issues 
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in focus. These authors will be the last group of writers 
investigated concerning definitions and descriptions. 
Jurgen Moltmann suggests that if games are merely 
looked upon as a means of escape from the real world, then 
they can be overlooked in terms of their social and political 
148 connections. Francis Hearn agrees with this point by 
arguing that play should claim a central place in the world 
of critical social theory. He says, "Play is more than a 
preparation for mature activities (adults as well as 
children have the capacity to play), and play refers not to 
specific activities but to a context, a set of principles 
around which personal and collective experience is meaning-
149 fully organized." For both .IJearn and Moltmann their 
analyses move play and game into a viable connection to both 
social and political theory. 
David Kinsley suggests that in the world of play 
150 "bondage of necessity does not exist." And this makes 
the play world not one of leisure in the contemporary sense, 
but one where freedom and transcendence are experienced. 
And Hugo Rahner's work attempts to join some problematic 
dualisms by claiming that 
Homo Ludens . . . poised between gaiety and gravity, 
between mirth and tragedy [is] the grave-merry man,151 
"Play," he says, "is a human activity which engages of 
necessity both body and soul. It is the expression of an 
inward spiritual skill, successfully realized with the aid 
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of physically visible gesture, audible sound and tangible 
152 matter." For both Rahner and Kinsley, play is connected 
to the transcendent, to a world of players joined in body 
and soul, mind and movement. 
Gerardus Van der Leeuw offers a similar proposal when 
he says, "A view of life which shrinks from the body cannot 
153 stand for beautiful movement." He believes that, "The 
history of the world is the play of God and man, movement 
154 and countermovement of the protagonist and his opposite." 
Miller's work fits in here; he argues that play has suf­
fered a twenty-five century loss of place as a primary term 
of human meaning. He, like Van der Leeuw, feels that an 
emergence of aesthetic interpretation is needed in play 
theory in order to rediscover the human sense of coherence, 
harmony, and significance which results in the play world. 
To recapitulate, Moltmann and Hearn are seeking polit­
ical explanations of play and game, Kinsley and Rahner seek 
theological reasons, and Van der Leeuw and Miller use 
aesthetic modes of inquiry into the nature of play and move­
ment. The term sport has not been mentioned yet; the words 
now are play, game, and beautiful movement. Also words like 
political, social, religion, art, culture have entered the 
discussions of these authors. 
Moving in another direction, some authors have looked 
at the problem of linking play to the world of illusion and 
make-believe. This group of writers includes Jacques 
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Ehrmann, Eugen Fink, William Morgan, David Roochnik and 
Kenneth Schmitz. Morgan feels that Huizinga's position of 
play being 'not real1 was intended "to convey the point that 
the fundamental disposition of play differs, in a signifi­
cant measure, from the instrumental demeanor of ordinary 
(real) life. . . . Play is of a different order of being 
than those activities that make up the fabric of daily 
155 life." But this analysis does not touch the heart of the 
matter. Roochnik begins to close in on the problem: 
Play is the very opposite of illusion, for it is 
a deepening of the experience of the world. . . . 
If play is grounded upon illusion and the sus­
pension of the natural world, then it is precluded 
from becoming a mode of being toward that world. . . . 
A full involvement in any situation will give 
rise to a unique world of distinctive temporality 
and spatiality.156 
Modifying that notion somewhat, Schmitz says, "Play cele­
brates the emergence of a finite world that lies outside 
and beyond the world of nature while at the same point 
•4. ..157 resting upon it." 
Fink's work is potentially as profound as Huizinga's. 
For him, "Play is an essential element of man's ontological 
makeup, a basic existential phenomenon. . . . The decisive 
phenomena of human existence are intimately related to each 
other. They do not exist in isolation, rather they inter-
158 act and interpenetrate." He goes on to say, m an im­
portant statement: 
The play world does not form a curtain or a wall 
between us and all that is around us, it does not 
obscure or hide the real world. . . . The play 
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world possesses its own internal space and time. 
And yet again, while playing we consume real time 
and need real space.159 
While it appears that the word play is being used al­
most exclusively, Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz do use the 
words game and sport throughout their arguments. Fink, 
though, deals primarily with a concept of play, but does 
speak of both games and their playthings. 
For Roochnik, 
A game has an end. In the midst of the game the 
player is aware of the end that is to come. Yet 
this does not in any way detract from his full 
commitment to the present. . . . Rather, the fact 
that the game ends heightens the urgency and the 
intensity of the activity.160 
Morgan uses the concepts of play and sport synonymously in 
his essay. Schmitz says, "The objectives of sport and its 
founding decision lie within play and cause sport to share 
in certain of its features - the sense of immediacy, 
exhilaration, rule-directed behavior, and the indeterminacy 
of a specified outcome.""1"^''' For these three authors 
(Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz), it appears that sport is an 
equivalent word for game and includes emphasis being placed 
on skillful performance within the context of a contest. 
Fink feels that too often adult games represent a 
flight from boredom, but "traditional games," he says, "are 
often bound up with collective imagination, with self-
commitment rooted in the deep primordial patterns of common 
,,162 
experience. 
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Ehrmann suggests that Huizinga's concept of play as 
make-believe and Caillois1 notion of play being fictive need 
to be re-examined. He says that they write as if reality 
16 3 is "corrupting, contagious, perverting, and impure." 
Ehrmann feels that "They [Huizinga and Caillois] fail to see 
that the interior occupied by play can only be defined by 
and with the exterior of the world. . . . Play cannot be 
164 isolated as an activity without consequence." For him­
self, Ehrmann concludes that play as a text contains within 
itself its own reality. "Play is not played against a back­
ground of a fixed, stable reality which would serve as its 
standard. All reality is caught up in the play of concepts 
which designate it."'1'^ 
While Ehrmann leans heavily on the use of the word play, 
he does speak of the game. Ludus for him is play in action, 
and he claims that Huizinga and Caillois erred in never 
doubting "that the player is the subject of play; in believ­
ing that, present in the game, at the center of play, they 
dominated it. They forgot that players may be played: that 
as an object in the game, the player can be its stakes and 
• . i •• 16 6 its toy." 
For Ehrmann, as well as for the other four writers, the 
problem of play-game-sport becomes both cultural and onto-
logical, While they support much of the work of Caillois 
and Huizinga, they do represent a group of critics beginning 
to call some of that work into question. The direction of 
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this last group of authors, from Moltmann to Ehrmann, also 
indicates that analyses of play-game-sport are moving into 
many realms, particularly political, aesthetic, philosophical, 
and theological. This multiplicity of perspectives once 
again points to the richness of the play-game-sport world 
and what it seems to mean to people who are looking direct­
ly at the phenomenon. 
Metaphors and Models 
What characterized the discussion in sections one and 
two of this chapter was looking at the play - game - sport 
world directly. Prom its historical events to its defini­
tional attempts, the game world has been uncovered. What 
characterizes authors of this third section is the tendency 
to use game in a modeling or metaphorical way. In other 
words, these writers appear to have a grasp of what game is, 
and they use that insight in a way other than by identifying 
events or delineating descriptions about the phenomenon. 
The section will be by no means exhaustive of the material 
which exists concerning this metaphorical approach. Rather, 
it is indicative of the way in which the word game (and 
play, sport, and dance, too) has moved into many dimensions 
of human thought. When writers such as Rainer Rilke, W. H. 
Auden, Thomas Merton, Hermann Hesse, Rudyard Kipling, 
William Blake, Lewis Carroll, and so many others make 
reference to play-game-sport in some fashion, note has to be 
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taken. For, in part, those understandings cannot be ig­
nored, and will also help fashion the model of game which 
will emerge in the last section of this chapter. 
Karl Jaspers, while worrying about sport as a mass 
phenomenon, nevertheless, feels that sport has a soaring 
quality even though the connection to the divine has been 
severed. He describes sport as a way for people to express 
themselves. 
We feel in the sport movement something that is . . . 
great. Sport is not only play and the making of 
records; it is likewise a soaring and a refresh­
ment .... Contemporary human beings wish to 
express themselves ... they rise in revolt 
against being cabined, cribbed, confined; and 
they seek relief in sport.167 
Michael Novak says, "What is true of achievements in sports 
is also true in painting, writing, in architecture, in 
understanding, in judgment, in action. . . . Many persons 
cherish those achievements which fulfill their own identity; 
16 8 these are the most precious they attain." For Jaspers, 
the player is one who "strikes a blow in his own behalf, 
169 stands erect to cast his spear." 
Hannah Arendt also takes up the theme of the game and 
states: 
I cannot enter the game unless I conform; my motive 
for acceptance is my wish to play, and since men 
exist only in the plural, my wish to play is 
identical with my wish to live.170 
In another of her works, Arendt comments,"When one is dead 
life is finished, not before, not when one happens to 
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achieve whatever he may have wanted. That the game has no 
ultimate purpose makes it so dangerously similar to life 
171 itself." David Riesman suggests that the subverting of 
sport, drama, feast days, and ceremonies has undermined the 
competence to play. He says also, "It is quite clear that 
it is childhood experience that will be most important in 
172 making possible true adult competence at play." 
It is important to remember that these authors—namely, 
Jaspers, Novak, Arendt, and Riesman--are not writing books 
about play, game, or sport. But in order to highlight cer­
tain points which for these people are connected to philos­
ophy, religion, politics, and sociology, they all make use 
of the words play, game, and sport. 
Henry Bugbee, in his journal, talks of the gracefulness 
and absorption of a person playing a game, and says, "That 
which is alertly and gracefully done can teach us of faith-
173 fulness, and of reasonableness, in their connection." 
Of music, poetry, dance, painting, architecture, and games, 
Henri Lefebvre asks the question, do they express the 
174' secret nature of everyday life? Smith, the Borstal boy 
in Alan Sillitoe's story, may answer the question when he 
says, "I knew what the loneliness of the long distance 
runner running across country felt like, realizing that as 
far as I was concerned this feeling was the only honesty 
175 and realness there was in the world." Robert Pirsig, in 
his best-selling book, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
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Maintenance, speaks of how abnormal the world would be if 
1 7 ft 
the fine arts, poetry, and games were subtracted from it. 
These things he feels make the world common to us all and 
give the world a sense of quality. For Hermann Hesse, the 
Game became a symbol of the human imagination operating 
177 according to strict rules yet with supreme virtuosity. 
It may be that the poets express best what needs to be 
said. Rainer Rilke, on play, writes: 
Play by yourself, throw, catch, throw, ever and ever— 
That's inessential knack, no gain at all. 
Not till that sudden start when you endeavor 
To catch and hold an immortal playmate's ball 
She's aimed you, right at center, in a sweep 
So justly gauged it might be one progression 
In God's great bridging, leap on leap— 
Then first, catch-as-catch-can becomes possession. 
Not yours; that of a world... And if the sheer 
Courage and strength sufficed, and back you threw it, 
Or better yet, had thrown before you knew it, 
Courage and strength forgotten...(as the year 
Throws all abroad the birds.' migrating legions 
Whom older warmth, subduing younger regions, 
Explodes across the oceans —) only so 
You're stamped true player and assume full risk. 
Do you then make the throwing easier? -no, 
Nor harder for yourself. The blazing disk 17_ 
Has left your hands and meteors to its orbit... 
About game, Robert Fitzgerald writes: 
In the sunburnt parks where Sundays lie 
Or the wide wastes beyond the cities 
Teams in grey deploy through sunlight. 
Talk it up boys, a little practice. 
Coming in stubby and fast, the baseman 
Gathers a grounder in fat green grass, 
Picks it stinging and clipped as wit 
Into the leather: a swinging step 
Wings it deadeye down to first. 
Smack. Oh, attaboy, attyoldboy. 
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Catcher reverses his cap, pulls down 
Sweaty casque, and squats in the dust: 
Pitcher rubs new ball on his pants, 
Chewing, put a jet behind him; 
Nods past batter, taking his time. 
Batter settles, tugs at his cap: 
A spinning ball, step and swing to it, 
Caught like a cheek before it ducks 
By shivery hickory: socko, baby: 
Cleats dig into dust. Outfielder, 
On his way, looking over his shoulder, 
Makes it a triple. A long peg home. 
Innings and afternoons. Fly lost in sunset. 
Throwing arm gone bad. There's your old ball game. 
Cool reek of the field. Reek of companions.179 
And the poet W. H. Auden says: 
The peasant may play cards in the evening while 
the poet writes verses, but there is one 
political principle to which they both subscribe, 
namely, that among the half dozen or so things 
for which a man of honor should be prepared if 
necessary, to die, the right to play, the right 
to frivolity is not the least.180 
In describing the joys of sport at Oxford, Allan Seager says, 
"Slowly I began to comprehend the English attitude toward 
sports which is this: sports are for fun. If you are good 
at one or two of them, it is somewhat in the nature of a 
divine gift. Since the gift is perpetual, it is there every 
day and you can pull out a performance very near your best 
,,181 any time." 
What a number of people from diverse backgrounds see 
in play, game, and sport is obviously something special. It 
would be unfair to criticize them for interchanging the 
words play, game, and sport, for their insights do not con­
fuse the issue of this section. That is to say, the 
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something great that Jaspers speaks of is what all these 
people speak of. Definition is defied here, as well it may 
have to be, and yet some kind of soaring quality is being 
described by many people in many ways. For all the 
criticisms levelled against modern-day games, they justifi­
ably pale in light of the significance that game has or can 
have for the contemporary world. Even in the midst of a 
national intercollegiate basketball championship, Timothy 
Healy, president of Georgetown University, remarked: 
The last place on earth that alchemy should work 
is in the abstract and windy shape of a modern 
urban university. Yet, it is precisely in the 
university, in its puzzlements and hungers, that 
the alchemy of sports does work ... a marvelously 
useless competition . . . where rules are objective­
ly enforced, here a victory-that does not entail a 
loss. Here is all the fullness God meant for us, 
if only we could dream hard enough, if only we 
understood what those youngsters on the court are 
up to.182 
Marvin Cohen puts it this way: "Performance tells. . . . 
The home run wasn't hit because the hitter's father was the 
vice-president of the team. . . . The no-hitter was pitched 
with no quarter given, by token of no favor. . . . There's 
18 3 no debating what happened; it happened." Great things 
happen because of people, people finding a better perfor­
mance than they believed possible within themselves and yet 
believing all the while in the possibility of the game. 
For Jaspers, "The self-preservative impulse as a form 
of vitality finds scope for itself in sport. . . . Through 
bodily activities subjected to the control of the will, 
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energy and courage are sustained, and the individual seeking 
contact with nature draws nearer to the elemental forces of 
184 the universe." For Weiss, "The athlete is a man of 
action who responsibly tries to bring about a public result. 
. . . The athlete is content . . . to be judged by men. . . . 
The athlete engages in acts which preserve the past of his 
sport."185 
Somehow, these themes of greatness, vitality, fullness, 
courage, exuberance, connection to both a past and a future, 
and integral to both human life and culture, weave their way 
into the works of these authors. And yet, for the most 
part, many do not write directly from an explicit historical 
or definitional interest in play, game, or sport. 
Mention has been made of the use of game as a text in 
Clifford Geertz's anthropological work. About a decade prior 
to the time that Geertz suggested his theory of game as 
text, Robert Gahringer was proposing the following: 
The game has to be understood as a fundamental 
form of communication, i.e. as a language. The 
game is an instrument through which persons 
communicate with one another.186 
It was in the decade of the 1950's that Richard McKeon 
proposed a modern speculation toward dreams, play, and 
games: "Fantasy is the source not only of science and art 
but of reality; life is fundamentally play, and we con-
18 7 struct theories of games to solve its problems." 
C. S. Lewis speaks of the central paradox of the 
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vision of the poet John Milton. Discipline, for Milton, 
exists for the sake of its seeming opposite—for freedom. 
To illustrate this, Lewis offers the following as represen­
tative of Milton's respect for obedience: 
The pattern deep hidden in the dance, hidden so 
deep that shallow spectators cannot see it, alone 
gives beauty to the wild, free gestures that fill 
it. . . . The heavenly frolic arises from an 
orchestra which is in tune; the rules of courtesy 
make perfect ease and freedom possible between 
those who obey them. Without sin, the universe 
is a Solemn Game; and there is no good game 
without rules.188 
Thomas Merton picks up the idea of linking play, game, and 
dance to the cosmos, and says: 
The Lord plays and diverts Himself in the garden 
of creation, and if we could let go of our own 
obsession with what we think is the meaning of 
it all, we might be able to hear his call and 
follow Him in His mysterious, cosmic dance. We 
do not have to go far to catch echoes of that 
game. ... No despair of ours can . . . stain 
the joy of the cosmic dance which is always there. 
Indeed, we are in the midst of it, and it is in 
the midst of us, for it beats in our very blood, 
whether we want it to or not.189 
The use of the words play, game, sport, and dance to 
represent both very specific ideas and very global concerns 
characterizes the work of the writers in this section. 
These authors speak from many disciplines and use the words 
as models or analogies to help better understand their own 
interests, which for the most part do not have to do with 
either physical education or organized sport per se. 
This third prong of the current chapter completes the 
look at game. Such a view is composed of events, 
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definitions, and metaphors. The final section of this chap­
ter will focus on fashioning from the material a model of 
game which will be carried forward for further investi­
gation. 
The Text of Game 
It is now time to look at the word game to see what 
it means. The words play, sport, and dance will not be 
carried throughout the rest of this work. However, from the 
preceding three sections it is apparent that the whole com­
plex of words is a difficult one to untangle. The fact that 
this study is not intended to be a definitional effort of 
game makes the ensuing task even more problematic, for what 
follows will be the characterization of game using, from the 
materials already laid out, relevant concepts which will 
form the text of game. Not all the thoughts will be con­
nected, nor can every nuance be accounted for regarding the 
word complex play-game-sport-dance. 
The widest possible latitude will be given to the con­
cept of game, yet boundaries will be established and critical 
traits will be described as being integral to the game 
structure. A reminder is given at this point that the in­
tent of Chapter Five will be to extend the model of game 
based on the material presented next in Chapter Four. 
Giving wide berth to a concept of game now merely allows 
the discussion to retain a flexibility which will be 
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important later on. Consequently, a very simple and open-
weave texture will appear throughout this section. There is 
no intention of producing a set of definitions against which 
every form of play, game, sport, athletics, and dance can 
be judged. For, what is at issue concerns the distinctness 
of the game as a cultural form and as a space appropriate 
for public appearance, and the meanings which arise when 
human beings enter such a structured world. 
A start is made toward establishing game as a distinct 
cultural form by focusing on the word "structure." A struc­
ture implies boundaries and also suggests space. What fills 
up this structured and boundaried space constitutes the 
final bit of discussion for this chapter. The format to 
follow is one of picking away at the material already pre­
sented in order to lay out a distinct shape for game. 
A game proceeds within its own proper boundaries ac­
cording to a set of fixed rules. Games are identified as 
matches or contests of some sort, and Huizinga's concept of 
agon is accepted to establish this idea. The rules of the 
game are freely accepted and become binding to its players. 
The word play is to be used as a verb when accompanying the 
nouns game and player(s), so that a game (noun meaning in­
animate form) is played (verb meaning action) by players 
(noun meaning human beings). This confirms Huizinga's 
position on the origin of the word play or plega, and also 
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his statement that one does not 'do' a game, rather, one 
plays a game. 
The dictionary definition of agon is acceptable in its 
entirety, and that of game is modified to be a contest played 
according to rules, and displaying in the result, the 
superiority either in skill or good fortune of the winner 
or winners. The essence of the play spirit must underline 
the game, and Huizinga's discussion of this matter must be 
included as explanatory. Play in this noun sense is to be 
viewed as an essence, spirit, attitude, trait or character­
ization of the players engaged in the game. 
Game is involved with performance of skills and in some 
cases involves the use of special equipment like bats, balls, 
racquets, nets, and so on. Games, their rules, skills, and 
equipment are made by human beings and engaged in voluntarily 
by human beings. 
Caillois1 continuum characterizing paidia to ludus is 
accepted in its entirety as being appropriate for game, and 
not as a sliding scale to indicate a difference between play 
and game or a difference between the so-called child's 
world of play and the so-called adult world of play. 
Caillois' category of agon is accepted as game due to its 
essential words, experience, competition, and perseverance. 
Caillois' statements on agonal activity being uncertain as 
to outcome and equal as to conditions at the outset are 
appropriate. 
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Game is a structure which is entered into with no in­
tent to do anything other than live through a prescribed 
beginning to a prescribed ending with no material gain or 
productivity realized. Sport in Loy's sense, bound up in 
production and consumption, and all the other traits Loy 
mentions, is not acceptable for inclusion in this framework 
of game. That kind of structure, namely sport, needs a 
separate set of interpretations, for, to be sure, there is 
meaning associated with what Loy calls a highly institution­
alized game. Sport in Mcintosh's and Metheny's sense is 
acceptable and appropriate for consideration as part of the 
game framework. The work of Weiss on sport is acceptable 
for its stress on history and repetition of events, and his 
justification of why contests take place is quite 
appropriate. 
The classification system of Mcintosh is very helpful 
to this study in sorting out different kinds of sports and 
physical activities. The use of the word game for the word 
sport can be made within the work of Mcintosh, Metheny, and 
Weiss. It is Loy's concept of sport that aids most in help­
ing to separate out an activity pattern which does not 
belong under game's umbrella. A problem could arise, 
though, when looking at the players themselves. While Loy's 
highly institutionalized game, called sport, cannot be in­
cluded within the structure of game under present consider­
ation, is it possible that the play spirit may still be 
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present within such an activity? The answer to that ques­
tion is not within the scope of this study and must be left 
to the author who attempts to untangle the play-game-sport 
complex from the perspective of sport. 
Game does not stand in an opposing relationship with 
'real life,1 and is not taken up just because spare time is 
available and needs filling in some way. Game is a world 
of the grave and merry; paradox, ambiguity and uncertainty 
exist within its prescribed order. What is distinct about 
game is that the bondage of necessity does not exist. The 
game world is not one of labor, nor does it rely on a fully 
established set of means-ends relationships for its being. 
The world of game is different from the world of labor or 
job-holding, but that does not make it any less real than, 
for example, those activities. 
The works of Moltmann, Kinsley, Hearn, Miller, Van der 
Leeuw, Rahner, Ehrmann, Fink, Morgan, Roochnik, and Schmitz 
offer ideas which are appropriate for this text of game. 
There is no problem here with substituting the word game for 
sport in their studies, and the sense of play as a noun of 
structure may use the substituted word game, with the sense 
of play as a noun meaning play-spirit being reserved for 
players. 
One word which has drifted across the discussion has 
been dance. Where dance in the noun form is part of a 
structured game, it can be taken within the game model. But 
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dance, like sport, needs its own perspective on this matter 
to be articulated. This does not preclude from game 
qualities of dancing such as harmony, rhythm, grace, or 
beauty of movement. 
What might be a key notion for this framework concern­
ing inclusion/exclusion may lie in the concept of agon or 
contest. Simplistically put, is it fair to suggest that 
too much agon equals sport, too little agon equals play, no 
agon equals dance, and just the right amount of agon equals 
game? Using terms like too much or too little is problem­
atic surely, but it may be that the notion of contest is 
a pivotal one for sorting out events for inclusion. Cer­
tainly, the production-consumption understanding helps ex­
clude inappropriate activities. And the use of play or 
dance qualities help characterize the players of game. 
Also, a quirk of the English language, as Huizinga points 
out, is that the word play as a verb characterizes the doing 
of a game; one does not dance a game, nor does one sport a 
game. Additionally, movements within a game may be viewed 
as dance-like, gestures may be considered sporting, or 
expressions might be seen as playful. 
What makes the verb form of the word play somewhat 
problematic lies in engaging in activities that Mcintosh 
calls conquest sports, for example, hiking, cycling, 
mountain-climbing, running, canoeing, and the like. To 
bring these activities in under the name of game does 
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require a leap of the imagination. For each activity by 
title designates its own structural form, its own action 
form, and its own participant form, for example, a hike, to 
hike, and hiker. Certainly, public contests are held 
around these events, so the concept of agon is fulfilled, 
and where there are others taking part, the concept of 
fraternity is satisfied. In fact these events can be moved 
under the umbrella of the game world if acceptance is given 
to the different mode of describing the activities lin­
guistically. 
Concerning game myths and events, the link to another 
sort of world is made. This game world is linked to 
festivity and also to tradition. Contests and matches make 
up games, with extraordinary performances always being a 
possibility for the participants. Being open to the public 
and being played out in public are characteristics of these 
events. There is a certain indivisibility within the game 
world due to the clarity of its being marked off by a 
definite beginning and end. People come together on a 
voluntary basis and become connected to traditions by virtue 
of repeating a game which has already been played by many 
others in times past. This connection to a past through 
playing in a present ensures thfe possibility of the future 
of a game. A game is meant to be communal in nature in that 
two or more are involved, and from this communality a com­
munication of meaning can be made. Cady's concept of agon-
ism and fraternity do mix within the game setting. 
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Celebration of skillful performance is appropriate: 
records may be kept, pictures may be taken, spectators may 
applaud, stories may be told. These, in addition to re­
peated playing, are ways of extending the tradition of game. 
Songs, paintings, poems, sculptures, and legends fit into 
the model of game. From generation to generation games are 
passed on in varied ways, and all these ways become important 
to the cultural understanding of the text of game. 
While the game seems to have suffered a disconnection 
from the divine, Jasper's "soaring" quality seems an ap­
propriate replacement toward some kind of cosmic link. The 
cherishing of achievement and a sense of complete absorption 
can be identified within the game. By choosing the 
boundaries of game, a certain sense of freedom is experi­
enced. Zest, exuberance, and vitality, as well as patience 
and discipline, are all part of the game world. 
The last stanza of Fitzgerald's poem suggests some 
significant ideas about a game: 
Innings and afternoons. Fly lost in sunset. 
Throwing arm gone bad. There's your old ballgame. 
Cool reek of the field. Reek of companions. 
A set of images combine to speak of pain and pleasure, nature 
and history, sights and smells, space and time, past and 
present. Implicit is the image of hope for a future, a 
repeating of the game, a belief that it will happen again. 
All these things are the game. 
While this last section has not reviewed every 
reference of the previous three sections, a sense of what 
is appropriate for further consideration has been conveyed. 
Many authors echo the sentiments of others, some offer new 
points of view, but it is Huizinga's work which threads its 
way through so many studies. In any event, from a huge 
array of material, a text of game has been proposed. Sig­
nificant use of language has been underlined by a belief 
that game has something to say. 
Essentially, a form or structure has been talked about, 
and in a small way the player has been as well. The game 
is played by its players; the player as a human being is 
affected by the realm of human affairs. This realm will 
be called the human condition and it is this concept which 
will form the primary focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HUMAN CONDITION 
Now that the structure of game has been looked at, the 
realm of human affairs will be the next concern. For it is 
within this domain that the players of the game reside. 
Once again, the literature is vast and complex regarding 
matters such as being, knowing and doing. Three primary 
authors—Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, and Elizabeth 
Sewell—have been selected to address the concerns of the 
human condition. Again, the work of each author alone sug­
gests too much material for the-/.scope of this study. So 
from the work of each writer only certain points will be re­
viewed, that is, those best applicable to the particular 
topic of game. 
In addition to the three writers chosen, one more con­
cern will be addressed as a separate topic at the end of 
this chapter. Mentioned earlier in the text were the per­
plexing concepts of embodiment and intentionality. Inherent 
in these concerns lie the problematic notions of mind-
body or embodiment, and willing or intentionality. Each 
of the authors already identified addresses one or both of 
these matters, and an additional author—namely, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty—will be called upon to reveal some ideas 
pertaining to embodiment and intentionality which might be 
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of help to this study. 
The chapter, then, will have four sections. The work 
of Hannah Arendt, Michael Polanyi, and Elizabeth Sewell will 
comprise the first three sections, each author being viewed 
separately. The fourth section will include the concerns 
of embodiment and intentionality addressed by the three 
authors, Arendt, Polanyi, and Sewell, and the work of 
Merleau-Ponty will be introduced at this point. 
From the work of Hannah Arendt, action, public space, 
commitment, promise, remembrance, agon, culture, appearance, 
authority and tradition will be explored. From Polanyi1s 
work, the concept of tacit-explicit knowing will be examined 
as well as his idea of the master-apprentice relationship. 
These relate to Polanyi's discussion of the performance of 
skills. Sewell's notion of game as a system of nonsense, and 
her understanding of the importance of human images will be 
examined. Merleau-Ponty1s thesis of enfleshed being or 
embodiment will be looked at in light of Polanyi1s idea of 
indwelling, Sewell's concept of "two becoming one," and 
Arendt's discussion of the problematic relationship of the 
vita activa and the vita contemplativa. Intentionality or 
willing will be linked to the voluntary entrance into the 
game structure in the sense of choosing to do something, 
moving the body to do it, and accepting the unpredictable 
consequences of the choice. Arendt and Merleau-Ponty 
primarily will address this issue. 
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It is important to remember that none of the authors 
chosen for this section of work is concerned about game per 
se. Arendt writes from a political stance, Polanyi from a 
scientific background, Sewell from a poetic perspective and 
Merleau-Ponty from a phenomenological approach. But they 
all have something to say which has an important bearing on 
how a model of game might be expressed. And they are con­
cerned with the human condition and with our being-in-the-
world. 
Hannah Arendt 
Hannah Arendt was a political philosopher, and her "one 
solution," quoted often from her profound book, The Human 
Condition, is this: 
What I propose is a reconsideration of the human 
condition . . . it is nothing more than to think 
what we are doing.1 
Her writings encompassed many political topics, but, as Alan 
Anderson suggests: 
She offers us but one solution for our predicament. 
It is as simple as our problems are elementary. 
It is . . . to reconsider, t o rethink, the 
fundamental experiences and capacities of men — 
and it is to this task that she has devoted 
herself.2 
The themes of her work center on authority, tradition, 
worldliness, freedom, revolution, labor, work, action, 
speech, thinking, willing, judging, plurality, totalitarian­
ism, the banality of evil, the public and the private 
realms, remembrance, promises, constitution, natality, 
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3 mortality, immortality, and eternity. Though her writing 
career spanned four decades, it is from The Human Condition 
that the first major insights are gained for this study. 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl characterizes Arendt's concept 
of the vita activa, the active life, in this way: 
She emphasized man's properly political capacities, 
action and speech, and distinguished these from 
work and labor. Arendt considered these activities 
in light of the fundamental conditions of human 
existence - plurality, natality, mortality, life 
itself, worldliness, and earthboundness - and in 
light of a vast historical shift, from the clas­
sical period, when each activity had its place in 
the private or the public realm, to the modern 
period when both private and public realms atro­
phied and a hybrid realm, called the social, 
emerged.4 
For Arendt, the three categories of labor, work, and action 
were critical to her own study.1 She proposes that 
Labor is the activity which corresponds to the 
biological process of the human body. . . . 
Work provides an 'artificial1 world of things, 
distinctly different from all natural surround­
ings. . . . Action . . . corresponds to the human 
condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not 
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. . . . 
Labor assures not only individual survival, but 
the life of the species. Work and its product, 
the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence 
and durability. . . . Action . . . creates the 
condition for remembrance.5 
Arendt's category of action is the one which most con­
cerns this study. For it is within this sphere that Arendt 
deals with such issues as public appearance, freedom, agon, 
plurality, speech and deeds, courage, and risk-taking. She 
calls the public space of action "politics" and models the 
space on that of the Greek concept of the polis. 
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Politics, she believed, is not simply or even 
primarily the domain that holds the monopoly of 
force, or the sphere that determines who gets 
what. Rather, it is the arena of excellence and 
responsibility where, by acting together, men can 
become truly free. It transcends the domains of 
interest, and power in the usual sense by pro­
viding citizens with the opportunity of achieving 
a greatness and nobility that may be revered and 
remembered forever. Thus, for her, politics estab­
lished the context for tradition and authority as 
well as culture and judgment in the widest sense. 
Arendt describes the Greek polis as a place where 
citizens met other citizens on equal terms. 
Equality existed only in this specifically public 
realm, where men met one another as citizens and 
not as private persons. . . . The Greeks held that 
no one can be free except among his peers. . . . 
The reason for this insistence on the intercon­
nection of freedom and equality in Greek political 
thought was that freedom was understood as being 
manifest in certain . . . human activities, and 
that these activities could appear and be real 
only when others saw them,, judged them, remembered 
them. The life of a free man needed the presence 
of others. Freedom itself needed therefore a place 
where people could come together - the agora, the 
market-place, or the polis, the political space 
proper.7 
The human activities to which Arendt refers are those 
of speaking and doing. "What makes man a political being," 
she says, "is his faculty of action? it enables him to get 
together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach 
out for goals and enterprises that would never enter his 
g 
mind, let alone the desires of his heart." Margaret 
Canovan feels that Arendt's concept of action means that, 
in the company of others, people often take initiatives 
which require courage and the taking on of responsibilities 
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which then move people out of the realm of predictable 
Q 
behavior and toward the realm of freedom. In the company 
of others, Arendt is concerned that we ask the question what 
equalizes us, for, she says, "People are not born equal in 
their private lives.But task and place can equalize 
those who come together over a common matter. 
Throughout his life man moves constantly in two 
different orders of existence; he moves within 
what is his own, and he also moves in a sphere 
that is common to him and his fellowmen. . . . 
The main characteristic of the common with respect 
to the individuals who share it is that it is much ,.. 
more permanent than the life of any one individual. 
Permanence coupled with durability and remembrance 
relates directly to culture and tradition. "Culture in the 
sense of developing nature into- a dwelling place for people 
as well as in the sense of taking care of the monuments of 
the past, determine even today the content and the meaning 
12 we have m mind when we speak of culture." The relation 
of culture to durable objects and things which are the 
products of work and fabrication can be contrasted with 
actions, stories, and memories of action which are not, 
properly speaking, products. For action has no product as 
an end result. Action stands outside the chain of means-
ends relationships. But, 
. . . action . . . 'produces' stories ... as 
naturally as fabrication produces tangible things. 
These stories may then be recorded in documents 
and monuments, . . . they may be told and retold 
and worked into all kinds of material.13 
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Concerning remembrance of these stories, Arendt says, 
Experiences and even the stories which grow out 
of what men do and endure, of happenings and 
events, sink back into the futility inherent in 
the living word and the living deed unless they 
are talked about over and over again. What saves 
the affairs of mortal men from their inherent 
futility is nothing but this incessant talk about 
them, which in turn remains futile unless certain 
concepts, certain guideposts for future remembrance 
and even for sheer reference, arise out of it.14 
Tradition, culture—indeed, worldly reality itself—are 
constituted by coupling the world of objects with the 
memories of people's words and deeds. "The whole factual 
world of human affairs," Arendt contends, 
depends for its reality and continued existence, 
first, upon the presence of others who have 
seen and heard and will remember, and second on 
the transformation of the intangible into the 
tangibility of things.15 
The presence of others she identifies with those who 
spectate. In this regard, she quotes a parable which was 
ascribed to Pythagoras and reported by Diogenes Laertius: 
Life . . .  is like a  festival; .  . . some come to 
the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, 
but the best people come as spectators.16 
She traces the word for spectator to the Greek word, 
theatai, which later became the word for theory. "The word 
'theoretical' until a few hundred years ago meant 1contem-
17 plating,' looking upon something from the outside." Dolf 
Sternberger suggests that the German version of her book, 
The Human Condition, contained a passage which showed 
. . . the individual, the citizen of the polis, in 
the dual role of actor and spectator, existing in 
an auditorium in which everyone is watching and 
spectating at the same time.18 
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Arendt accords the spectator a privileged place in the 
public world by suggesting that actors are concerned with 
parts while spectators can see the whole performance. 
Withdrawal from direct involvement to a stand­
point outside the game (the festival of life) is 
not only a condition for judging, for being the 
final arbiter in the ongoing competition, but also 
the condition for understanding the meaning of the 
play.19 
The word competition in Arendt's political sense re­
lates to the word agon. Sheldon Wolin says that for Arendt, 
Politics was essentially dramaturgic. It con­
sisted of public performances staged in a clearly 
defined public realm and witnessed by an audience 
of equals engrossed in what was taking place and 
indifferent to calculations of material benefits 
or consequences. Political men were not, however, 
actors reading lines; they were men engaged in a 
contest, an agon, a striving for excellence in 
terms of praiseworthy acts.20 
Arendt herself felt that the agonal impulse was important 
to the public realm, and says, "It is the desire to excel 
which makes men love the world and enjoy the company of 
21 
their peers, and drives them into public business." Peter 
Fuss suggests that the agonal thrust of The Human Condition 
needs to be coupled with the accommodational emphasis of 
another of Arendt's books, On Revolution, in order to under­
stand a realm where individual initiatives can be reconciled 
with joint decision-making and plural responses and 
22 enactments. 
The human achievements of action are not pursued for 
ends other than those which lie within the performances 
121 
themselves. Embedded in the performance is its meaning, 
and, as Arendt says, "The 'product' is identical with the 
23 performing act itself." She speaks of courage being 
present in the mere willingness to speak and act. "To 
insert oneself into the world and begin a story of one's 
24 own," ties people into a web of human relationships. 
These relationships are unpredictable as to outcomes, and 
always contain for those involved the possibility for great­
ness to emerge within a forum of plural appearances. Fuss 
characterizes Arendt's notion of the public realm by saying: 
Acting and speaking within the human community, 
allowing oneself to become part of the larger 
web of human relationships, requires courage, a 
willingness to take risks, and faith. Courage is 
needed to expose and disclose one's self in pub­
lic, risk is involved in that one is not master 
of what he thus reveals; and one must have suffi­
cient faith in the community of one's fellow men 
to entrust to its care this precious self.25 
What saves the public space of action and deeds from sheer 
unpredictability and radical chaos is the structure of laws, 
boundaries, and conditions which are taken up by people upon 
entry into the public world. This act is one of contract­
ing or covenanting with others and is an act of promising 
to abide by the rules. Arendt maintains that "I may wish 
to change the rules of the game . . .; but to deny them 
means no mere 'disobedience,' but the refusal to enter the 
2 6 
human community." Where people gather and bind them­
selves together through promises, covenants and pledges, a 
foundation for freedom is established. As a worldly 
122 
reality freedom exists only in the public realm, and to find 
public spaces for its appearance constitutes a kind of world-
building. To make and keep promises provide stability for 
the public world, "where uncertainty and unpredictability 
27 may break in from all sides." 
Arendt believes that "Freedom of movement is . . . the 
indispensable condition for action, and it is in action that 
2 8 men primarily experience freedom in the world." Similar­
ly, she says, "Freedom as an inner capacity of man is 
identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a 
political reality is identical with a space of movement be-
29 tween men." For Arendt, contacts and contracts with other 
people are essential for public-happiness. The function of 
the public realm is "to throw light on the affairs of men 
by providing a space of appearances in which they can show 
in deed and word, for better and worse, who they are and 
30 what they can do." These spaces of appearance can find a 
proper location almost at anytime and anywhere. The "space 
of appearance" is "the space where I appear to others as 
others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other 
living or inanimate things but make their appearance 
explicitly. 
Arendt speaks of virtuosity in action where accomplish­
ment lies in the performance itself and where the excellence 
of people shows in their responses to the opportunities 
presented by the public realm. She says that "The Greeks 
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always used such metaphors as flute-playing, dancing, heal­
ing, and seafaring to distinguish political from other 
activities, that is, they drew their analogies from those 
32 arts in which virtuosity in performance is decisive." For 
Arendt, this connection to the past is important. For, 
The world we live in at any moment is the world of 
the past; it consists of the monuments and the 
relics of what has been done by men for better or 
worse. ... It is quite true that the past 
haunts us; it is the past's function to haunt us 
who are present, and wish to live in the world 
as it really is, that is, has become what it is 
now.33 
As communal beings, we belong to others and to the 
surrounding world, and it is our responsibility to take care 
of such a world, a world which has to provide for the 
fragility of human affairs. By evaluating objects and 
judging what is to stay in the world, by enacting words and 
deeds and remembering stories of action, we keep the world 
fit for human habitation. Also we keep continuous a past 
which can be handed over from generation to generation. We 
await, then, the appearance of new people in the public, 
worldly realm. Both stability and change can be accommodated 
in this process. It is a process of humanizing the world 
by a continual discourse among people in a present recall­
ing a past and giving space for the as yet unseen future 
stories to be enacted. And, in Arendt's words, 
It remains the greatest prerogative of every man 
to be essentially and forever more than anything 
he can produce or achieve, not only to remain, 
after each work and achievement, the not yet 
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exhausted, sheer inexhaustible source of further 
achievements, but to be in his very essence be­
yond all of them, untouchable and unlimited by 
them.34 
According to Young-Bruehl, Arendt contrasts the politi­
cal space as one "in which men act purposively through 
words and deeds, with what she called the 'social,'" by 
which she means "the relations men develop for the mainte-
35 nance of life." Political space is characterized by the 
"sovereignty of a body of people bound and kept together, 
not by an identical will which somehow magically inspires 
them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the 
promises are valid and binding." Wolin feels that such a 
body of people in Arendt';s sense could also be called an 
audience and that such spectators should be taken "for the 
political community whose nature is to be a community of 
37 remembrance." Furthermore, for Arendt, Wolin suggests 
that 
Political action and labor signified primordial 
opposites: freedom versus necessity; extra­
ordinary action versus repetitive activity; life-
risking versus life-sustaining; action occurring 
in the bright light of the public stage versus 
activity hidden away in private places and private 
transactions; and finally, action constituted and 
signified by utterance and preserved in remembrance 
versus activity that is speechless, that issues in 
products destined to be consumed and forgotten.38 
Within the public realm of action, authority is vested 
in people by virtue of position and tradition. But, says 
Arendt, "Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those 
who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is 
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needed." Arendt recalls the importance of both tradition 
and authority in the Greek context of action: 
Tradition preserved the past by handing down 
from one generation to the next the testimony 
of the ancestors, who first had witnessed and 
created the sacred founding and then augmented 
it by their authority throughout the centuries 
. . . to act without authority and tradition, 
without accepted, time-honored standards and 
models, was inconceivable.40 
Change occurs for Arendt when people act in concert and take 
up the power they have by virtue of being together in order 
to begin again, to reconstitute the space for appearance 
after liberating themselves from a particular set of bonds. 
For Arendt, the Greek polis, the political and public 
realm, offered to people a chance for equality, freedom, 
change, stability, action, remembering, promising and for­
giving. In her words: 
. . .  i t  w a s  t h e  polis, the space of men's free 
deeds and living words, which could endow life 
with splendor.41 
Michael Polanyi 
From the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, we move 
to an examination of the epistemological premises of Michael 
Polanyi. Arendt believes that, "Wherever knowing and doing 
have parted company, the space of freedom is lost."^ For 
Polanyi, knowing and doing are never separated. 
I regard knowing as an active comprehension of the 
things known, an action that requires skill. 
Skilful knowing and doing is performed by sub­
ordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, 
to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether 
practical or theoretical.43 
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Polanyi sets out to establish a comprehensive epistemology 
of personal knowing, claiming that "by elucidating the way 
our bodily processes participate in our perceptions we will 
44 throw light on the bodily roots of all thought." 
Since we live in terms of meanings and significances, 
the enterprise of personal knowing points toward endeavors 
of comprehension rather than those of particularizing 
knowledge per se. In all acts of understanding there is a 
personal participation of the knower. Of his thesis in 
Personal Knowledge, Polanyi says, 
I have shown that into every act of knowing there 
enters a passionate contribution of the person 
knowing what is being known, and that this co­
efficient is no mere imperfection but a vital 
component of his knowledge .,45 
He also says that, "any attempt to avoid the responsibility 
46 for shaping the beliefs which we accept as true is absurd." 
The theory of personal knowledge which ties together 
relations of parts to wholes is summed up this way by 
Polanyi: 
The theory of Personal Knowledge offers an in­
terpretation of meaning. It says that no 
meaningful knowledge can be acquired, except by 
an act of comprehension which consists in merg­
ing our awareness of a set of particulars into 
our focal awareness of their joint significance. 
Such an act is necessarily personal, for it 
assimilates the particulars in question to our 
bodily equipment; we are aware of them only in 
terms of the things we are focally observing.47 
It is the concept of tacit knowing which is critical to 
Polanyi's work. The structure of tacit knowing always 
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involves two components; some of the words which Polanyi 
uses to describe the two poles are tacit-explicit, proximal-
distal, subsidiary-focal, and from-to. He says that "in an 
act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending 
48 to something else." For example: 
. . . we are relying on our awareness of a com­
bination of muscular acts for attending to the 
performance of a skill. We are attending from 
these elementary movements to the achievement of 
their joint purpose, and hence are usually unable 
to specify these elementary acts.49 
The explicit or focal awareness is always upheld by a sub­
sidiary or tacit understanding. In other words, we don't 
look at particulars but from the particulars to their joint 
meaning. We rely on the particulars of a situation in order 
« « 
to determine the larger meaning. The particulars are always 
rooted in the unclear, non-explicit, tacit dimension of 
knowing. And for Polanyi, this rooting of the tacit is 
primarily a bodily rooting. 
Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our 
external knowledge, whether intellectual or 
practical. . . . Our own body is the only thing 
in the world which we normally never experience 
as an object, but experience always in terms of ,-g 
the world to which we are attending from our body. 
Furthermore, 
Our body is always in use as the basic instrument 
of our intellectual and practical control over 
our surroundings. ... To be aware of our body 
in terms of the things we know and do, is to 
feel alive. This awareness is an essential part 
of our existence as sensuous active persons.51 
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Regarding the body as the ultimate though tacit ground 
for knowing provides a basis for understanding the body not 
only explicitly, but as the unspecifiable yet primary con­
dition for coming to know the world. The process of attend­
ing from the body to the particulars of the world is 
exemplified in the way we use tools or implements or learn 
physical skills. "We use instruments," Polanyi says, "as 
an extension of our hands and they may serve also as an 
extension of our sense. We assimilate them to our body by 
52 pouring ourselves xnto them." By contrast, "the skilful 
use of a tennis racket can be paralysed by watching our 
racket instead of attending to the ball and the court in 
53 front of us." Polanyi explains: 
Scrutinize closely the particulars of a compre­
hensive entity and their meaning is effaced. . . . 
Admittedly, the destruction can be made good by 
interiorizing the particulars once more. . . . 
But it is important to note that this recovery 
never brings back the original meaning. It may 
improve on it. Motion studies, which tend to 
paralyze a skill, will improve it when followed 
by practice. . . . The detailing of particulars 
which by itself would destroy meaning, serves as 
a guide to their subsequent integration and thus 
establishes a more secure and more accurate 
meaning for them.5 4 
In other words, it is appropriate to focus on isolated com­
ponents in tool or skill learning, but the effects of such 
particularizing will be noted meaningfully only in the con­
text of the re-constituted whole performance. 
This use of a tool or implement, when it becomes 
assimilated to the body in order to experience its use, also 
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changes the body in that the body expands into a new mode of 
being-in-the-world. In other words, the body touches the 
world in a different way and the world shapes the body dif­
ferently because of the artifact's shape and assimilation to 
the body. 
We keep expanding our body into the world by 
assimilating to it sets of particulars which we 
integrate into reasonable entities. Thus do we 
form, intellectually and practically, an in­
terpreted universe populated by entities, the 
particulars of which we have interiorized for 
the sake of comprehending their meaning in the 
shape of coherent entities.55 
Therefore, not only does the body change slightly in this 
recognition, but so does the world. 
In learning skills, "The aim of a skilful performance 
is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are 
not known as such to the person following them.1,56 Using 
swimming and riding a bicycle as examples of skill learning, 
Polanyi concludes that neither the swimmer nor the cyclist 
can give a full account of their performances in terms of 
particulars. This is because the particulars on which we 
rely for the performance of the skill are integrated into a 
more comprehensive meaningful act. 
This effort [i.e. riding a bicycle] results in an 
amazingly sophisticated policy of which we know 
nothing. Our muscles are set so as to counter­
act our accidental imbalance at every moment, by 
turning the bicycle into a curve with a radius 
proportional to the square of our velocity 
divided by the angle imbalance. Millions of 
people are cycling all over the world by skillfully 
applying this formula which they could not remote­
ly understand if they were told about it.5 7 
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This is the basis for Polanyi's famous idea that we know far 
more than we can tell. 
Polanyi proposes that all knowing takes place in the 
same way that people learn skills and use tools. A bi-polar 
process is in operation at all times, which involves both 
the tacit and the explicit. The importance attached to the 
unfocalized and ambiguous state of the body in knowing, 
whether involved with practical or theoretical concerns, 
cannot be underestimated. For Polanyi, the subsidiary and 
bodily level of tacit knowing is primary. In making sense 
of the world, Polanyi claims, "We rely on our tacit knowl­
edge of impacts that the world makes on our body and of the 
responses of our body to these impacts. Hence the exception-
5 8 al position of our body in the universe." 
For Polanyi, knowledge is upheld by tradition, in com­
munity and under a sense of authority. This structure offers 
a kind of check and balance system whereby personal knowl­
edge is saved from being merely subjective. Since the 
Cartesian norm of uni-polar or objective knowledge is not 
valid, and since the possibility of radical relativity 
besets subjectively based knowledge, the two poles of per­
sonal knowing must be accommodated and must seek a frame­
work which takes into account the irreducibility of the 
subjective-objective paradox. To be sure, the reality which 
one seeks in a process of discovery is objective, but as 
soon as it is claimed to be real, the subjective element 
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appears. This paradox is unresolvable, says Polanyi. Con­
sequently, he prefers to call knowledge personal and seeks 
a structure of tradition, community, and authority for its 
unfolding. 
Polanyi uses the example of the master-apprentice 
relationship to help elucidate these concepts. 
All skilful performances can be taught by rely­
ing on the pupil's effort to imitate and catch 
the knack of it. 59 
To learn by example is to submit to authority. 
You follow your master because you trust his 
manner of doing things even when you cannot 
analyse and account in detail for its effective­
ness. By watching the master and emulating his 
efforts in the presence of his example, the 
apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of 
the art.60 
Traditions passed on from one generation to another in this 
way preserve a fund from which personal knowledge draws. 
Initially, one must submit to the authority of another be­
fore one knows explicitly what is to be learned. Also, one 
accepts the responsibility of emulating the traditions which 
the master embodies. These acts of submission and respon­
sibility are themselves forms of personal knowing. Polanyi 
speaks of them in terms of commitment: 
The extent to which each of us accepts and relies 
on the existing medium of society for shaping 
his own thoughts and aspirations is therefore an 
ultimate tacit component of ours. I acknowledge 
this commitment myself as the framework of 
declaring myself thus committed. This is, indeed, 
merely to accept for myself the situation which 
I have defined as the calling of man.61 
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Traditions are embodied by masters and carried by them 
to each succeeding generation. Again, Polanyi uses skill­
ful performance as an example: 
The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling 
in them as parts of his body, while the watcher 
tries to correlate these moves by seeking to 
dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these 
moves by interiorizing them. By such exploratory 
indwelling the pupil gets the feel of a master's 
skill.62 
Polanyi feels that "In order to share this indwelling, the 
pupil must presume that a teaching which appears meaningless 
to start with has in fact a meaning which can be discovered 
by hitting on the same kind of indwelling as the teacher is 
practicing. Such an effort is based on accepting the 
6 3 teacher's authority." 
Polanyi argues for confidence in a kind of authority 
which provides for transmission of traditions in culture. 
Only a small fragment of his own culture is direct­
ly visible to any of its adherents. Large parts 
of it are altogether buried in books, paintings, 
musical scores, etc., which remain mostly unread, 
unseen, unperformed. The messages of these 
records live, even in the mind best informed 
about them, only in their awareness of having 
access to them and of being able to evoke their 
voices and understand them. . . . all these immense 
systematic accumulations of articulate forms 
consist of the records of human affirmation. 
They are the utterances of prophets, poets, 
legislators, scientists and other masters, . . . 
who, by their actions, recorded in history, have 
set a pattern for posterity.64 
Polanyi believes that a convivial order must be maintained 
wherein the authority of masters and the traditions they 
tacitly embody can be revealed. In this convivial setting, 
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fellowship and joint participation in the affairs of per­
sonal knowing come into play. Clarke Cochran states that 
Polanyi's belief in personal knowledge is predicated upon 
"belonging to a community, believing in its traditions, and 
65 understanding the experience which engendered them." In 
this context, rituals play a significant role. 
By fully participating in a ritual, the members 
of a group affirm the community of their existence, 
and at the same time identify the life of their 
group with that of antecedent groups, from whom 
the ritual has descended to them. ... It af­
firms the convivial existence of the group as 
transcending the individual, both in the present 
and through times past.66 
Within the structure of tradition, authority, and com­
munity, change occurs when apprentices move beyond their 
masters through acts of discovering new levels of reality. 
The action of personal knowing is one of searching for 
deeper levels of understanding, prompted by an urge to break 
through fixed conceptual frameworks. 
Human beings develop this desire for tension in 
a variety of forms. Man is one of the few 
animals who continue to play throughout adult 
life. Men have also at all times gone out in 
search of adventure. ... We . . . enjoy in in­
numerable ways the sudden relaxation of a tension 
in which we have become involved.67 
For Polanyi, knowing always involves doing and action. 
Indeed, William Poteat feels that 
Since Polanyi is willing to explore the analogies 
between the structure of cognitive acts and that 
of motor acts . . . new relations are made notice­
able to him. . . . This is possible because 
Polanyi has chosen to view both cognition and 
motility under the category of action. ... In 
134 
this unfamiliar permisiveness - that is, think­
ing of cognitive acts (of what the tradition 
would call the human mind) and the motor acts (of 
what the tradition would call the human body) as 
analogously embodying rationality - Polanyi 
shows yet another way in which-he innovates.68 
As previously discussed, knowing involves two facets, both 
of which are involved in the endeavor, one being tacit and 
unspecifiable and the other being explicit and particular. 
Personal knowing is based on both facets, is bodily rooted, 
and results in fashioning a coherent meaning toward which 
one has been aiming. But, as Marjorie Grene explains: 
. . . from-to knowledge cannot be instantaneous; 
it is a stretch, not only of attention, but of 
effort; effort must be lived, and living takes 
time. ... In the from-to stretch by which we 
grope our way forward out of and into and within 
a world, we both make and are made, possess and 
are possessed, in tension, indeed, and even 
paradox, but not in contradiction.69 
Grene claims that Polanyi has solved the Cartesian 
dilemma posed by using doubt as the basis of knowing and 
issuing in the body-mind "problem." The solution, outlined 
in Personal Knowledge, emerges in the act of taking up the 
responsibility for being the active center of discovery. 
She contends that "Knowing turns out to be the way in which 
we grope our way forward, relying on clues within ourselves 
70 to comprehend the complex patterns of the real world." 
And Polanyi concludes that 
The whole universe of human sensibility . .. . is 
evoked ... by dwelling within the framework 
of our cultural heritage. Thus our acknowledgment 
of understanding as a valid form of knowledge 
foreshadows the promised transition from the study 
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of nature to a confrontation with man acting 
responsibly, under an over-arching firmament 
of universal ideals.71 
Elizabeth Sewell 
At about the same time as the publication of Arendt's 
Human Condition (1958) and Polanyi's Personal Knowledge 
(1962), Elizabeth Sewell's opus The Orphic Voice (1960) was 
released. In this book she states: 
Modern thought supposes that human beings are 
capable of two sorts of thinking, the logical and 
the imaginative. . . . Science and poetry, 
mathematics and words, intellect and imagination, 
mind and body: they are old, they are tidy, they 
are mistaken. . . . The human organism, that 
body which has the gift of thought, does not have 
the choice of two kinds of thinking. It has only 
one, in which the organism as a whole is engaged 
in all along the line. There has been no pro­
gression in history from one type of thought to 
another.72 
While The Orphic Voice stands as one of Sewell's greatest 
works, her publishings extend over a thirty-year period, 
ranging from fiction to literary criticism to poetry. 
William Ray finds in Sewell's writings 
. . .  a  m i n d  t h a t  r e m a i n s  a l i v e  t o  t h e  m e t h o d  a n d  
to the divinest madness which is sense - in 
metaphor, magic, dream, identification, all the 
elements with which imagination builds 'private 
and public structures for living in.' . . . 
Voyager, exile, hero - the terms fit Elizabeth 
Sewell's life and work. ... As with Coleridge, 
her commitment is to the acts and the living 
language of imagination - to words as 'living 
powers,' 'powers of our own body and mind, 
energies of our own.'73 
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Of Polanyi and Arendt, Sewell suggests: 
Michael Polanyi would save us from dislocation from 
our instruments of power or idolatry of them by 
a new inquiry into, and affirmation of, human 
thought as mind and body, with faith and personal 
commitment as the foundation of all learning and 
knowing. Hannah Arendt would save us from self-
generated automatism by offering us freedom in its 
essential form, the power to initiate new be­
ginnings, in thought and action.74 
She says of Polanyi: 
It has now been put forward, by a scientist, that 
science with its distinctive form of logical 
thought depends on an act of affirmation by the 
scientist, personally, in what he is doing, and 
that this basic assertion of personal commitment 
can never be verified by any logical means. This 
is the theme of Polanyi's Personal Knowledge. . . . 
It is the restoration of science once more to the 
company of the arts, giving science for its 
foundation the mythic or metaphoric or poetic 
situation where figure and agent become one and 
the same.75 
Of Arendt, Sewell contends: 
In The Human Condition Hannah Arendt invites us to 
look at ourselves as human beings, individual, 
social, and political. . . . She is concerned in 
this work, she says, with activity, the kind of 
activity which is accessible to all average human 
beings. . . . Human beings, at the level of 
thought and action, have always at their disposal 
one resource, both simple and 'miraculous' in the 
exact sense: the power to initiate action, . . . 
to begin the new and improbable.76 
Much of Sewell's work is about method, the figuring of 
relationships based upon a personal trust in the use of 
one's own imagination. 
Method? body the mind and its ways (us all) 
in figures ^ 
And study them so. 
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This is an act of both making and unmaking, or as Sewell 
says, it means "to arise and unbuild again"—and again, and 
again. It is typical of her to give the clues for her 
method in a poem: 
The rule, we find, 
Is to be permeable: marbles stain: 
Light filters through packed crystals; someone's pain 
Threads our interstices. 
Creatures of all kind 
Are porous, breathe, fuse with their media; 
Closures but seem. 
Given a mind, 
Much more so; tides of the universe have play; 
Stars sift across our system once a day; 
Cosmos and chaos all we do. 
Then, Soul, defined 
As other, yet materially fleshed, 
Thy proper form retaining, o be meshed-
What flood of love, air, fire, 
Weep if thou will for shame and for desire, 
Shall stream thee through.:?8 
Of Sewell's method, called "postlogic," Ladner believes: 
The question of method must always be a question 
about man. ... It is because man is already 
a form-giving and form-receiving being by virtue 
of his own earth-rooted form as body-mind that he 
is able to go on forming any questions at all 
about how he ought to question. . . . For Sewell 
to speak of poetic method is not for her to ask 
us simply to consider the novelty of relying 
upon poetic verse as an interesting method of 
seeing what might otherwise have been ignored. 
It is her way of speaking about man's relation 
to the world. And postlogic or poetic method is 
the human instrument for discovering and develop­
ing this relation.79 
In this linking of person to world through language, 
through poetic method, Sewell says that skill in using the 
imagination to make connections is required and, as with any 
skill, this requires doing and practice. Additionally, she 
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maintains that 
What is needed is the patient cherishing of one's 
own flesh and blood and bones . . ., the listen­
ing to what it has to say, the faithful helping 
of the body to think and to contribute all it 
can to the life of the mind.80 
The use of the imagination is the primary methodological 
means for establishing systems of relationships, and 
language is the paradigmatic expression of this process. 
Sewell often uses the metaphor of a dance when speaking 
about language: 
Every word or group of words is at once a mean­
ing, a history, and the occasion of activity in 
the mind. . . . This then is our field, where 
everything is in action and movement, and you 
cannot 'tell the dancer from the dance.'81 
She likes the metaphor of dance 'because it implies that in 
the act of thinking the body is passionately involved and 
moving in a stylized yet free way, thus establishing a dance 
of relations. Sewell looks at language as activity or myth 
and says that "mind-bodies work and unite with figures in 
82 order to learn and discover." 
Since language is integral to the realm of human af­
fairs and is also bodily rooted, both complexity and ambi­
guity surround any discussion of its meaning. The poet and 
poetic method help in establishing both universal relation­
ships and personal transformations which come about through 
language. Sewell says, in quoting Valery, 
'The Poet, without being aware of it, moves in an 
order of possible relationships and transformations.' 
Here is the final and noblest game of skill and 
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hazard, the wager against odds, number, and calcu­
lation versus change and probability. . . . 
Poetry is the exquisite and brief moment between 
order and disorder.83 
Two metaphors used often by Sewell are those of game 
and dance, and throughout her work there are allusions to 
movement, activity and bodied involvement. All these 
metaphors relate to her primary field of inquiry, that of 
language and the use of the imagination as its method for 
making relationships. Sewell believes: 
The imagination cannot work and the wholeness of 
the human being will be ruined if mind wars 
against body . . ., for since the imagination is 
a unifying agent in all its operations it needs 
body and mind together in a reasonable prelimi­
nary harmony before it can proceed with the rest 
of its work, the multiplication of unitive 
relations between that harmony and all external 
things.84 
For Sewell, three great resource areas must be tapped 
constantly as we seek to make meaningful relations and sense 
of who we are to and in the world. These resources are 
tradition, metaphors, and personal experience, or, in 
Sewell1s terms, inheritance, images as signs or figures, and 
p r 
what is immediately known and lived. By drawing from 
these three areas, formulations of relations emerge which 
lead to discoveries, self-revelations, solutions to prob­
lems , and which enhance the human understandings we come to 
rely upon for making and taking up the world. This is a 
dynamic process which involves the movement and interchange 
of figures from at least five formal language-communication 
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systems: dance and ritual; music and rhythm; plastic arts; 
86 mathematics; and word-language. 
But, according to Ladner, for Sewell, "the body is the 
primary form from which and by means of which formalizing, 
p *n 
meaningful human activity is performed." On this matter, 
Sewell states that 
The world, the universe, is to the human mind a 
universe of figures. . . . Out of this appear 
the figures bright and beautiful, great and 
small, of the natural world. After them comes 
man. He shares with all things in nature the 
character of having a specific and recognizable 
figure of his own; ... He differs from them 
completely in that he appears as a figure to him­
self. The sheer fact of so appearing gives him 
a unique double figure, a body, which is a 
figure in itself, infused with a capacity, which 
we call mind, to perceive, invent, transmit, match 
and contrast, and act our figures, and to do so 
with conscious purpose.88 
Put it this way: there are men on a venture. 
After? one could say they are after cosmos and 
kingdom. Where? where else but the living rock-
vaults of mind and body.89 
Discovery, as Sewell describes it, takes place on two 
levels; one level is in relation to the universe and the 
other is in relation to the self. In this regard, she speaks 
of following the "self-unravelling clue," a phrase Coleridge 
used to describe clues which unravel a problem of inquiry 
90 
and also unravel the self of the seeker. The power of 
interpretation is involved here and includes both a self-
making or self-constructing and an attempt to interpret 
something about the universe. What Sewell is searching for, 
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again in Coleridge's words, is "an other world that now is." 
She feels that a world derived from conventional dualisms by 
which we conduct our methodological affairs is not the real 
world. To have split science from poetry, analysis from 
synthesis, mathematics from words, intellect from the imag­
ination, and body from mind has resulted in methods of 
inquiry which no longer make connections that result in 
meaningful and diverse ways of experiencing the world. So 
she says, 
We are leaving a world, which is not the world. 
We have constructed . . . with two-ness and a 
method appertaining, a world. If we can hold 
to a, to that an, letting go of the, we can 
begin to search.91 
The "two-ness" of which Sewell speaks implies the 
resultant dualisms which have plagued research in the con­
temporary, technological world. For Sewell, there are other 
ways of being in a world, and it is the work of the imagina­
tion to discover such ways. The problem faced by the imagi­
nation because of such a fragmenting and particularizing of 
the world is this: 
The imagination can work only by putting together; 
it has no other mode of operation. Consequently 
all the food that is offered to it which splits 
mind and body is useless to it.92 
The union of the self and the object it is contemplat­
ing or concerned with is the essence of poetic method for 
Sewell, and closely parallels Polanyi's thoughts on in­
dwelling. One of Rilke's poems helps to clarify this idea, 
and Sewell is fond of it for that reason: 
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Dance the orange. 
. . . You have possessed it. 
It has been deliciously converted to you. 
. . . Create the relation 
with the pure, reluctant rind, q 
with the juice that fills the happy fruit! 
Sewell has explored the relations of order to disorder, 
sense to nonsense, logic to nightmare, and numbers to 
dreams. In her book The Field of Nonsense, she uses the 
metaphor of game to describe nonsense and relates it to the 
language structures and verses of Lewis Carroll and Edward 
Lear. At the outset of the book Sewell proposes the follow­
ing: 
The assumption that you know what sense is, and 
consequently what nonsense is, depends not on 
the acceptance or rejection'of blocs of fact 
but upon the adoption of certain sets of mental 
relations. Whatever holds together according 
to these relationships will be sense, whatever 
does not will be nonsense.94 
Nonsense could be dismissed as either a deviation from 
reality or as an annihilation of relationships. But for her 
own work, she believes that nonsense is held together 
through a set of valid relationships. 
We are going to assume that Nonsense is not mere­
ly denial of sense, a random reversal of ordinary 
experience and an escape from the limitations of 
everyday life, into a haphazard infinity, but is 
on the contrary a carefully limited world, con­
trolled and directed by reason, a construction 
subject to its own laws.95 
In looking at the nonsense verse of Carroll and Lear 
for the particular kinds of valid relations, Sewell proposes 
an analogy to game. She asks: 
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Could Nonsense be an attempt at reorganizing 
language, not according to the rules of prose 
or poetry in the first place but according to 
those of Play? I do not mean here the simplest 
forms of games and energy and horseplay, but the 
more highly developed and complicated types of 
play. Each game of this type is an enclosed 
whole, with its own rigid laws which cannot be 
questioned within the game itself; if you put 
yourself inside the system which is the game, 
you bind yourself by that system's laws, and so 
incidentally attain that particular sense of 
freedom which games have to offer.96 
Sewell explores the notion of freedom through a phrase of 
Valery's: "The poet is most free when he most loads him-
9 7 self with chains." Sewell talks of this idea being "a 
piece of strange insight. ... I found myself defining 
freedom, for myself, as the voluntary acceptance of apparent-
9 8 ly arbitrary limitation." 
Returning to the game, she ties some of these ideas to­
gether by formulating a definition: 
A GAME: the active manipulation, serving no use­
ful purpose, of a certain object or class of 
objects, concrete or mental, within a certain 
limited field of space and time and according to 
fixed rules, with the aim of producing a given 
result despite the opposition of chance and/or 
opponents.99 
Sewell speaks of players who voluntarily consent to play, 
their need to manipulate playthings with some sort of con­
trol, and the game structure being separated into distinct, 
small, and separate units. All of these features of games 
and their players result in the production (or attempts at 
such) of some kind of ordered series of relationships. The 
opposition, on the other hand, attempts to inject disorder 
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into the opponent's scheme of relations while attempting 
to produce its own network of successfully ordered movements. 
The actions of ordering and disordering are necessary to the 
dynamic of a game. 
But game, for Sewell, means enclosure and fixed rules, 
and she suggests that the safety experienced inside the game 
because of the imposed limitations must at some point come 
to an end. Game is not a metaphor for life here. Game is 
a limited world which serves no productive purpose and in­
corporates clearly defined units of skills and objects which 
have specific functions within the game. In the nonsense 
world of game, a weaving of relationships, establishing 
associations and identifying elements compatible with one 
another, and a drive toward ordering them takes place against 
the tension-producing, disordering probability of an 
opponent. 
While many of these kinds of things do go on within our 
daily lives, Sewell feels that a danger lurks in staying 
within the game metaphor for too long. The danger is that 
perfect nonsense or perfect order creates "a universe which 
will be logical and orderly, with separate units held to­
gether by a strict economy of relations, not subject to 
dream and disorder with its multiplications of relationships 
and associations.""''^ Taken to its extreme, nonsense limits 
emotions, paradox, ambiguity, accommodation, passivity for 
contemplation, and the multiplicity of perspectives 
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possible through other forms. This is why for Sewell a game 
must come to an end, and one must step out of it. There are 
many systems of relationships and game is just one of them. 
To end a game at its appropriate point and then leave it 
means to "unbuild" it so that it can arise again when re­
played and can be experienced for its own unique arrangement 
of things and people. 
Games, in Sewell*s view, also have a larger cosmological 
significance. 
We thought we were on safe ground with these/ 
logical games, so numbered and orderly; but Siva 
dices with the world, and if, in terms of 
mythology, the gods play games with the universe, 
then any play on our part is a shadowing of 
theirs. ... So any game is at one and the same 
time an exercise of skill and manipulative 
ability, a way of finding out how God deals with 
the universe, and a dangerous make-believe with 
holy things.101 
Understanding game as myth and metaphor takes her from a 
world of orderly relationships between and among small parts 
to a connection with the cosmos. And this connection is 
linked to the body: 
The logical type of play is a manipulation of 
things . . .; but this other type of play is a 
putting of oneself into things, not the moving of 
bodies (be they card or counters . . .), but per­
haps something to do with the body itself and 
movement.102 
The notion of the body becoming one with its object of 
concern was put forward by Sewell in the early stages of her 
writing on the imagination. It is interesting to note that 
Polanyi came to the same idea (under the rubric of 
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"indwelling") toward the end of his writing career. Both 
emphasize the importance of the body in every instance of 
knowing. 
Sewell's writings suggest a constant and dynamic inter­
course between the abstract and the concrete, between in­
tellectually perceived relations and the corporeal fabric of 
the enfleshed body. Her work is concerned with establish­
ing relationships and with joining seemingly disparate 
entities. She relies on the language of myth and metaphor, 
the language of play, game and dance, and of movement, body, 
and action to inform her inquiry. 
Embodiment and Intentionality 
The discussion in this chapter so far has centered on 
action, skills, and appearances undertaken within volun­
tarily chosen, yet rule-bound, settings. Embodied knowing 
and sensate understandings have also been emphasized. The 
human condition reveals facets of both volition and an 
active unity between mind and body. Communication through 
word-speech and movement-speech in the presence of others 
condition the appearances of human beings. Persons as em­
bodied, intentional, acting beings decide with others 
about making and taking up the forms of the world. Hannah 
Arendt says: 
Men are conditioned beings because everything 
they come in contact with turns immediately into 
a condition of their existence. The world in 
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which the 'vita activa' spends itself consists 
of things produced by human activities. . . . 
In addition to the conditions under which life 
is given to man on earth, and partly out of them, 
men constantly create their own, self-made con­
ditions. . . . Whatever touches or enters into 
a sustained relationship with human life im­
mediately assumes the character of a condition 
of human existence.103 
The human condition which has formed the basis for 
exploration so far in this chapter concerns human beings in 
performance. Action in the public space is constituted by 
enacted skills. These often require instruments and oppo­
sition for their achievement and are located within a game 
structure. The body as the ultimate, tacit instrument of 
knowing becomes one with its objects of concern, and in the 
presence of other enfleshed beings finds performances 
within itself which at times are miraculous. 
To conclude this chapter, the words "embodiment" and 
"intentionality" will be explored. Philosophers continue . 
to be plagued and confused by the complex and problematic 
status of both. Consequently, this part of the discussion 
is not meant to be comprehensive in terms of the literature 
which exists, nor is it intended to untangle the deeper 
mysteries behind such terms as mind-body, perception, con­
sciousness, will, or intention. Rather, the nature of em­
bodiment will be explored through some of the ideas offered 
by Arendt on the vita activa, by Polanyi on indwelling, and 
by Sewell on mind-body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty1s work will 
be plumbed for his understanding of enfleshed beings. These 
148 
ideas are important to the nature of this study, since human 
beings as players of games are embodied persons in action in 
a chosen field. The meaning of intentionality will also be 
explored through positions taken by Arendt and Merleau-
Ponty, since the volition of the embodied player is 
also of interest to this study. 
The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty1s most 
important book, was published in English in 1962 though 
first published in French in 19 45. Richard Zaner believes 
it is the corporeal scheme which is of fundamental impor­
tance to Merleau-Ponty. Such a scheme is constituted by 
means of concrete tasks carried out through bodily movements 
with a concurrent unity between..body senses, organs, and 
objects. The phenomenon of language is also particularly 
interesting to Merleau-Ponty. Garth Gillan says that 
Merleau-Ponty writes with two foci always in view: "the 
language of philosophy and its self-discovery within the 
corporeal texture of language itself, the flesh of 
105 language." Probably no other modern phxlosopher has 
devoted so much attention to the status of the enfleshed 
being-in-the-world. Like Arendt, Polanyi, and Sewell, 
Merleau-Ponty challenges the epistemological and ontological 
methods of inquiry into knowing and being which have re­
sulted from an acceptance of Cartesian doubt as a method­
ological starting point, with the subsequent emphasis on 
mind being separate from body. 
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But in this essay it is Hannah Arendt who will first 
delineate the nature of the problem of the body and conse­
quently the problem of action versus contemplation, or body 
versus mind. Arendt states: 
The primacy of contemplation over activity rests 
on the conviction that no work of human hands 
can equal in beauty and truth the physical 
'cosmos,1 which swings itself in changeless 
eternity. . . . This eternity discloses itself 
to mortal eyes only when all human movements and 
activities are at perfect rest.106 
She feels that such a conviction was held by the philoso­
phers of Greek antiquity and resulted in the placing of con­
templation in a hierarchical position above the status of 
action. This notion has ruled the tradition of metaphysical 
inquiry throughout the ages of Western civilization. Arendt 
adds: 
Christianity, with its belief in a hereafter 
whose joys announce themselves in the delights 
of contemplation, conferred a religious sanction 
upon the abasement of the vita activa to its 
derivative secondary position.1^7 
Arendt also believes that since thinking is swift and 
immaterial, philosophers have always had a certain hostility 
toward the body because the body is viewed as an obstacle 
toward achieving the clarity which contemplation brings. 
Since the flesh is rooted in both organic demands and an 
ambiguity which can never be fully explained, the body is 
sometimes regarded by philosophers as a hindrance to the 
non-sensate and invisible activity of thinking. Thought 
requires quiet, solitude, and stillness; action requires 
150 
movement, others, and tension. All thinking demands a 
stopping, a ceasing of doing. And, as Arendt says, "While 
you are thinking, you are unaware of your own corporeal-
108 ity." The thinker's own body seems absent in the action 
of thinking. Awareness of others, or of one's own sensate 
flesh, interrupts the thinker. This awareness of the body 
moves the thinker into the realm of the vita activa whether 
it be in the form of labor, work, or action. 
Arendt feels that the distrust of the vita activa, as 
an adequate way to experience the world, has its origins in 
philosophers who fostered the notion that contemplation was 
more important than action. Mind over matter is one way of 
stating this position. The radical disconnection of mind 
from matter occurred in the philosophical work of Descartes. 
As Descartes would have it, the cogitating mind (res 
cogitans) was divided from the extended body (res extensa) 
in which it happened to be housed. Grene says of this 
Cartesian error: 
There is no such thing as a mind by itself; there 
is no such thing in the living world as a body 
by itself. It is from this cardinal metaphysical 
error of Descartes that his epistemological 
errors, with all of their misleading consequences, 
flow.109 
One of the misleading consequences of Cartesian method­
ology has been to reduce the universe to mathematical and 
analytical treatment. Arendt speaks of the mathematical 
web which has been spun around reality: 
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It certainly is neither a demonstration of an 
inherent and inherently beautiful order of 
nature nor does it offer a confirmation of the 
human mind, of its capacity to surpass senses 
in perceptivity or of its adequateness as an 
organ for the reception of truth.HO 
But Arendt is quick to point out that the vita activa and 
the vita contemplativa are both woven into the condition of 
being human. She suggests that the capacities of labor, 
work, and action are as important to human beings as the 
capacities of thinking, willing, and judging. In fact, much 
of Arendt's philosophical work is devoted to exploring the 
relationship between the life of the mind and the life of 
action. She states that 
Men . . . subject to labor in order to live, moti­
vated to work in order to make themselves at 
home in the world, and roused to action in order 
to find their place in the society of their fellow-
men can mentally transcend all these conditions, 
but only mentally. . . . They can judge 
affirmatively or negatively . . .; they can will 
the impossible . . .; and they can think.Ill 
The problem of mind and body, Arendt contends, is as 
old as the first philosophers of Western civilization, name­
ly, Parmenides , Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle. A consequence 
of the problem has been a distrust of the senses. For 
Descartes and for those who first invented sense-substitut­
ing instruments, a loss of trust in the senses was ac­
companied by a distrust of common sense. Of Descartes, 
Arendt says: 
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It was thought that destroyed his common-sense 
trust in reality, and his error was to hope he 
could overcome his doubt by insisting on with­
drawing from the world altogether . . . concen­
trating only on the thinking activity itself.112 
By "common sense" Arendt means the following: 
The only character of the world by which to gauge 
its reality is its being common to us all, and 
common sense occupies such a high rank . . . because 
it is the one sense that fits into reality as a 
whole our strictly individual senses. ... It 
is by virtue of common sense that the other sense 
perceptions are known to disclose reality and are 
not merely felt as irritations of our nerves or 
resistance sensations of our bodies.H3 
For Arendt, our senses tell us something and are inte­
grated into a perception of reality by a sixth sense which 
is common sense. Thinking withdraws us from the world which 
is sensorily given and thus from the feeling of reality 
which is given by common sense. Arendt says that the 
common sense experiences which a person has in company with 
others guarantee a sense of reality about being and about 
the world. 
The reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by 
its worldly context, which includes others who 
perceive as I do . . . and by the working to­
gether of my five senses on the other. What . . . 
we call common sense ... is a kind of sixth 
sense needed to keep my five senses together. . . . 
This . . . 'sixth sense1 because it cannot be 
localized as a bodily organ, fits the sen­
sations of my strictly private five senses . . . 
into a common world shared by others.114 
What precipitated the modern distrust of the senses was 
the invention and subsequent reliance on the instrument of 
the telescope. Galileo's instrument began to uncover what 
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lay beyond the world of ordinary sense experience. The 
stage was set for a loss of faith in the senses to tell us 
anything reliable about reality. What became common to 
human beings was no longer the belief in the truth of sense 
experience but the belief that each person possessed a com­
mon faculty called reason which could never be made common­
ly accessible to the senses. With the telescope, the body 
conspired against itself to confirm "with its own eyes" the 
unreliability of ordinary vision. "Truth," "knowledge," 
and "meaning" retreated inward into the recesses of the 
abstract mind. 
As a result of the mind-body split, reality has been 
fragmented into analyzable bits.'of information made known 
through mathematics and scientific technology. Ladner main­
tains that 
In order for this state of affairs to have emerged 
so thoroughly and indisputably the whole context 
of meaning and reality had to shift radically 
from the locus of man's own body and speech as 
the paradigmatic place of understanding to the in­
finity of space with its appropriate language.115 
To recover "the paradigmatic place of understanding," 
Polanyi proposed his theory of personal knowledge which re­
instated the primacy of the body's actions in coming to know 
the world. As we have seen, integral to Polanyi1s thesis 
is his discussion of indwelling. 
When we make a thing function as the proximal 
term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our 
body-or extend our body to include it-so that we 
come to dwell in it. . . . Indwelling, as 
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derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is 
a far more precisely defined act than is empathy, 
and it underlies all observations.116 
To bring out an essential point about indwelling, 
Polanyi continues to employ the example of skillful use of 
instruments. 
We use instruments as an extension of our hands 
and they may serve also as an extension of our 
senses. We assimilate them to our body by pour­
ing ourselves into them. . . . Everytime we 
assimilate a tool to our body our identity under­
goes some change; our person expands into new 
modes of being.117 
For Polanyi there is a reliance on bodily awareness in order 
to attend to the performance with which it is concerned. In 
speaking about Polanyi's work, Grene says, "every comprehen­
sive entity, no matter how comp;lex . . ., depends, Polanyi 
would insist—and rightly insist—on lower levels of reality 
for its existence. All reality, so far as our situation 
118 shows us, is body-bound." Grene also suggests that: 
In every comprehensive entity, a skilful perfor­
mance, a life history, the growth of an 
institution, or whatever it be, something not 
yet born is striving toward a being that pulls 
it forward to maturity.119 
Polanyi believes that skillful doing and knowing in­
volve an intentional change of being and that this change 
comes about due to a pouring of the self into the object of 
concern. He proposes that 
The arts of doing and knowing, the valuation and 
the understanding of meanings, are seen to be only 
different aspects of the act of extending our 
person into the subsidiary awareness of par­
ticulars which comprise a whole.120 
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The domain of legitimate knowledge, for Polanyi, includes 
intentions and actions and the meanings and understandings 
which come from them. He also claims that "What we perceive 
is an aspect of reality, and aspects of reality are clues 
to boundless undisclosed, and perhaps yet unthinkable, 
121 experiences." And when we indwell completely some aspect 
of reality which we perceive, Polanyi reasons that there is 
a resultant striving to seek further levels of reality. It 
is the body which indwells or pours itself into the object 
or theory or framework or tool of its concern in order to 
interiorize it and know it. 
This fusion of self with its concerns also forms a 
focus for the work of Elizabeth,Sewell. The joining of mind 
and body is sought through the active use of the imagination. 
I have repeated one essential thing about which 
I conceive to be the true life of the imagination, 
that in it the life of the mind depends for its 
liberation upon a kind of submission to the life 
of the body (and the human), and that the two 
must live together, according to the way of man 
and not of angels or demons. This submission is, 
superficially, a scandal, but, more profoundly 
viewed, it is a way of freedom.122 
The imagination, for Sewell, is linked inextricably to 
method, which is a process of making and finding meaningful 
relationships. About this, Sewell contends: 
This method calls in consciously the whole figure 
of the human organism of mind and body, and from 
this builds up its thought in an organic and 
human frame by which the human being and his 
universe are to be related and interpreted.123 
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The concept of mind-body working together through the 
imagination is expressed in a fragment of one of Sewell's 
poems: 
We look for knowledge and experience. 
Holy things both, as is the earth itself, _ 
And every man. Our word is 'Keep together.1 
Another one of Sewell's poems indicates that, "Man only 
125 feels his mind / In-fibrilled in the flesh." For Sewell, 
the body thinks, the human being as a whole enters into both 
the formation and taking up of its images. 
If, for the living individual, the body is the 
original generator of forms, first its own struc­
ture and behavior, then forms which are in varying 
degrees separated from itself and which according­
ly offer the mind-body scope for its formalizing 
tendencies, it may be true to say that all formal 
activity in the human mind 'has its origin and 
roots always in the physical. The mind-body may 
generate forms as language or terms for metaphoric 
activity by which to understand itself and its 
experience, but all form, no matter how apparently 
abstract and intellectual, may never lose its con­
nection with, its message for, the body.126 
There is no liberty in chaos and it is the work of the 
imagination to bring some order to diversity. Within this 
ordering, freedom of action and its possible fruitfulness 
can be experienced. The imagination puts things together 
and builds structures of relationships out of seeming dis­
parities. About the imagination Sewell believes that 
It is its nature to multiply relationships in 
every possible way, and to accept contradictions. 
And so there is no reason to be surprised if we 
see that it requires the self to unite and 
identify with whatever it may be contemplating 
in fact or in image.12 7 
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This unity of body with image is analogous to Polanyi's 
sense of indwelling in that the person feels an embodied 
union with an object or theory or instrument. 
Sewell contrasts two methods of inquiry in one of her 
poems, one stanza suggesting the Cartesian approach of ab­
stract, formal inquiry and the other stanza suggesting a dis­
covery process of bodily enactment. 
"The Two Kinds" 
I have sat down with the Entities at table, 
Eaten with them the meal of ceremony, 
And they were stamped with jewels, and intuned 
God's ordered praises. 
But now the Activities hand me to the dancing, 
Brown naked bodies lithe and crimson-necklaced 
And tambourines besiege the darkened altars, 
In what God's honour?128 
In discussing Sewell's work, Ladner says that 
The recovery of the whole human form—including 
body, world, dreams, logic, imagination, language— 
involves the development and extension of what 
Sewell calls 'the human metaphor' (which is 
poetic metaphor) to every area of our existence 
as thinking and knowing beings.129 
Ladner goes on to indicate that "Poetic method starts at the 
point of overcoming the dichotomies that most philosophers, 
poets, theologians, and critics since the seventeenth cen­
tury seem inevitably to have been left with, for the unity of 
the knower and the known, the subject and object in this meth­
od is precisely what is pre-supposed in understanding man's 
130 epistemic activity." In Arendt's words, such unity means 
"mind and body, thinking and sense experience, the invisible 
and the visible, belong together, are 'made' for each 
other. 
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The final word on these matters, for this chapter, 
belongs to the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Free­
dom, he says, cannot be found in the act of breaking away 
but only by engagement in situations. The body is joined 
to the world in this engagement through movements into and 
inside of projects. Merleau-Ponty says, "Our body is not in 
space like things; it inhabits or haunts space. . . . For 
us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it 
is our expression in the world, the visible form of our 
132 intentions." Klaus Meier indicates that for Merleau-Ponty, 
"Meanings arise through the body's power of expression. . . . 
The lived-body always possesses the possibility of unfolding 
more projects and participating:in more meaningful 
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activities." 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body, which affirms the 
priority of "I am" to "I-think," is related to his theory 
of perception. "To perceive," he says, "is not to experience 
a host of impressions . . .; it is to see, standing forth 
from a cluster of data, an imminent significance."134 Since 
human beings move about in space, which is inhabited by both 
objects and other persons, multiple perspectives and inter­
pretations of what is happening must inevitably arise. In 
order to be present to things and people through one's body, 
perceptions must be relied upon to help make sense of the 
relationships which unfold during experience. Commenting on 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception, Gillan says: 
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Perception is the original, unmediated relation­
ship with existence, for it is within this per­
ception that what exists and is meaningful first 
appears. Existence is thus the category of the 
seen, the heard, the touched, the smelled, and 
the tasted. The role of perception as the realm 
of existence is identical to its role as the 
original domain of meaning.135 
Grene compares Polanyi's work to that of Merleau-Ponty1s and 
concludes that the thesis common to both philosophers is 
this: 
Sensory immediacy has its directness, its 
reliability, not from its being cut off, 'in my 
mind,1 but from the very fact that it is out 
there: it is my most concrete, dramatic, 
pervasive manner of being in the world.136 
Immersion in the world through the attentive body en­
gaged in the speech and action of its projects offers to 
human beings significance and meanings. Also, the kinds of 
projects and forms people take up through active engagement 
provide the situation in which a person's potential ability 
can be explored. We normally lend our bodies to the world 
and inhabit the world without any intention of appropriating 
it or possessing it. What the world provides is a space for 
movement, structures which make it up, other people who 
also want to appear, and a natural environment. All these 
together provide a many-layered and complexly textured field 
of reality into which we insert ourselves in order to make 
discoveries about who we are and from which we gain per­
ceptions about our relation to the reality of such a world. 
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For Merleau-Ponty, the body rootedness of our being-
in-the-world is fraught with ambiguity and perplexity. 
Ambiguity is the essence of human existence, and 
everything we live or think has always several 
meanings. . . . There is in human existence a 
principle of indeterminacy. . . . Existence is 
indeterminate in itself, by reason of its funda­
mental structure, and in so far as it is the very 
process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on 
meaning . . . chance is transformed into reason. . . . 
Existence never utterly outruns anything, for in 
that case the tension which is essential to it 
would disappear.137 
In a sense, claims Merleau-Ponty, we are condemned to mean­
ing and the tension of actively taking up the world will 
always result in many perspectives on reality by virtue of 
being a body acting with other bodies. He says, "The world 
is not what I think, but what I.:live through. I am open to 
the world, I have no doubt that I am in communication with 
138 it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible." Zaner 
adds, with reference to Merleau-Ponty's work, 
My body-proper manifests me to the world, puts 
me at the world, by means of my various senses. . . . 
To act on the world is to disclose the world as a 
contexture of possible ways-to-be. ... To be 
embodied, and thus to be sensuously perceptive of 
objects, and to be able to act on them, is to 
belong to the world in the sense of being engaged 
in a body which places me at things themselves, 
with no intermediary.139 
To be placed "at things themselves" can be interpreted 
as being at one with them, another kind of indwelling. "As 
I contemplate the blue sky," says Merleau-Ponty, "I am not 
set over against it . . .; I do not possess it in thought 
. . ., I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, 
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140 it 'thinks itself within me.'" In this way, being in the 
midst of things, the body is present to the world and the 
world's presence is opened to the body. The body thus 
experienced is a center of action. And the larger the 
body's potential for action, the more insightful will be the 
set of meanings which comes from any authentic appearance 
among people and objects. For Merleau-Ponty, the embodied 
self is the locus where lines of meaning converge to help 
discern the texture and patterns of the reality of the world. 
He believes that "My body is the fabric into which all 
objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the 
perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehen­
sion.'"141 
The perceived world of which Merleau-Ponty speaks is 
filled with all sorts of colors, shapes, sounds, and smells, 
and it is against this kind of background that acts stand 
out to reveal their own distinctive shape. Although such 
action presupposes a diversity of resultant meanings, there 
is always a kind of unity of events which are undertaken by 
embodied beings. Relationships are established in a face-
to-face communication of person to others or person to 
objects which are not mediated by entrepreneurs or instruments 
which rob the body of its trust in the senses. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it, 
Our task will be to rediscover phenomena, the 
layer of living experience through which other 
people and things are first given to us . . .; 
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to reawaken perception and foil its trick of 
allowing us to forget it as a fact and as a per­
ception in the interest of the object which it 
presents.142 
In other words it is not knowledge of particulars 
is revealed to us; rather, a revelation of the meaning 
being-in-the-world in some unified way is presented to 
Grene states that 
There is no absolute, once for all, knowing by 
human beings. . . . There are only ourselves 
using all the means at our disposal: bodily 
orientation, sensory images, verbal formulations 
. . . and, finally, our deepest, widest vision of 
the world we dwell in: using all these as clues 
to the nature we are in a given instance trying to 
understand.143 
So we keep coming back to meanings and interpretations, 
understandings and perspectives; all rooted in the ambiguous 
embodied self. And this self is an active seeker of re­
lationships with the world and its objects. The movement of 
person into the world is characterized, says Merleau-Ponty, 
by intentional threads which run from the body to its 
projects and through its actions. He says, "Ahead of what 
I see and perceive, there is, it is true, nothing more 
actually visible, but my world is carried forward by lines 
of intentionality which trace out in advance at least the 
144 style of what is to come." 
Merleau-Ponty identifies a broadened notion of in­
tentionality which includes both the voluntary taking up of 
a position and the movement toward the unity of the world 
which is already there. That is to say, we go forward with 
which 
of 
us. 
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an intentional plan of action but also recognize that the 
world has its own intention. Yet, there is a conscious 
movement toward the world by the body and intentional 
threads from the body link a person to the world. Paul 
Schilder speaks of human action being directed toward an aim 
through some sort of plan, but he suggests that it would be 
wrong to believe that the plan exists in the full light of 
consciousness. 
We do not know clearly, but still have an in­
stinctive insight where this intention may lead 
to. . . . This germ of the plan to a movement 
finds its development only during performance of 
the action, and the sensations provoked by the 
action will have a developing influence on the 
plan. In this plan the knowledge of one's own 
body is an absolute necessity.145 
Stuart Hampshire puts it this way: 
More often than not we have not previously ex­
pressed to ourselves our intention, or formulated 
it in words. But it is the possibility of our 
declaring, or expressing, our intention from 
moment to moment, and if the question is asked, 
that gives sense to the notion of intention itself. 
Without this possibility, the notion of intention 
becomes empty.146 
In this light, Merleau-Ponty claims that it is important 
to understand motility as basic intentionality. Movement 
is not thought about movement, and every voluntary movement 
takes place in some sort of setting so that the "I can" 
intention is allowed to find its actuality in "I am able to 
and I do it." But the intention to act may not result in an 
"I am able." When we try to follow up our intentions they 
have a tendency to modify themselves based upon the situation 
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encountered so that at every moment new intentions may 
147 spring afresh from the body. Moreover, intention is not 
simply a desire, a wish, or a choice. Hampshire writes 
about complexities of the concept of intention: 
The notion of the will, of action, the relation 
of thought and action, the relation of a person's 
mind and body ... - all these problems find 
their meeting-place in the notion of intention.148 
The connection of willing to intention also interests 
Hannah Arendt. According to her, the will as an invisible 
faculty of the mind transforms a desire into an intention, 
and the willing ego is the driving force behind intention-
ality, which subsequently becomes the driving force behind 
action. Her discussion on willing centers on the idea that 
"the will anticipates what the future may bring out but is 
149 not yet." For Arendt, the will is connected to future 
projects and to freedom: 
The decision the will arrives at can never be 
derived from the mechanics of desire or the de­
liberations of the intellect that may precede it. 
The will is either an organ of free spontaneity 
that interrupts all causal chains of motivation 
that would bind it or it is nothing but an il­
lusion. ... It is impossible to deal with the 
willing activity without touching on the problem 
of freedom. ... It is the will, whose subject 
matter is projects, not objects, which in a sense 
create the person that can be blamed or praised 
and anyhow held responsible not merely for its 
actions but for its whole 'Being,' its character. 
Willing is not a substitute for thinking nor is it a 
substitute for wishing. When Arendt speaks of the connection 
of willing to freedom, she suggests that, like the connection 
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of mind to body, the matter of the relationship has plagued 
philosophers throughout Western history. She says, "We can 
no more trust men of thought to arrive at a fair estimate of 
the Will than we could trust them to arrive at a fair esti-
151 mate of the body." The body cries out for its basic 
organic necessities to be met, but these necessities inter­
rupt the thinking self and the will stretches the thinker 
into a future where no certainties exist. 
The will, for Arendt, is the spring of action and pro­
vides the impetus for being able to begin something anew 
with all its inherent indeterminacies. The problem with 
this future orientation of the will is that no matter how 
high the level of predictability, there is always a basic 
uncertainty about the as yet not experienced. And, impor­
tantly for Arendt, the projects of the future as concerns of 
the will can just as easily be left undone as be undertaken. 
Arendt says that the will is our mental organ which has a 
connection to both freedom and a: future, both of which are 
fraught with indeterminacy but which also always hold out 
152 for the possibility of the new to occur. She says that 
the mood of the willing ego is that of impatience and dis­
quiet. There is a worry prior to moving into a project due 
to the will's wish for the "I-can" to be converted into an 
15 "I-do." The will always wills to do something and 
pushes forward into a future with some tension due to the 
unknown ability of being able to turn volition into the 
aimed at performance. 
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There is no tranquility in the act of willing, for tied 
into this faculty is the desire to appear, to perform among 
others. The will prepares the ground for action, and the 
cessation of willing means a start to doing something. It 
is not choice between this or that which characterizes the 
will; rather, there is a suggestion of tenseness and im­
patience toward a future set of actions which involves a 
plan but also faces the realm of contingency once action 
begins. 
Finally, as Merleau-Ponty says, "to understand is to 
experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is 
i 5 4 
given, between the intention and the performance." The 
body is the anchorage in the world, and the motility of the 
body enables intention to be converted to performance. And 
while the possibility of contingency and unpredictability 
haunt our future projects, the faculty of will nevertheless 
prods the body to surge forth into uncertain situations in 
order to experience the harmony of self in relation to the 
world. This kind of action is not caught in a series of 
means-ends relationships. Rather, willing and performing 
move out of the realm of necessity or habit and into a realm 
of discovery where the "I-can" and the "I-do" have a chance 
to meet, though not causally and not in full certainty of 
outcome. 
Neither the discussion on intentionality by Merleau-
Ponty nor the one on willing by Arendt suggest that desire, 
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simple choice,or cause-effect motivation characterize the 
action of the invisible faculty. In the realm of human af­
fairs, the performances drawn from the body in action due 
to its pull of intention are always capable of being un­
predictable and extraordinary. For both Arendt and Merleau-
Ponty, intentionality is linked to freedom and also to the 
future. The result of intentionality or willing is a doing, 
a doing which is movement, action, performance. Merleau-
Ponty says that it is "by willing what I will and doing what 
155 I do, that I can go further." For Arendt, 
Every volition, although a mental activity, re­
lates to the world of appearances in which its 
project is to be realized; in flagrant contrast 
to thinking, no willing is ever done for its own 
sake or finds its fulfillment in the act itself. 
Every volition not only concerns particulars but -
and this is of great importance - looks forward 
to its own end, when willing-something will have 
changed to doing-it.156 
The problems of body and will have been just that— 
problems for centuries and for many philosophers. The in­
tent of this section has been to present a perspective on 
these problems which is relevant to this study. The intent 
of this chapter has not been one of attempting to undercut 
the importance of contemplation, mathematics, science, or 
technology. Rather, a recovery of the importance of the 
status of the body in relation to knowing and being has been 
attempted. A claim has been made for the importance of the 
body in action as it relates to the condition of being human. 
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The body with its senses and its movements cannot dis­
trust itself regarding what it knows and what it has to tell 
about reality. The body is not involved in a losing com­
petition with the mind, nor does action deserve a minor 
standing in relation to contemplation. The movement of the 
body to its projects and in its projects is profoundly sig­
nificant, and yields an understanding of the world which is 
just as important as—indeed, provides the ground for—the 
kinds of relationships which are mediated by instruments, 
mathematics, and abstract logic. The concreteness of the 
lived-body in its actions and in its perceptions also 
presents a way of ordering relationships from which meanings 
arise. Just because the body presents us with an irreducible 
ambiguity and mystery is no reason to distrust the perspec­
tives which result from its way of grasping the world. On 
the contrary, we have seen how all forms of meaning have an 
irresolvable connection to and take their orientation from 
this irreducible ambiguity. 
Elizabeth Sewell is right when she says there needs to 
be a loving unity between mind and body. In Hannah Arendt's 
words, the life of the mind and the vita activa are made for 
each other. But, what have been problems for ages will not 
be solved in this one small paper. Still, an effort to re­
cover the importance of the field of action through in­
tentional movements by embodied human beings has been made. 
The particular structure for action is, in this study, the 
169 
game. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to es­
tablish a connection between the structure of game and the 
conditions of being human. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE HUMAN CONDITION OF THE GAME 
Two boys uncoached are tossing a poem together, 
Overhand, underhand, backhand, sleight of hand, 
every hand, 
Teasing with attitudes, latitudes, interludes, 
altitudes, 
Make him scoop it up, make him as-almost-as-
possible miss it, .. 
. . . make him scramble to pick up the meaning. 
This fragment of a poem suggests the movement of this 
chapter. It is now time to make some connections;, to weave 
a network of relationships from the previous chapters. This 
study has arrived at a point of having established a number 
of significant ideas generated by many people. Threads of 
these ideas will be woven together in this chapter from a 
framework of words determined to be important. Within the 
configuration of words about to be written, there lies a 
meaning which will be caught if at all possible. A commit­
ment was made early in this inquiry to uncover an appropriate 
understanding of game and its relation to the human con­
dition. An effort will be made to deal with the problems 
raised by this study in relation to the human condition of 
the game as well. 
The procedure to be followed in this chapter will 
emerge in two movements. The first section of the chapter 
will be a joining of the relations between game and the 
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human condition. The question, "What happens when people 
join in a game," which was posed at the start of the dis­
cussion, is now being readied for possible answers. The 
second section of this chapter will address the problems 
which beset the proposed model due to its place in the con­
temporary world. The discussion will take a critical look 
at how the game and its players have been affected by some 
of these difficulties. 
Both sections of this chapter will draw on the con­
nections made from the material already outlined. The 
ideas, words, notions, and phrases have been supplied by 
many authors. But it is now time for me to undertake a 
"dance of relations," to interpret what has gone before. 
The web of connections which I will formulate about game and 
its players is made by standing on the shoulders of many 
authors who have informed this work. My personal knowledge 
of games after a lifetime of their play and a few years of 
their study will couple with the ideas of many to form one 
more perspective in the study of games. 
A Paradigm 
We have been considering the nature of action, action 
taken up by players of a game. The game has been described 
as a structure with rules and practices. Players come to­
gether with other players to find out who can achieve what. 
Skills are performed and equipment is often used. A ground 
181 
is prepared and then run upon, walked upon, jumped upon, and 
fallen upon. The ground is a defined one, the rules are 
set, the skills are practiced in advance. Tension mounts 
before and during a game, and after the game is over there 
is a kind of satisfying calm before it all happens again. 
There are beginnings and middles and endings that all con­
tain sets of relations peculiar to that game. 
Games bring people together. Players appear because 
of a commonly accepted concern, namely, a game. There is a 
contest, there is opposition, there is sometimes achievement 
and sometimes frustration. To risk displaying one's skills, 
knowing that a good or not-so-good performance may result, 
gives the game both vitality arid seriousness. People want 
to appear both as themselves and in the presence of others. 
The uncertainty of outcome in a game and the fear of not 
performing at one's best do not doom the game. Rather, un­
predictability and tension draw people into its realm in 
order to satisfy the personal urge to know. During a game, 
as people play with others, they come to grasp facets of 
their own identity and their own abilities. They see in 
their achievements, in contests, a result of their practice. 
The skills people learn from those who know them are placed 
in relation to an opponent's skill in a game in order to 
find out who best can achieve what one knows. 
When people join in a game they also take up the past. 
They embrace centuries of traditions and customs which 
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remain inherent in games played today. Performances from 
the past become embodied in players seeking the same kinds 
of challenges that drew people into that same game years 
ago. In many cases the same kinds of equipment and imple­
ments are used by players today that were handled by people 
of antiquity. The stuff of games, their playthings, are 
taken up by the player as an extension of the body. There 
is a feel for the tools of the game. One knows the bat, 
ball, or racquet and connects with it immediately upon 
sensing it. 
The discovery of one's ability to achieve something 
never done before is always possible in the game, and, more 
often than not, is probable. The player promises to abide 
by the rules of the game, and in so doing becomes free to 
explore the kinds of relations in the game which can allow 
for a great performance to take place. This is a serious 
matter for the player even though a game may be fun. There 
is a zesty and exuberant quality to this seriousness as the 
player explores self-competency and experiences a kind of 
self-revelation as well. This is not a frivolous or unim­
portant state of affairs for human beings. Games are real 
and intense, and within their non-productivity, do serve the 
purpose of providing a space wherein revelation, discovery, 
and freedom can be attained. 
Every game has its own ordering of time and space in 
relation to both its players and things. Within this setting 
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of time, space, bodies, and things, action is encouraged, 
and full attention is paid to the particular kinds of orders 
each game contains. When the game stops, people turn to 
some other kind of time-space-person-object reality. But 
engagement in the game, given its own peculiar but accepted 
ways, provides the player with a mode of being not experi­
enced in any other setting. Therefore, games are unique; 
each one unto itself and all together. Games allow people 
to come together, to move, and to communicate. In an 
artificially created space, voluntarily taken up and con­
tested, people must appear with others and communicate some­
thing about their skillfulness by moving their bodies among 
others and with things. The primacy of the acting, embodied 
self, moving in a boundaried space and in concert with 
others, taking up traditions of the past and rules of the 
present, performing competently and intently, freely and 
expressively within limits, finds its actualization in the 
playing of a game. 
The intensity of a game comes about because players 
willingly enter into its structure with an aim toward being 
active and performing to their utmost. There is an urge to 
engage in the pursuit of one's intentions, a desire to put 
to a test, with others involved, what one has practiced. 
And yet a game is not played out of necessity; the choice to 
play. is voluntary. The game produces nothing material. 
The result of a game is in the play itself and not in an 
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outcome which will be used for something else. In a sense, 
the action of the game results in futility, in nothing pro­
duced for consumption or use. When the game ends, the 
players disperse and the highly charged space of the game's 
play lies inert until the game is begun anew by another set 
of players. The game is special because people find out 
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that they can do special things in action. When people 
start a game afresh, they rediscover a unique kind of co­
herence and also come to know a bit more about their own 
abilities within such order. 
While the people and their performances live on through 
stories, the inanimate outline of game would quickly become 
a dusty and forgotten relic of the past if players didn't 
concretely embody its structure. Through stories, artifacts, 
records, and performances games continue to remain alive. 
In a way, these might be construed as its products. But 
these products are not for consumption; rather, they are for 
preservation. They become the permanent and durable facts 
which insure that a game continues. This is the connection 
of game to culture, to a world which is durable because of 
the structures and artifacts preserved from generation to 
generation. Such judgments of preservation and remembrance 
continue to be made by players of the game, and, in par­
ticular, by those who take on the mantle of authority 
whereby they pass the game on to others because of their 
mastery of the game. Such people include teachers of the 
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game, players of the game, and those responsible for its 
record keeping of stories, performances, and rules. 
What characterizes such people is competency of skills, 
knowledge of traditions and customs, and a genuine passion 
or love for the game. By taking on the responsibility of 
passing the game from one generation to the next, those in 
authority do not have to coerce players for respect. The 
combination of tradition and authority binds together the 
community of players who are committed to the game, not for 
personal gain as such, but for preserving the game from 
violation or disappearance. Players commit themselves to 
this willingly because the game has been the space of ap­
pearance which has provided them with both personal achieve­
ment and which has disclosed the mystery of their own 
bodies. 
Despite the unpredictability inherent in the movement 
of bodies among others, the game allows a player to come to 
trust the body and its perceptions within the game setting. 
The game uses for its ground the earth, and roots the body 
to its soil or to a floor which is just above it. The en­
gagement in action because of the moving, sensate, earth-
rooted body takes on significance because of the game's 
unique structure. The significance is one which encourages 
trusting both the earth and the senses even though no 
ultimate predictability will ever be possible within the 
game. 
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There is a special way that the game allows for re­
lationships to develop among people. Communication takes 
place through the language of intentional and purposive move­
ment. This takes place in an agonal setting, a setting of 
contest, of competition which is not necessarily predicated 
solely on winning or losing. The contest is filled with 
opportunities to find out many kinds of things in relation 
to one's body, other objects, and other people. There 
exists within the game an ordering of people, numbers, space, 
time, things, rules, boundaries and skills. The urge to 
find out about them and to determine one's relation to them 
influences the intent to join in a game. And yet a player 
may never be able to make explicit all the kinds of con­
nections or realizations experienced in a game. 
A game is not all that there is; it is not a metaphor 
for life. The game structure is one among many within which 
people can become involved and act. The game does provide 
a certain way of ordering things and people and skills. The 
kinds of discoveries which can be made personally, within 
the public realm, because of what a game is may also be made 
by taking up other humanly constructed forms, though not 
quite the same way. While games are unique, many other con­
figurations of the human imagination also have their own 
distinctness. For example, to act in a play, to sing in a 
choir, or to play a musical instrument in an orchestra, 
provide ways of relating the body in action to skillful 
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performance among others. But each is different; each is 
separate from the other because unique ways of making re­
lationships exist within each. While connections can be 
made among these human enterprises, they cannot be lumped 
together as one thing nor can they be relegated into a 
category of insignificance. Care must be exercised within 
all of these endeavors to extend their metaphorical relation­
ships appropriately. Life is not a continuous tennis game 
nor is it the ongoing playing of a flute. 
What connects these kinds of humanly created forms is 
their emphasis on performance, performance which is an end 
in itself. There is movement of the body in concert with 
various objects and with other people. What separates the 
game from other performances and gives important status to 
it is not, for example, a claim to democratic ideals or 
morality or any number of psychological, sociological or 
physiological theories, though these all may have merit for 
what they tell us about game. What makes a game special is 
the element of contest; game creates an agonal space wherein 
people try to give the best performances they are capable of 
in relation to some sort of opposition. It is the deliber­
ate attempt of the player, within the rules of the game, to 
reckon with such opposition so that a particular intention 
might be achieved, and this is accomplished through skilled 
action. 
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Make no mistake about this; it is not narcissism or 
ego-boosting that is being suggested here. Rather, it is a 
genuine and serious endeavor to play well among and because 
of others and not in spite of them. It is an honest and 
intense effort to see what a player can do skillfully when 
in relation to others. By contesting with others, not for 
gain or prizes, players find out about their competencies 
and thus about themselves. Because of this peculiar ar­
rangement within games, that is the competitive setting, 
revelation through skillful performance gives an indication 
to a player of what capabilities are possessed. 
The element of contest, of agon, rests on a "being-
better- than, " a standing out. 'it is interesting to note 
that the word ecstasy means just this—to stand out—and is 
taken from the Greek word ek-stasis. There is an ecstatic 
quality to good game play, even if only for a brief moment, 
as players realize what it is "to-be-better-than." This 
should not be construed as a metaphor for production-based 
models of human affairs. The error of so taking the con­
cept of agon lies in the fact that this "being-better-than" 
due to either personal or team achievement within the game 
results in nothing. No material thing emerges as an end-
product of a game. The "end" of the game is in the perfor­
mance itself and not in something which goes forward for use 
or consumption. Herein lies the problematic use of game 
language as a metaphor for enterprises where it is 
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inappropriate. What does belong within such enterprises is 
the language of highly organized sport. Sport which is con­
stituted by production, consumption, technology, institution­
alization, patronage, and attempted predictability, contains 
the language which is much more appropriate to, for example, 
business, industry, and the military complex. But it is not 
the language of a non-productive and an immaterial game 
which should be used by these kinds of institutions. 
Game language should be reserved for those endeavors 
which seek to demonstrate something about human beings in 
action, action which is public, unpredictable, immaterial 
and offers equality to participants at the point of entry. 
Game language tells us something about culture, about tra­
ditions, about competitive endeavors which result in nothing 
but a better understanding of self and a world of relations. 
A clearer perspective about the human body, a trusting of 
its senses, a realizing of its potential and its ability to 
grasp reality because of its relation to both others and 
things, can issue from a game. 
What allows a game to provide the conditions in which 
people appear is its capacity to permit under rules, speech 
and action of distinction. The game sanctions contesting to 
do this; it allows the body a way to say something through 
competition and to find out how well something can be said. 
A certain kind of freedom within order is experienced in a 
game, and the enjoyment of being with others is felt even 
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though one attempts to stand out from them through skilled 
performance. To engage in this type of action requires 
courage, for while the player may do extraordinary things 
during a game, there is always the risk of failure. But 
people take up this kind of tension, because even in the 
smallest ways, people experience a kind of transformation 
in a game. 
People become more than they are by playing a game; 
every new thing experienced, every new relationship made, no 
matter how slight, changes them and also changes the world. 
Different images are embodied, and as such lend another 
shape to the reality of the experienced world. The ability 
to undergo such change is due to movement; the game is not 
predicated on statically pre-positioned formations. And be­
cause of the dynamism of the game's motion, the future 
within any game is uncertain; the enterprise of ultimate 
prediction of a game's movement is doomed to failure. 
The initiative that one takes to participate in a game 
springs from an intention to play. The willing player not 
only voluntarily makes the choice to play a game and accept 
its consequences, but also takes the chance that the 
"I-intend-to" may not be translatable into an "I-am-able-to." 
But in the attempt to achieve a goal of being an able-body, 
the player relies on his personal knowledge of skills which 
are guided toward success based upon the clues and per­
ceptions that emerge during the game's play. The skillful 
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player is at one with whatever objects, rules, or conditions 
frame that game. 
To be a games-player implies being a citizen of the 
world. The word citizen has to do with the word city; the 
word city also relates to the words civic and civil. Con­
sequently, to be a games-player also implies being civilized. 
The civilized games-player is "city-fied," which means, in 
the Greek sense, that a player takes seriously the responsi­
bility of contributing, by action, to the well-being of a 
polis. Also, what the civilized player finds out is that 
through dignified performance, enacted in the presence of 
others, reality unfolds. For within a games-polios, or space 
wherein people act together, appearances are authentic. 
Such authenticity discloses realities about people, nature, 
and the world. When people act together out of a common 
concern, committed to upholding certain traditions and 
rules, they find ways of fitting their perceptions into a 
web of relationships which are genuine. 
While games are played out under an element of contest, 
players continue to offer respect and courtesy to their 
opponents. In a way, the unspoken rules of a game--in other 
words, the etiquette of a game—are as important to the 
situation as are the written rules. For in upholding the 
etiquette of a game, a player acts out of respect for both 
the traditions of a game and all its players. Even though 
competition enters into a game, the play of it proceeds not 
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at the expense of others but because of others. While the 
element of agon is inherent in games, care must be taken by 
those responsible for game events to ensure that all players 
are accorded a dignity befitting the courage it takes to 
perform. 
The agonal impulse of "to-be-better-than" does not just 
mean winning for a player. Rather, at any moment in a game, 
something unexpected may happen, a player may at any time 
"be-better-than" he or she ever was before. Competition is 
as much concerned with the small moments of discovery and 
change as it is with a desire to win. This is the element 
of contest experienced at its fullest, that is, the awareness 
of doing something one has never done before. It is a kind 
of "ah-ha" moment, a moment of revelation, when something 
never before performed is accomplished. 
This embodied knowing is personal and connects the 
players of a game to past performances either of self-making 
or those of other players. Every breakthrough or new per­
formance is predicated upon a prior one. But this perfor­
mance is a whole new endeavor and is not simply a summative 
effect of putting together isolated bits from the past. 
What gives a game unity is that it relies on whole perfor­
mances, on the completion of skills in relation to rules, 
tools, people,and space. The game is not practice; it is 
not played out by isolating parts from other parts. Rather, 
there is a drive toward unity which players undertake as 
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they seek a comprehension of the total activity. Each game 
represents a unified whole endeavor, complete with a be­
ginning and an end; and during its play, performers seek for 
their own unified effort to be fulfilled. There is a cer­
tain rhythm and harmony to a game, and, when well-played, 
both a grace and beauty of movement dignify its players. 
Game is connected to the real world. While its re­
lation to the divine or to the cosmos has been diminished 
in contemporary times, there is still a transcendent or 
soaring quality about the game. While games root bodies to 
the earth, at the same time, the characteristic of ecstasy 
prevails in a game. Through the game, people become linked 
to one another, to certain objects, and to a world. The 
history of games suggests that players have believed in a 
connection of their play to something beyond the self. And 
contemporary approaches to games still aspire for the attain­
ment of something which is beyond the self. 
One connection beyond the self is the link with others, 
the covenanting or pledging with others to abide by a set of 
rules for the sake of what may be achieved. People become 
responsible to one another not to break their promise of 
accepting the rules. The connection of game to the world is 
made by embodied beings who are placed inside traditions 
when they take up a game. There is the responsibility to 
uphold what is integral to a game and preserve it for others 
within their culture. The connections which are beyond the 
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self to, for example, earth, other people, past, future, 
culture, and traditions, keep the game linked to the realm 
of human affairs by assuring that the game does not serve 
the interests of one person or one group alone. 
Myths of games suggest connections to things and beings 
of another realm. This remains viable even in a world where 
secularization and atomization form contemporary approaches 
for knowing and doing. Games have an internal cohesiveness 
and also connect to a larger realm which considers people 
in action together to be significant. There is a unity 
within a contested game and because of its constitution 
people always enjoy the possibility of experiencing some­
thing new while playing. :-.v 
Games, essentially, remain simple in form and imple­
ments. Each game is a coherent whole, a complete structure 
among many other games. All games are connected in the 
larger realm of human affairs to those similar kinds of 
endeavors which take performance to be of value and meaning­
ful. The whole realm of such affairs, which considers 
action to be important, provides the conditions for entering 
the world of appearances in human ways. People join a game 
on equal terms with others at the outset, and all have the 
chance of finding out who they are because of their actions 
together. 
The community of people who join in games authorize 
some of its members to teach others game skills and to pass 
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on traditions of the game. By demonstrating a mastery of 
what game is, a person comes to dwell in a game and thereby 
has the authority to demonstrate it to others. One such 
person is the physical education teacher. The responsibility 
of knowing games and demonstrating their various forms is 
assumed by the teacher in recognition of why games are an 
important, imaginative enterprise, and why they must be 
passed on to others. A physical education teacher believes 
in the primacy of action, performance, skills, practice and 
perceptions. These teachers help people to realize their 
capacity for the "I-am-able" experiences. The teacher of 
physical education embodies personal knowledge and offers 
to others the possibility of indwelling in the kinds of dis­
covery which games offer. 
The game is unique and proves the setting wherein 
people act together and yet strive to stand out. The body 
says something by virtue of its ability to move skillfully 
in competition with others in a game. The person tells 
others who he or she is in personal performance. The game 
produces nothing other than these performances, and is taken 
up willingly because of this. Games begin, go on, and end 
according to rules and special sets of configurations of 
skills, tools, space, time, and other people. Each game has 
a unity unto itself; each game has an element of contest 
which challenges people to risk personal display in order 
"to-be-better-than." Although tension is felt, there is 
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enjoyment in playing a game. People might do things they've 
never done before within a game, and, in so doing, become 
transformed by the experience. They reveal to themselves 
through others a bit more about who they are. There is an 
intensity about players engaged in a game, and yet, there is 
a quality of zest and exuberance which often marks their 
play. Ambiguity and uncertainty must be embraced in a game. 
The body is rooted in paradox, and moving bodies and ob­
jects intensify the unpredictable nature of both the game 
and its players. 
The language which describes the game is pregnant with 
meaning. But interpretation of the words of game must be 
made carefully before extending -game language into other 
realms of human affairs. Particular caution must be exer­
cised around the word contest. While this is a key word for 
understanding game, it is also the word which has suffered 
the most misuse. The problem of competition is a contempo­
rary one for games; the problem of action is an ancient one. 
These and other difficult matters have plagued attempts to 
understand games. For the implications and consequences of 
these problems, an effort will be made to uncover the 
pressures which push and pull against the integrity of games. 
Critical Problems 
The difficulty in seeing the rightful shape of game is 
due to a number of factors. Many of these have been alluded 
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to during the course of the inquiry, and their effect has 
been felt in attempting to determine just what is the right­
ful shape and status of game. At the point where the myth 
of game begins, at least in Western civilization, so too do 
the problems. What follows is a critical look at some of 
the difficulties which surround game as it has developed 
particularly in Western cultures. 
The paradigm of the human condition of the game is one 
of interpretation. Woven into this interpretive design are 
concepts about what it means to be human as presented 
earlier in the discussion by a number of contemporary phi­
losophers. Games have been interpreted through stories and 
language usage. What is problematic for both strands of the 
design, namely, game and the human condition, is the body 
and the status of action. The body in movement, acting 
willingly, has posed difficulties for the philosophers of 
Western civilization from the days of antiquity to the 
present. 
The conceptual separation of mind-body-soul within 
Greek philosophical thought has "progressed" to the contem­
porary radical split of mind from body. The moving and 
excited person destroys the stillness and quiet character 
assigned to the contemplative. Thinking about pure form and 
ideas is not possible when the body is agitating to do some­
thing. And since it is the clarity of ideas which has been 
placed above the unpredictable and zesty movement of the 
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body, the status of action finds itself relegated to a 
secondary position at best. 
What may have superseded action in the contemporary 
world is the importance assigned to the fabrication of 
goods, the ability to produce a material end-result. To be 
sure, there is no material result of genuine action. The 
work of completing and providing an actual product for use 
or consumption may have crept above action, second only to, 
and possibly even challenging the old superiority of, con­
templation. What seem to be, in a sense, futile, unneces­
sary, or immaterial performances are being diminished in 
value. If game can be placed in the realm of such action, 
of non-productive ends, it too ;falls under the confusion 
surrounding the status of deeds that yield nothing other than 
the possibility of revelation through performance. 
The split between body and mind, or action and contem­
plation, has been further exacerbated by the ensuing dis­
trust of what sense experience can reveal. How we fit into 
the given world of others, objects, and nature has come to 
be doubted if the reality of such disclosure is left to 
sense perception. Part of this doubt stems from the increas­
ing level of instrumentation and statistical data which con­
figure the world in such a way as to "prove" the senses 
inaccurate. Instead of taking the arrangement of facts 
under a particular paradigm which sees things in one way, 
technological and mathematical approaches have been given 
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precedence in the declaration of what is to be taken as 
real. Since game employs neither statistics nor techo-
logical instrumentation during its play, and also encourages 
reliance on immediate sense perception for successful per­
formance, it occupies an increasingly perplexing position 
in the realm of human affairs. 
What has resulted because of these difficulties is a 
placement of the world of game in opposition to the world of 
labor. Game has taken refuge in the realm of leisure-time 
or social activities and has come to rely on the justifi­
cation given them as things to do when not producing things 
for use or consumption. Filling up spare time has afforded 
game a place and also has provided for numerous social and 
physiological theories which legitimate game. There are 
many reasons offered for why people do and should play games 
which are assumed to be opposite to work. Most of these 
reasons, however, are inaccurate. 
The inaccuracy of the value which has been ascribed to 
game has also resulted in the misuse of its metaphorical 
possibilities. Coupled with this inappropriate use of game 
language is its own internal word problem, since most 
literature lumps play-game-sport together as if all combi­
nations were possible. Game has been pulled linguistically 
out of shape and also suffers theoretically from its in­
clusion into every conceivable discipline of inquiry. 
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The attempt to justify game, to accord it a valued 
place, has been characterized by a drive which parallels the 
cause-effect and controlling nature of scientific method­
ologies. The aim of predictability is a futile one for 
game. The outcome is never known for sure in advance of its 
play; and the sheer fact of having bodies interact with 
other bodies presupposes an uncertainty within which the new 
can occur. To link game with people in a world of action 
which produces nothing and is filled by ambiguity suggests 
that its justification must lie outside the realm of neces­
sity or means-ends relationships. 
The paradoxical nature of game in which grave but merry 
people play becomes problematic* in a world striving for 
clarity, rationality, and logic. The many perspectives 
which result within the game setting stand in opposition to 
the aim of achieving clear objectives toward which all are 
striving in one way. The simple fact of contesting under­
mines uni-dimensional methods of play. And since the game 
is played by people who embody not only formality but also 
the unexplainable, the game is an act of personal knowing 
and doing and can rest easily upon that claim. Yet, in a 
world which likes to believe that the subjective can be 
separated from the objective, a dimension of action which 
manifests the personal can be suspect. 
What to connect game to is a problem of the status of 
action and the body. And yet, it seems that many people do 
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recognize that there is an importance about games. The 
translation of this importance suffers as the misunderstand­
ing of purposeful and personal doing continues. To link 
game to flesh, to earth, to the senses, to indwelled instru­
ments, is to move away from the realm of technology and away 
from a universe conquered by science, even though the struc­
ture of game is an artificial creation. 
Games are played in public. They begin at a point 
which takes all its players to be equal as to the conditions 
of its play. Games are played out among people who are open 
to judgment by others. Spectators may be present, pictures 
may be taken, records may be kept. Games are played among 
people who gather together outside of the private realm. 
There is no privacy in games and the light of the public 
world shines on its players so that many can see the action. 
The quiet and solitude of private contemplation are not 
present in the movement of games. People are tense and 
excited and all together in the game space. In a world 
where viable spaces for public appearances are either dis­
appearing or becoming merely social, and where the retreat 
to the safe, controllable private realm is encouraged, the 
game world stands as one of the few remaining public spaces 
for personal appearance. 
The community of games-players who respect a certain 
authority for the game's conduct and also take up a game's 
traditions willingly do so, in contemporary times, in light 
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of a fading belief in all three, namely, community, tradition, 
and authority. No one is coerced to play a game; it must be 
played among others; and many of the actions of games are 
based upon similar ones of many years past. 
In a time when promises are made in abundance and often 
just as quickly forgotten, games stand on the tradition of 
all people agreeing to play by the rules. To promise to one 
another is a form of pledging that to the best of one's 
ability, the game will be played honestly and according to 
its laws. One cannot forget in the game the promise made to 
others; for, if players break their promise either by cheat­
ing or by being "spoilsports," the game is destroyed. 
Within the bounds of a game, which are voluntarily ac­
cepted, a certain kind of freedom is experienced. This is 
not the freedom of breaking away to do whatever one pleases; 
rather, this is the freedom that comes because of limitations 
and the presence of others. To find out who one is by play­
ing with others in public in a game under contesting con­
ditions stands contrary to the kind of so-called freedom 
espoused through retreating into the solitude of one's own 
privacy or contemplation. 
Unfortunately, frivolity and the non-serious are 
characteristics which have been assigned to the game. Yet, 
what is re-presented in images which people take up through 
movement should not be underestimated in either seriousness 
or intensity. Some games encourage the taking on of roles 
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while others concentrate on seeking skilled performances 
through artificially made-up formations of people and ob­
jects. Whatever configurations find their way into a game 
in the way of skills, tools, or states of being, all have 
the capacity to reveal something about reality. A game is 
not a frivolous matter in the sense of suggesting something 
which is unimportant. A game is both serious and enjoyable, 
yet immaterial to the necessities of living. A game is 
about human action and encompasses a realm of uncertainty 
in which people performing together, yet under opposition, 
find out a lot more about themselves than they ever would in 
private. The discourse through movement, among others, is 
a way of communicating about oneself. And while the in­
terpretations of such revelation may be numerous, the sig­
nificance of the kinds of personal knowing revealed in 
performance cannot be underestimated for their value. 
The drive toward predictability, logic, and objectivity 
will never be achieved by playing a game. Means-ends re­
lationships do not constitute the stuff of games. When a 
whistle first blows, a clock first starts, or a score is 
first posted, the outcome and progress of a game is still in 
doubt. The times are not calm during the playing of games. 
There is always an uncertainty about playing a game because 
of the risk of revealing one's skills in relation to others. 
And yet a game is a telling time. Players tell what they 
know by skillfully moving, and very often they tell more 
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than they felt they knew. Performances always have the pos­
sibility of being the best ones ever given by a player. In 
order for this to happen, other people must be present so 
that the game can be played and the stories of it re-told 
after its ending. 
The problems of valuing action, intentional movement, 
and skillful performance are those faced by the explorers 
of the significance of game. A world which values predict­
ability, material possessions, and logic cannot see the 
value of games in an appropriate way. The filling up of 
spare time is, for example, not the right way to see game. 
The statistics kept by the columns-ful are not the way to 
tell about performance. The vailue lies in the performance 
itself with no end-product other than skilled play and the 
story of that skilled play re-told. The preservation of 
games relies on the durability of its myths and not on the 
recitation of numbers. 
To find out about the why of things and of existence 
must take place through speech and deeds among others. 
Retreating to privacy or making contrived social appearances 
will not tell us much about nature, the world, or the 
world's people. In order to think about what we do, to 
experience the calm of personal reflection, we must be com­
mitted to doing something among others first. From these 
actions of communication we can then take the opportunity to 
contemplate what they mean. These actions are not mediated 
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by entrepreneurs; rather, they are direct, face-to-face, 
encounters among people in the light of the public domain. 
When human understanding pushes toward separating 
action from contemplation, will from freedom, and reason 
from imagination, it is not difficult to comprehend why the 
game stands in a problematic place. For, in effect, play­
ing has a lot to do with each of the so-called polar points 
of such separations. When knowledge is valued for its explicit-
ness and its predictability, it is easy to see why compre­
hending the meaning of a game poses a problem—not least be­
cause of its reliance upon ambiguous bodies moving in an 
uncertain setting. When being private is considered the way 
to be free, the public playing of games in the company of 
others becomes circumspect as a mode for freedom. When the 
language of game is reduced to competitive productivity over 
and against others, the metaphoric value of the game world 
suffers inappropriate forms of usage. How the game rises 
above the problems of a contemporary world to claim its 
valid and rightful position is a difficult matter, and is 
made more difficult as the usurping effect of highly 
organized sport, in particular, takes hold. 
If game was the last stop in a configuring of com­
petitive performance, the problems would still be present 
as judgmental ones. But when the productive and consumptive 
realm of sport becomes the predominant model for the place­
ment of skillful performance against and at the expense of 
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others, game faces the predicament of trying to hold onto 
a valid position, particularly in terms of competition, in 
spite of the powerful pull from sport. The problem sport 
must confront is with its product; goods are made, consumed 
or used up, and disappear. Sport, because of its consumable 
products, runs the risk of its own disappearance. Game, if 
it follows the sport model, will also meet the possibility 
of being lost to culture, because the genuinely unrepeatable, 
yet memorable, actions of individuals within a game will 
give way to the predictable and repetitive needs of the 
masses of producers and consumers of sport. So, not only 
does game face the problems assigned to the status of the 
body in action, it also confronts the difficulty of how to 
respond to the strength of its seemingly close neighbor, 
sport. 
What has been presented in this chapter is an interpre­
tation of game and its play by persons. The problems that 
confront such a configuration of bodies in action within 
structure were then posed. Neither of the two sections 
within this chapter is intended to be the final word. 
Answers to questions and solutions to problems are tentative, 
and are offered in a spirit which invites further response. 
The matters for discussion within this inquiry are both 
complicated and perplexing. Yet games continue to be im­
portant; people say something when they are engaged in them. 
Together, people experience in public and in common what it 
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means to reveal their humanity by playing a game. Such 
humanity is marked by communication, transformation, and 
personal knowing. Game is only one mode which provides for 
such a human appearance; and each game is but a tiny whole 
in the entire realm of human affairs. Nevertheless, im­
portant things happen to people because of people and the 
game structure together, and this importance cannot be under­
estimated for its potential significance to persons. 
The end of this study is now in sight. The final chap­
ter will not provide absolute conclusions about the topic of 
game or the human condition or their joint enterprise. The 
movement toward finishing this inquiry is made with full 
awareness that many questions will continue to haunt the 
reader. A movement will be made, however, toward suggesting 
some implications which might be drawn from an investigation 
such as this. 
NOTES 
Kennedy, p. 6. 
CHAPTER V 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The mark of true discovery is not its fruitful-
ness but the intimation of fruitfulness.1 
What Michael Polanyi alludes to in this quotation is 
applicable to a study even as small as this one. The fruit-
fulness of an inquiry such as this lies not so much in pro­
viding complete answers to questions as identifying and 
pursuing intimations of directions to be taken for a deeper 
exploration and understanding of games. The recovery of 
game through myth and under the aegis of language has taken 
place by drawing from a number of disciplines, namely, 
politics, science, poetry, and philosophy. Throughout the 
inquiry,game has revealed aspects of its structure and its 
play not often recognized. 
Understanding the game as a contest and as a method of 
personal knowing, based upon skilled performances by persons 
in action with others, has been the fundamental focus of 
this study. The preservation of the game through its 
stories and conditions gives it significant status as a 
cultural activity. The limits of the game, which people ac­
cept voluntarily, make possible a kind of freedom for its 
participants. This paradoxical relation of limitation to 
freedom nonetheless allows the game to become a context 
210 
where people can appear as distinctly human selves. 
The game, which is non-productive, yet taken up in 
earnest and filled with intense agon, enables persons to 
stand out from others by virtue of their skill. The per­
formances given in public by players are marked by pledging 
to abide by the rules and conditions of the game in order 
to achieve distinction. The revelation that "one can do' 
and 'do well,1 comes about because of and in the challenging 
yet convivial presence of others. The dynamic interaction 
of doing and knowing begins with deeds and words of communi­
cation. The type of communication exhibited by skillful 
performance in the confines of a game is characterized by 
the personal will to succeed. ;The combination of these 
characteristics makes the game structure unique in the realm 
of human affairs. 
In speaking of the content of public life, Hannah 
Arendt claims that all too often, 
We remain unaware of the joy and gratification 
that arise out of being in company with our peers, 
out of acting together and appearing in public, 
out of inserting ourselves into the world by word 
and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our per­
sonal identity. ... It is only by respecting 
its own borders that this realm, where we are free 
to act and to change, can remain intact, preserving 
its integrity and keeping its promise.2 
The notions of freedom because of limits, and identity be­
cause of others are embodied concretely within the realm of 
a game. By preserving the integrity of game structures, 
people transmit games from one generation to the next, 
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thereby providing durable forms for culture. It is only 
when games are used to meet the demands of productivity or 
necessity that they risk being consumed by society rather 
than being preserved for culture. 
In speaking of play as a basis of culture, Johan 
Huizinga says, "For many years the conviction has grown upon 
me that civilization arises and unfolds in and as play." 
What Huizinga and others see in the playing of a game is a 
paradigm for the durability and preservation of the world. 
The forms of play which have survived link people to con­
cerns beyond those of self. Games have survived for cen­
turies in cultures due to the effort to preserve rather than 
to consume. Arendt maintains, "We understand by culture . . . 
the mode of intercourse prescribed by civilizations with 
respect to the least useful and most worldly of things, the 
works of artists, poets, musicians, philosophers, and so 
4 forth." The "and so forth" must include the realm of game 
as a worldly structure, and the mode of intercourse within 
the game is the skillful playing among people. 
Concerning skillful playing, Michael Polanyi believes 
that achievement in performance is also a paradigm for know­
ing. Knowing and doing are joined through the enterprise of 
skillful action. Polanyi contends: 
It would seem that we can move our body only in­
directly by thrusting forward our imagination 
which then evokes subsidiarily the means of its 
own implementation. . . . The cyclist's striving 
imagination, which has discovered within a few 
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weeks a whole tacit system of balancing, may well 
be credited with the performance of instantly 
reapplying this system to the new conditions.5 
The whole game, including the performances which occur 
within it, represents a model for personal knowing. It is 
a totality of order and coherence of a particular sort, 
never fully explainable or predictable. The whole game 
exists because of its traditions, its reliance on authorized 
teachers, and its display of practiced skills within a com­
munity of players. 
Acts of skilled performance are guided by the imagi­
nation. The forms of games are humanly constructed and 
imaginatively dwelled in during play. The particular 
systems of numbers, objects, and rules made up by people and 
then voluntarily taken up by them, represent the imagination 
at work within any game. The joining of body and mind in 
willful action, the judging of performances and thinking 
about their meaning, find a unity in the setting of the 
game, before, during, and after its play. Elizabeth Sewell 
says that, "The contemporary imagination will not be healed 
or recover its freedom until it restores to life the Body-
g 
Mind relationship. 11 The game is one form where the action 
of joining body and mind occurs, relying as it does on the 
imaginative effort of dwelling in skills, objects, rules and 
performances. 
Within the game we have discovered a method for coming 
to understand sets of relationships made and then lived in 
213 
by persons voluntarily and willingly, as well as a model for 
the creation of a coherent structure of boundaries within 
which people find a certain kind of satisfaction and free­
dom. While played under a strict set of rules, and as a 
contest, the game is never fully predictable, and always 
retains the capacity to surprise its players and spectators. 
The "never-before-done" is always a possibility for the 
games-player due to the number of configurations offered 
within a game setting and the variety of responses which 
have not yet ever been attempted. 
This imaginative union of body-mind with objects, rules, 
skills, and people is easily seen in the play of children. 
Children become trains, snakes,1 waves, and trees in their 
games. Likewise, in adult games there is an embodied and 
trusted connection to the game and its configurations. This 
is not the result of a machine-like or habituated kind of 
behavior. Rather, it is a mature kind of indwelling which 
is made possible by games. Merleau-Ponty describes this in­
dwelling as a blending: 
There is a human body where, between the seeing 
and the seen, between touching and the touched, 
between one eye and the other, between hand and 
hand, a blending of some sort takes place. "7 
The blending of people and things in a game takes place as 
human beings, caught up in the intensity of playing, give 
full attention to expressions of the self and to receiving 
the expressions of others through performance. 
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To do something well, and then to extend it toward new 
areas of discovery, is possible every time a game begins. 
Because this is so, the game haunts its players and beckons 
them to attempt new performances. Even a seemingly in­
significant moment in a game may be the occasion for a 
player's intense striving and seIf-investment. One well-
placed drive or one crisply hit serve might be enough to 
draw a player back into the charmed circle of a game again 
and again. Both the mystery and the manner of the game, the 
tacit and the explicit, work in tandem for a player. To­
gether, the explainable and the uncertain, press a player to 
be as good as he or she can be. 
In spite of—perhaps even because of—the problems 
posed by games, they weave an alluring web for the partici­
pants. If new generations of participants are to experience 
the intrinsic integrity and inherent values of the game as 
disclosed in this study, the game must withstand the chal­
lenges of highly organized sport. Sport has its own place 
in the social world, where players are producers for spec­
tators who are consumers. But games must preserve for 
public endeavor the common striving toward excellence in 
performance with no other result than the action itself. 
The integrity of the world, not just games, depends on pre­
serving domains wherein human affairs, though frail and un­
certain at times, can be conducted apart from the drive 
toward predictable means-end relationships. 
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In contemporary Western society, game has been placed 
opposite work as a way to fill up spare time. It has also 
been placed alongside sport as if it were natural kin. Both 
relationships are problematic for the game. How the prob­
lems are resolved is, in part, a responsibility for those 
who teach games to others. As one who has the authority to 
pass on the skills and traditions of games, the physical 
education teacher, for example, must recognize and attempt 
to untangle the problems posed by sport and leisure-time 
activities in relation to meanings which are appropriate to 
the unique human activities provided by games. 
This study has attempted to understand the game from 
the standpoint of its relation to the human condition. The 
methodology of the inquiry has unfolded during the course of 
the investigation and has disclosed its own particular shape 
which, it is hoped, has followed the contours of the material 
presented. The movement has been from textual interpreta­
tion to a joining of ideas into a coherent understanding of 
both the game and the human condition. The human condition 
of the game emerged as a unified and plausible idea both be­
cause of the nature of the phenomena and because of a 
methodology which has encouraged a union of ideas rather than 
the separation of findings into bits of information. 
This study has purposely worked with general areas of 
concern rather than reducing such large patterns to their 
smallest components. Wherever particulars have been 
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presented in this study, an attempt has been made to relate 
them to a larger, fuller perspective. It is on this whole 
presentation that the central meaning of this inquiry 
rests. 
The plurality of perspectives generated within a com­
munity of investigators committed to revealing what is, pro­
vides for researchers such as myself the context for con­
structing another perspective about the reality of certain 
phenomena. This diversity of view is encouraging and needs 
to be encouraged, for it is within multiplicity and 
plurality that the real world exists. There is a level of 
uncertainty about all truths; every layer of truth uncovered 
reveals another stratum to be further explored. Methods for 
uncovering what is actually there proceed in many ways and 
from many perspectives. Those involved in science, mathe­
matics, poetry, architecture, art, physical education, 
anthropology and the like seek to discover the truth of 
their concerns. 
A fresh way of seeing something has the power to trans­
form understandings of issues. Investigations of phenomena 
which offer renewed interpretations of things can help people 
to see another layer of meaning concerning what they do and 
why they do it. The heuristic surge to find out about things 
and self characterizes human exploration. Methods for satis­
fying the desire to know are varied, to be sure, but all are 
upheld by personal commitment and competencies. People 
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select problems and methods for researching them based upon 
personal interests and skills. As Polanyi pointsout, this 
is the way knowledge moves, through personal commitment to 
uncover what is, and by selecting methods which best suit 
the problem and the skills of the researcher. 
A hermeneutic method which has utilized phenomeno-
logical approaches has been used in this study, based upon 
interests, skills, and the nature of the matter explored. 
It is hoped that the interpretations revealed throughout 
the study can result in other people looking at the phenomenon 
of game in a different way. 
A game is a space where persons can appear to each 
other as themselves. Yet, a game is not everything; there 
are many limitations within a game, and at some point people 
must stop playing games. But while the game goes on, im­
portant things happen to people because people are acting. 
Game faces problems which are both old and contemporary 
in nature. The future of the game rests on the integrity of 
its structure as well as the recognition of this integrity 
by its participants. Games have survived for centuries and 
continue to draw people to their play. People who take up 
the responsibility for preserving the meaning and significance 
of a game must do so with insight into what a game can be for 
people. It is possible that a study such as this can pro­
vide a greater understanding of the importance of the game, 
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as well as how and why people conduct themselves within it 
and on its behalf. 
The Game is ascent and descent. Advance and with­
drawal. . . . The Game 'asks' to be played. . . . 
Belief, feeling, thought and action intermix. . . . 
Beginnings, ends and fresh beginnings come to­
gether again. . . . The Game is not definitive, 
it is not the last word. ... It remains . . . 
the undivulged, the impracticable. It plays with 
us, impels us toward action. . . . The wandering 
truths of the world and the true wanderings of 
man confront each other and compose this game.8 
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